Writing Requirement Bibliographies

Advanced Strategic Education Program
(Basic Course)
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I. **General Resources**
      i. Table of Contents
         1. Section 2: Addressing Army Capabilities [most pertinent section for this research topic]
            a. Will Technology be an Advantage or a Vulnerability for the U.S. Army in 2025
            b. Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
            c. STEM Impact on Army Warfighting Challenges and Manpower
            d. Robotics and Artificial Intelligence Come of Age: Military Implications
            e. Seizing Objective 2040: Develop a Single Synthetic Training Environment
            f. Simulation: The Remedy to Future Joint Force Readiness and Leader Development
      i. “Much of the future-looking discussion in national security circles today focuses on autonomous systems and cyber weapons. Largely missing from this discussion is a place for humans on the battlefield. Do today’s emerging and potentially disruptive technologies mean that humans will no longer be important in future warfare? A look at historical military operations and current technologies suggests the proper response is that, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of man’s obsolescence have been exaggerated.”
      i. “The United States can no longer take for granted its decisive technological superiority. The battle to sustain and enhance the US military’s technological superiority has begun.”
   d. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (Fall 2016) [Open Access]
         1. “Are artificial intelligence, genetic modification, and human enhancement taboo? Our adversaries may not think so. Should we let imagination lead the way into the future or be stymied by our fears?”
         1. “Social and behavioral sciences are increasingly converging with basic physical science leaving us to ponder important questions about the nature and limits of the human being in relation to the machine.”

1. “BMI is a technology with enormous potential that deserves more attention, resourcing, and development. While it is not generally accessible today, technologists, ethicists, and the public should consider its implications now.”


1. “Increasing knowledge of genetics and cellular function, coupled with increases in computing power, is allowing development of novel, highly targeted treatments for all manners of disease and injury. However, every new treatment also represents a potential new lethal weapon.”


1. “Science and technology will continue to drive potentially dangerous technologies such as biotechnology, directed energy, and nanotechnology. Threats from nations, groups, and individuals must be deterred by new thinking.”


1. “For additive manufacturing to be considered a "game changing technology", increases in functionality of the fundamental building block materials and printer configurations is needed to enable the most revolutionary applications.”


1. “The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) investigates future force structures including critical breakthrough technologies in disaggregated capabilities, hypersonic strike weapons, and directed energy.”

II. **Drones**


i. “'The Drone Revolution Revisited' offers a guide to the evolving ecosystem of unmanned systems technologies as it stands in 2016, and reflects the ways in which the technology has evolved and matured over the past seven years since the publication of ‘Wired for War’ [by Peter W. Singer]. The research produced by our students served as the basis for Chapter I, which consists of portraits of 30 systems that Singer presented as the harbingers of the drone revolution. Some of the systems—for example, the U.S. Navy’s MQ-8 Fire Scout—have grown into large multi-billion dollar military acquisition programs, while other systems that seemed promising, such as the Boston Dynamics BigDog or the Foster Miller SWORDS, have fizzled. Of these 30 systems, 13 are active or deployed, three remain in development, and 14 have been cancelled or are inactive. By revisiting these
systems, we have sought to update, expand upon, and interrogate Singer’s 2009 portrait of the drone revolution.”


i. “Armed non-state actors are increasingly employing ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ (COTS) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to support combat operations. A wide range of these systems have been employed in recent years in conflict zones of the Middle East, North Africa, and Ukraine. The popularity of small UAVs has increased dramatically as they have become widely available for commercial and consumer use, with global sales of civilian unmanned aerial systems expected to approach $5 billion USD in 2021.

These otherwise innocuous systems can provide armed groups with unique capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions and are sometimes modified for direct offensive use when converted to carry improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other arms and munitions. The booming civilian market for COTS small UAVs has made it easy for groups such as the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Saraya al-Khorasani to support combat operations with UAV technology. ‘ARES Special Report No. 2 Emerging Unmanned Threats’ is a thorough analysis of current trends and developments in COTS UAVs, as well as specifically examining the use of these technologies by non-state armed groups in various conflict zones, and discussing some of the measures developed to counter this threat.”

III. **Autonomous Weapons**


i. “In this working paper, 20YY Warfare Initiative Director Paul Scharre and Adjunct Senior Fellow Michael Horowitz discuss future military systems incorporating greater autonomy. The intent of the paper is to help clarify, as a prerequisite to examining legal, moral, ethical and policy issues, what an autonomous weapon is, how autonomy is already used, and what might be different about increased autonomy in the future.”


i. “CNAS Senior Fellow Paul Scharre has written a new report, ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk.’ The report, which is a part of the CNAS Ethical Autonomy Project, examines the risks in future autonomous weapons that would choose their own targets and the potential for catastrophic accidents.”

IV. **Quantum Computing**

i. Note: This is a particularly relevant article as a Chinese quantum satellite recently teleported a partial for the first time. This is a breakthrough in quantum communications.

ii. “Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, former director of the National Security Agency, once wrote, ‘Important as it is in peacetime, communications security becomes even more important in wartime.’ For a few decades, nations have been relying on encryption systems to protect a wide variety of computerized transmissions ranging from commerce to government to military communications. While today’s encryption systems are considered reasonably secure, the possibilities of quantum cryptography and quantum computing offer a whole new dimension and threat to computerized secrecy.

China is among a growing number of countries seeking to unlock the science of quantum cryptography and computing, which many experts believe will one day revolutionize computerized security. With China’s ongoing push to modernize its military and advancing to become a global innovative force, success in this area could materialize into an enormous economic and military advantage.

This article examines the significance of these technologies, China’s progress in quantum communication and quantum computing, and the consequences for the United States and other nations should the Middle Kingdom acquire a real capability in this science. It is an area that U.S. analysts will need to follow closely in the coming months and years.”

V. Hypersonic Weapons


i. “The field of hypersonics is an important emerging area of applied science and technology in the 21st century which holds great potential both to protect Americans from a wide range of threats, or in the wrong hands, could endanger the United States and its deployed forces around the world.

In an era of constrained defense budgets and increasing modernization needs, it is understandable any new concept requiring taxpayer investment must be rigorously examined. After discussions with a variety of decision makers in government and the defense community, we believe present and emerging security requirements call for a clear understanding of what this technology could entail for our national defense, by addressing the following questions:

• What is hypersonic technology?
• Why is this technology important now?
• How can it benefit the United States, its allies, and partners?
• What is a reasonable path forward to realize these benefits?

The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies is an independent, nonprofit research and analysis organization founded by the Air Force Association, which has advocated for aerospace power in defense of our nation since its incorporation in 1946. This paper does not advocate specific programs or industrial initiatives, in keeping with this tradition. In this study, we aim to reveal the value of hypersonics,
evaluate the field’s import for our defense, and propose a focused way ahead to realize success.”
Modular Force and Critical Force Structure Issues

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I. Strategic Research Projects
      i. “An option to build landpower for the United States Army in the 21st Century, in austere budget environments, is to glean insights from the practices of the Roman Army. During the Republican and early Imperial periods, the Romans used non-citizen soldiers in the Roman Army. Combined with the traditions and legacy of the U.S. Army and its own history of employing non-citizen troops as allies and within its own formations could result in a more affordable approach to providing land forces.”
      i. “Operating in the grim 2014 fiscal environment, DoD strategic leaders are challenged to reduce the budget while retaining balance across military readiness, force structure, and modernization. Yet modernization has proven to be a double-edged sword. Despite delivering highly effective combat capability, complex new weapon systems are failing to meet reliability requirements driving higher life-cycle costs. Thus today’s modernization creates tomorrow’s operations and support budget dilemma. Sustainable modernization requires acquisition strategies to produce new capabilities which meet reliability requirements. To close the reliability gap, strategic engagement is required earlier in modernization to correct the cultural bias that favors effectiveness over reliability resulting in unacceptable long-term sustainment costs. Early strategic influence must create cultural change to set the conditions for existing reliability reforms to succeed. The paper provides four principles to guide strategic leaders in embedding modernization culture change. If strategic leaders do not correct modernization culture biases, unreliability will extend the gale force winds swirling the military into a budgetary perpetual perfect storm.”
      i. “In 2005-2007, when the U.S. Army restructured to a modular force, the Department of the Army also transformed the theater-level commands, known as Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), to a more capable headquarters and staff while adding certain subordinate, theater-enabling functions, as required by geographic region. With these changes, the geographical ASCCs transformed to theater army headquarters, but neither ASCCs nor theater armies are well understood by most in the U.S. Army. Adding to the confusion and misunderstanding, each theater is unique; therefore, the ASCCs are structured differently to meet the demands of a particular theater and Geographical Combatant Command. It is important to understand the roles and responsibilities of an ASCC and what are the differences compared to a theater army headquarters. Why do ASCCs exist? This will help to identify the challenges and organization
Modular Force and Critical Force Structure Issues

shortfalls that still must be overcome to fully operate as a theater army headquarters.”

  i. “Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military must adjust to meet anticipated and directed threats to U.S. national security. The active component of the U.S. Army is addressing these issues by building a more expeditionary, modular force, capable of projecting power with a rapid response. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey directed a review on transitioning the U.S. Army Reserves and National Guard into an operational forces, while the U.S. is engaged in two major conflicts and preparing for cuts to the military budget. Historically, discussions on dealing with the current and future threats with a limited budget and an adaptive global enemy do not appeal when the discussion pertains to force restructuring. Currently, one of the areas under review is the U.S. Army’s approach to enterprise management and the alleviation of duplicated missions. Secretary Gates proposed the elimination of Joint Forces Command, a reduction of this one headquarters will save the U.S. roughly $230 million dollars a year. Another area of duplication is within the U.S. Army’s Reserve Components, where both the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves reside. The question is why does the Army maintain two Reserve Components and should the nation combine this force into one?”

  i. “Over the last decade, the Army experienced many changes while fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The more transformative changes were demands placed on Soldiers and leaders to resource the war effort, introduction of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and reorganizing operational units to a modular force structure. These changes created demands on personnel and leader development systems. As a shortage career field, junior logistics officers in Ordnance, Transportation and Quartermaster were particularly stressed as Army requirements outpaced its inventory of junior logistics officers. Challenges such as missed opportunities for broadening assignments, fragmented command relationships, disjointed unit deployments, multiple "in-lieu of" missions and filling MiTT requirements disrupted normal professional development timelines. As stewards of the Army, senior leaders should understand that junior officers had different developmental experiences. Although battle hardened, junior logistics officers may require guidance transitioning to garrison operations and expect senior leaders to balance opportunities for education, training and broadening experiences outside the Army to prepare them for senior leader positions in the future.”

  i. “In the fall of 2003, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker ordered the U.S. Army, to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. Under the lead of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Modular Force and Critical Force Structure Issues

Command (TRADOC), General Schoomaker directed the conversion to be swift and to not utilize the Army's more deliberate force development methods. At the heart of the brigade-based structure, the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), (Heavy, Infantry and Stryker), would drive the transformation efforts and would answer the continual call as the decisive combat element on the modern battlefield. Supporting these BCTs were five doctrinally identified modular support brigades: Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Fires Brigade, Combat Aviation Brigade, Sustainment Brigade and Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. As the support brigades evolved they would begin to demonstrate their relevance in the modular force. It is the evolution of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, its demonstration of relevance and its quest for legitimacy that serves as the focus of this Strategic Research Project.

II. Other USAWC Publications
      i. “The Army’s force posture is out of balance, with a greater percentage of troops stationed in the United States than at any time since the late 1940s. This has forced an over-reliance on lengthy, continuous rotational deployments to achieve deterrence and assurance in theaters such as northeast Asia and Europe. This finding is based on a 9-month study assessing the costs and benefits of rotational deployments and forward stationing. The analysis reveals that in terms of fiscal cost, training readiness, morale and family readiness, and diplomatic factors, the United States could likely achieve deterrence and assurance objectives more efficiently and more effectively with increased forward stationing. The recommendations address what kinds of units would be best suited for forward stationing, where forward stationing would be most efficacious, and how the Department of Defense should go about rebalancing Army force posture.”
   
      i. “Facing the realities of fiscal constraints that will require force reductions while the world remains a volatile and dangerous place, defense documents and Army policies are full of terms like ‘reversibility’ and ‘expansibility’ to explain how the smaller service will be able to deal with major contingencies. However, those terms are rarely if ever clearly defined. There is an obvious assumption that the Army will be able to conduct major wars. A detailed analysis of those situations reveals that the capacity for growth was based upon institutions and practices that no longer exist or are extremely degraded, bringing into question the viability of the concept. With the demise of the draft and significant reductions in both the industrial and training bases, the bulk of assets for growing active forces will have to come from the Reserve Components, a course of action generally avoided in the past.”

III. Other

i. “In 2003, the U.S. Army began implementing a set of ambitious changes to its force structure to address the challenges of waging war and conducting extended stabilization operations. It has done this while engaged in a multiple-theater war. One of the changes involved transforming the Army from its traditional, division-based force into a brigade-based force, a concept that has come to be known as ‘modularity.’ Although it was the proximate focus of this study, this move was not made in isolation. It was accompanied by two other force structure change initiatives and a major force management change initiative, all of which were roughly concurrent. The first force structure change was to ‘grow the Army’ by raising end strength, thereby allowing the Army to add units. The second was to rebalance the force, moving some supporting capabilities from the reserve component to the active component. The aim was to bring the reserve component force structure into closer alignment with that of the active component. This rebalancing also moved more manpower into the tactical part of the Army and reduced the size of the institutional Army—the sustaining base—to an unprecedented low percentage of the total Army. The major force change initiative occurred in 2006, when the Army Force Generation process moved the Army from a tiered readiness to a cyclical readiness model. Given the near-simultaneity of these events, it is not surprising that their effects have become inextricably entangled, limiting the ability to isolate cause from effect. Congress directed this study to determine whether, by converting to a modular force, the Army has improved its capabilities.

In the move to the brigade-centric force structure, or modularity, the Army replaced its division-centric force structure with a force whose constituent building blocks are brigades and brigade combat teams (BCTs). BCTs were rebuilt by making proportionate combat, combat support, and combat service support, formerly provided by the host division, organic to the BCTs’ organization. In the process, the Army reduced the number of combat brigade types in its force structure, from some 17 individual types to three: infantry BCTs, heavy BCTs, and Stryker BCTs. The move to modularity provided the Army with a greater number of smaller, very capable force packages, making it easier to sustain the protracted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combat support and combat service support units and force structure were also redesigned to make the entire force more modular. However, the focus of this report is on the combat arms portion of the force structure and its operational command-and-control capabilities (or operational headquarters capabilities).”
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I. National Commission on the Future of the Army (US)
      i. “In light of the projected security environment, conduct a comprehensive study of the roles and structure of the Army, and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Army, in order to:
         - Make an assessment of the size and force mixture of the active component of the Army and the reserve components of the Army.
         - Make recommendations on the modifications, if any, of the structure of the Army related to current and anticipated mission requirements for the Army at acceptable levels of national risk and in a manner consistent with available resources and anticipated future resources.
         - Make an assessment of proposed AH-64 transfers from Army National Guard to the Regular Army.”
   b. Andrew Hill, “Ignoring the Army’s Recent Past Will Not Help it Win Future Wars” *War on the Rocks* (February 2, 2016) Open Access
      i. “The Future of the Army report is part of a broader pattern of a denial of the significance and relevance of the Army’s recent experiences.”

II. Parameters
      i. “By recognizing practices that amplified sectarian tension during the surge, military and government leaders can more effectively manage future conflicts. Paying tribes to fight alongside coalition forces yielded short-term benefits that caused long-term problems. When the surge—and the cash payments—stopped, dissension reemerged. Ignorance of local culture as well as insufficient consultation and ineffective communication with the populace prevented authentic coalitions from forming. Inattention to the incompatible goals of various ethnosectarian populations perpetuated conflict. Tolerating a national government that perpetuates societal divisions and sectarian discrimination prevents the long-term reconciliation necessary for a stable state.

      The following strategies conversely reduce sectarian tension. Military intervention must be coupled with efforts to increase official oversight, agency funding, and interagency communication. Collaboration between US personnel and the nascent state’s leaders must lead to strong governmental institutions that adequately reconcile sectarian divides. Host country personnel interactions with civilian and military trainers must occur across all levels of government to ensure adequate representation of the country’s citizens, including in its military forces. Cultural competency training for US troops must be completed prior to their participation in interventions. These changes will position American leaders to generate more positive outcomes in future interventions.
ASEP-B Suggested Organizational Climate and Senior Leadership Resources

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I. Strategy Research Projects
      i. “Senior leader misconduct in the U.S. Army erodes trust critical to inculcation of Mission Command and endangers its ability to act as a profession. I assert that the U.S. Army underestimates the impact of leader misconduct on internal trust in the force and external trust of the institution. In light of these challenges, the U.S. Army should conduct a psychological assessment and counseling at the Pre-Command Course for lieutenant colonels and colonels, to identify leaders at risk for future misconduct, including toxic leader behaviors. Leaders identified without prejudice, as ‘at risk,’ would be counseled and assisted by an U.S. Army psychologist to identify mitigating measures to reduce chances of future misconduct. Reducing levels of leader misconduct would strengthen trust internally, within the U.S. Army, and externally, with civilian leaders, and the American public. As the U.S. Army navigates an era characterized by reduced budgets and evolving roles, the foundation of trust will be vital to the implementation of Mission Command and maintaining the U.S. Army as a profession. The U.S. Army would be able to do so only if it restores the confidence and trust within the force, with civilian leadership, and the American public.”

      i. “The Army’s professional identity is critically important to maintain its legitimacy with the American people and to operate effectively in today’s morally ambiguous operational environment. In 2010 the Army embarked on a Campaign of Learning to assess the health and understanding of the Army Profession among its members after nearly a decade of conflict. While the renewed emphasis on the Army Profession raised overall awareness, implementation activities to date have failed to reach the audience and echelon most effective at fostering a professional identity and enduring commitment to the Army Ethic among Army Profession practitioners. Rather than continuing to develop more programs and activities at the strategic level the Army needs to focus on the organizational level, specifically the battalion command teams, as the best source to foster the Army Ethic in Army professionals.”

      i. “The mission appears simple: make the Army smaller after more than a decade of continued conflict, and prepare the Army and its leaders for contemporary war. Yet, while the Army has started laying out plans to rapidly reduce force structure, changes affect more than buildings, bases, and equipment. The human enterprise and specifically the Army’s leaders are a critical resource that must also undergo change. The Army has been in this position before and its actions during the post Vietnam and Gulf Wars are two examples from which the Army could glean valuable
leader development lessons that will aid in keeping the Army ready. This research project examines leader development actions and initiatives that proved decisive in previous eras of fiscal constraint, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to develop competent and committed leaders of character, and maintain the Army’s future competitive advantage.”

   i. “In the midst of significant transition, it is important that the Army reflects on what it has experienced over the last twelve years of combat and takes advantage of the opportunity to improve its ability to execute its core missions and meet its obligations. While there is much to be learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lessons in leadership have the greatest implication for enduring effects on and for the force. By understanding the origins of mission command and approaching its implementation from a perspective of changing organizational culture, the Army stands to reap benefits well beyond merely empowering subordinate leaders. More importantly, truly inculcating mission command will also serve as a catalyst to an even greater lesson that Army leaders must learn: the ability to dialogue within, across, and outside the Force, undeterred by the trepidation of speaking truth to power when presenting dissenting views, alternative perspectives, and potentially unpopular options.”

   i. “Character development is the starting point to build prototypical leaders committed to the Army’s enduring purpose and charter. As the Army envisions the Land Force of 2020, it must cultivate prototypical Army leaders to meet the indeterminate demands of the 21st Century. Within its current design and intended purpose, the Army leader development strategy lacks the approach necessary to develop professional prototypical leaders of character who are committed to the Army profession and strategic vision, and reflect institutional values. This paper surveys the Army’s archetypical development model as an instrument for professional growth, analyzes the need for committed prototypical leaders of character, and offers prescriptive and descriptive recommendations to the Army’s leader development strategy for senior leaders to consider as they continue to shape and influence leader character and institutional behavior. To meet the unique demands of the transnational security community, the Army must invest time, energy, and resources in character development across the institutional and operational domains of leadership.”

   i. “The Army has made mission command the cornerstone of its operations and leadership doctrine. Despite its inclusion in doctrine for more than 10 years, the Army still struggles to fully enact mission command. There are significant cultural barriers that drive this inability to realize the full potential of mission command. This
paper uses Kotter’s organizational change model and Schein’s methods of cultural change to analyze current Army culture and its level of misalignment with the precepts of mission command. From this analysis, it identifies cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to enable senior leaders to create and sustain needed change to fully embrace mission command. Army senior leaders, at multiple levels, must make mission command a focus area and provide role-modeling and coaching to their subordinates. The Army must incorporate mission command principles into its philosophies and creeds and continue to tell the story of why mission command is necessary for future success. Army systems, including performance evaluation, education, training and assignments must be modified to create culture change to better align leader development with mission command.”

II. James G. Pierce, Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010). Open Access
a. “In the present study, Dr. Pierce postulates that the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture. Specifically, the purpose of his study is to explore the relationship between the Army’s organizational culture and professional development. He examines the degree of congruence between the Army’s organizational culture and the leadership and managerial skills of its officer corps senior leaders. He uses data from a representative sample of such leaders while they were students at the Army War College, Classes of 2003 and 2004. At the macro level, the results of his research strongly suggest a significant lack of congruence between the U.S. Army’s organizational culture and the results of its professional development programs for its future strategic leaders. He bases his conclusion on empirical data that indicate that the future strategic leaders of the Army believe that they operate on a day-to-day basis in an organization whose culture is characterized by:

- an overarching desire for stability and control,
- formal rules and policies,
- coordination and efficiency,
- goal and results oriented, and
- hard-driving competitiveness.

Dr. Pierce recommends that the leaders of the Army profession initiate an organizational culture change effort. Specifically, he recommends changes to the more informal aspects of the professional development program, such as the less than lifelong commitment to the Army profession, the ‘up or out’ personnel policy, and the officer evaluation system which may be creating an underlying assumption that failure will not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances. Those conditions all are representative of ‘theories-in-use’ that are incongruent with the concept of professionalism. As a result of the current culture, senior leaders may be exercising an excessive degree of structured supervision which reinforces the culture of stability and control despite, the formal education system which attempts to teach the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that junior professionals learn to distrust their senior leaders and to then subsequently perpetuate the cycle of over-control, or depart the profession altogether.”

a. “As the Department of Defense (DOD) transitions to a new administration, it will be accompanied by numerous editorials advocating for equipment modernization and changing our theater-specific postures. Many of these discussions will call for altering DOD’s current strategy. In essence, they will reiterate a dogmatic logic among the department’s leadership: the best way to solve a problem is to develop a new strategy. To succeed, we must realize that focusing mainly on strategy will cause us to overlook our greatest advantage—organizational culture.

Patrick Lencioni relates the importance of organizational health (culture) this way: ‘The single greatest advantage any company can achieve is organization health. Yet it is ignored by most leaders even though it is simple, free, and available to anyone who wants it.’ Prior to overhauls of our current strategy, the new administration should ask DOD strategic leaders—the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service chiefs, and combatant and component commanders—to focus on creating or fostering a healthy culture. These top-tier military leaders are uniquely responsible and positioned to forge a culture that will increase engagement, innovation, and empowerment, yielding a military that promotes and retains its best practices and warfighters. This article presents a brief overview of organizational culture followed by a three-part construct that enables strategic leaders to assess, benchmark, and positively transform DOD culture. As part of the leadership transition, incoming strategic leaders should first assess the culture of the entire organization and benchmark the assessment across the DOD and against private sectors. Once DOD culture is benchmarked, an informed plan based on the findings should be implemented to promote and retain the most talented workers.”


i. “The virtue theoretic approach to ethics locates moral value primarily in the character of the agent rather than in the rules governing an act or the consequences that follow from it. Concerns about the character of the agent long have been a central preoccupation of military organizations. To be sure, modern military organizations in the United States and other Western, liberal, democratic states pay close attention to the rules governing acts and the consequences of these acts. Nevertheless, virtue ethics are of first importance, insofar as military organizations aim to cultivate soldiers, sailors, and airmen with specific sets of character traits, habits, and practices. This interest in moral development and moral virtue is especially evident in the missions and operations of service academies, officer training schools, and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps programs. It also can be found in the programs for training enlisted personnel as well as the regular, annual training provided to operational forces.”


i. “In these times of ethical uncertainty, especially among senior Navy leaders amid the ongoing ‘Fat Leonard’ fiasco, we need to look to our roots. The Foundations of
Moral Obligation elective, otherwise known as ‘The Stockdale Course,’ has been a mainstay at the Naval War College (NWC) for most of the past forty years. Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, USN, the fortieth President of the College, collaborated with Dr. Joseph Brennan, a professor emeritus from Columbia University’s Barnard College, to develop the elective shortly after Stockdale assumed the presidency. Little did they know how popular the elective would become and the positive impact it would have on graduates over the years. The Foundations elective has become a part of the moral fabric of both the institution and the U.S. Navy.”

One indication of this is that NWC’s formal role in both leadership and ethics has expanded relatively recently. Then–Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan W. Greenert approved the first Navy Leader Development Strategy in January 2013 to ‘synchronize the Navy’s leadership and strengthen our naval profession by providing a common framework for leader development.’ In early 2014, Greenert directed the President of the Naval War College to be responsible for all officer and enlisted leadership and ethics curricula for the Navy. A few months later, in March 2014, the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center was created at Naval Station Newport to provide leadership education and training, curriculum support, research, and assessment. With their Foundations elective, Stockdale and Brennan laid the foundation for leadership and ethics instruction at the Naval War College, and their work continues to have a profound impact on leaders throughout the Navy today.”


i. Relates to the importance of ethics and leadership.


a. “The military needs men and women who have courage—the physical courage to go into battle, to overcome fear in the face of bodily injury or death, mental pain, and lifelong disabilities. Militaries run on physical courage. Without it, they run from a fight and surrender. Many sources quote Aristotle as saying, ‘Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees the others.’ Courage is a primary virtue, as all other virtues require it.

There is another type of courage the military needs, but it is hard to measure or even define—moral courage. The following words of Robert F. Kennedy are as salient today as they were in June of 1966 when he spoke them in Cape Town, South Africa. ‘Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society. Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence. Yet it is the one essential, vital quality of those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to change.’ Bravery in battle is needed, but so is the courage to stand up for what is right and against what is immoral, unethical, or illegal.

A critical application of moral courage is knowing when and how to disobey—which can be thought of as intelligent disobedience. This involves an ability to work within the system to maintain standards and uphold moral values. Organizational culture and operational pressures can sometimes cause the values of people to become blurred when the mission
becomes more important than virtues. These can take us down the slippery slope of ends justifying means. Good people and good Soldiers can do bad things in these situations. An organizational emphasis on personal accountability for our actions, regardless of situational pressures, will support the courage needed to do what is morally and ethically right. This article will make the case that moral courage, including intelligent disobedience when warranted, should be taught and encouraged to ensure those in the follower role have the disciplined initiative to disobey orders when appropriate and to recommend alternatives that uphold professional military core values. First, we need to define the terms we are using to understand their importance.”


a. “Battlefields demand decisions; decisions without complete information, decisions without time to deliberate, and decisions without the opportunity to discuss and debate the ‘right’ course of action. While battlefields demand decisions, the Army demands that decisions be ethical, and in-line with Army Values. The decision-maker must often feel his way forward absent a clear picture of the ethical terrain ahead, relying only on experience and the training the Army provides. Too often, Army training fails decision-makers by not showing them how to make decisions when conflicts arise the between the values they have been taught, and the situation on the ground. They may not even recognize the ethical dimensions of their decisions. The Army must train decision-makers to make decisions by recognizing and applying values and rules.

Ethics is a broad category of study encompassing overarching moral principles and standards of conduct. This article discusses both facets. For clarity, the term ‘values’ will be used to reference moral principles, and the term ‘rules’ will be used to reference standards of conduct. ‘Ethical decision-making’ refers to the use of values and rules to make decisions. Ethics training can be divided into two categories, knowledge-based training and application-based training. Knowledge-based training focuses on teaching values and rules. Application-based training focuses on teaching individuals to apply their knowledge of values and rules.”
To be clear, this article does not challenge the idea that counterinsurgency requires substantial manpower, nor does it assert the absence of positive lessons from the surge. To the contrary, the surge’s influx of troops living among the people to provide security demonstrated remarkable operational success. But, the operational success could not be translated into strategic success because corresponding intergroup reconciliation and institution-building did not occur. Future efforts should focus on aligning military interventions with intergroup reconciliation efforts. Research should explore how US personnel can effectively facilitate intergroup negotiations and productive dialogue in host countries. Divergent expectations for postsurge interactions should be addressed to bolster intersectarian efforts to sustain security. Finally, strategies to encourage local participation in military interventions that do not rely on cash payments should be developed and assessed to prevent similar destabilization. The lessons from the surge provide a powerful starting point for understanding military, government, and sectarian interactions.”

   i. “The Army suffers from an identity crisis: by training forces for all types of wars it ends up lessening combat effectiveness across the entire spectrum. Instead of preparing inadequately for every war, the Army needs to focus on a specific skill set and hone it to a sharp edge. Aware of the risks of preparing for an incorrect type of war, the Army recovered from the consequences of such miscalculations in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and more recently, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In short, a well-defined Army can scramble to remedy known deficiencies in combat operations; however, consciously choosing not to set a deliberate course will not serve the Army well.”
      1. “This commentary responds to Gates Brown’s article ‘The Army’s Identity Crisis’ published in the Winter 2016–17 issue of *Parameters* (vol. 46, no. 4).”

   i. “America is hurtling toward strategic insolvency. For two decades after the Cold War, Washington enjoyed essentially uncontested military dominance and a historically favorable global environment—all at a comparatively low military and financial price. Now, however, America confronts military and geopolitical challenges more numerous and severe than at any time in at least a quarter century—precisely as disinvestment in defense has left US military resources far scarcer than before. The result is a creeping crisis of American military primacy, as Washington’s margin of superiority is diminished, and the gap between US commitments and capabilities grows. ‘Superpowers don’t bluff,’ went a common Obama-era refrain—but today, America is being left with a strategy of bluff as its preeminence wanes and its military means come out of alignment with its geopolitical ends.”
Foreign policy, Walter Lippmann wrote, entails ‘bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power.’ If a statesman fails to preserve strategic solvency, if he fails to “bring his ends and means into balance,” Lippmann added, ‘he will follow a course that leads to disaster.’ America’s current state of strategic insolvency is indeed fraught with peril. It will undermine US alliances by raising doubts about the credibility of American guarantees. It will weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to think aggression may be successful or go unopposed. Should conflict actually erupt in key areas, the United States may be unable to uphold existing commitments or only be able to do so at prohibitive cost. Finally, as the shadows cast by US military power grow shorter, American diplomacy is likely to become less availing, and the global system less responsive, to US influence. The US military remains far superior to any single competitor, but its power is becoming dangerously insufficient for the grand strategy and international order it supports.

Great powers facing strategic insolvency have three basic options. First, they can decrease commitments thereby restoring equilibrium with diminished resources. Second, they can live with greater risk by gambling that their enemies will not test vulnerable commitments or by employing riskier approaches—such as nuclear escalation—to sustain commitments on the cheap. Third, they can expand capabilities, thereby restoring strategic solvency. Today, this approach would probably require a concerted, long-term defense buildup comparable to the efforts of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan near the end of the Cold War.

Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps impossible. Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy which will eventually be punished.”

III. Other
      i. “The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent fundamental change in its strategic and operating environments. This report suggests this reality is the product of the United States entering or being in the midst of a new, more competitive, post-U.S. primacy environment. Post-primacy conditions promise far-reaching impacts on U.S. national security and defense strategy. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for DoD to examine and adapt how it develops strategy and describes, identifies, assesses, and communicates corporate-level risk. This report takes on the latter risk challenge. It argues for a new post-primacy risk concept and its four governing principles of diversity, dynamism, persistent dialogue, and adaptation. The authors suggest that this approach is critical to maintaining U.S. military advantage into the future. Absent change in current risk convention, the report suggests DoD exposes current and future military performance to potential failure or gross under-performance.”
ASEP-B Consolidating Gains

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i. “The Army’s force posture is out of balance, with a greater percentage of troops stationed in the United States than at any time since the late 1940s. This has forced an over-reliance on lengthy, continuous rotational deployments to achieve deterrence and assurance in theaters such as northeast Asia and Europe. This finding is based on a 9-month study assessing the costs and benefits of rotational deployments and forward stationing. The analysis reveals that in terms of fiscal cost, training readiness, morale and family readiness, and diplomatic factors, the United States could likely achieve deterrence and assurance objectives more efficiently and more effectively with increased forward stationing. The recommendations address what kinds of units would be best suited for forward stationing, where forward stationing would be most efficacious, and how the Department of Defense should go about rebalancing Army force posture.”


i. “Here’s the basic problem: Major wars against peer competitors burn up weapons and munitions at a ferocious rate far beyond what the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industry can produce. America’s defense industrial base is designed for peacetime efficiency, not mass wartime production, because maintaining unused capacity for mobilization is expensive. Congress and the Pentagon believe weapons are expensive enough without paying for something that may never be needed.”

d. Conrad Crane, “The Biggest Hurdles to the Future Army We Need” War on the Rocks June 16, 2016 Open Access

i. “Over the last decade, the Army has shifted its focus from fighting wars to capturing lessons learned, updating doctrine and creating concepts that will enable it to project power across the globe in support of national objectives. Among the new terms and concepts are regional alignment, mission command, and cultural competence. The difficulty in understanding the relationship between regional alignment, mission command, and cultural competence is that there has not been a great effort to explain how these efforts can serve each other as part of a single approach. The U.S. Army would benefit from fully incorporating the three concepts to enable future operations in an ever-changing environment. The paper demonstrates how the concepts are viewed as an interdependent system rather than as separate ideas and how the symbiotic relationship between regional alignment, cultural competence, and mission command could empower the U.S. Army to accomplish its strategic objectives in a resource constraint environment. Initially, the paper explores the regional alignment concept as a requirement to pursue national strategic objectives. Subsequently, the paper explains the U.S. Army’s mission command concept and how cultural competence enables it. Next, the Army’s cultural requirements are defined to explain the role of culture, cultural competence, and inter-cultural communications. Finally, the United States’ Operation Blacklist and Strategic Hamlet Plans of the Japanese Occupation and the Vietnamese pacification efforts are examined to highlight the concepts and principles that enabled operations and influenced the regional alignment, mission command, and cultural competence initiatives.”