

NOTES

Foreword

1. Reagan, Ronald. National Security Decision Directive 130. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 6 March 1984, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-130.htm> (Accessed 23 December 2005).
2. Emergent NATO doctrine on Information Operations cites Diplomatic, Military and Economic activities as “Instruments of Power.” It further states that Information, while not an instrument of power, forms a backdrop as all activity has an informational backdrop.
3. Neilson, Robert E. and Daniel T. Kuehl, “Evolutionary Change in Revolutionary Times: A Case for a New National Security Education Program,” *National Security Strategy Quarterly* (Autumn 1999): 40.
4. Rumsfeld, Donald, in a speech to U.S. Army War College students, Carlisle, PA, March, 2006.
5. Groh, Jeffrey L. and Dennis M. Murphy, “Landpower and Network Centric Operations: how information in today’s battlespace can be exploited,” *NECWORKS*, Issue 1, March 2006.

Section One – Strategic Communication

Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas?

1. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 31.
2. James J. Zogby, *What Arabs Think* (Utica, NY: Zogby International, 2002), 61-64. Overall impression of the US reflected in the Zogby poll (% favorable/% unfavorable): Lebanon - 26/70; Jordan - 34/61, Kuwait - 41/48; Saudi Arabia - 12/87; UAE - 11/87; Morocco - 38/61; Egypt - 15/76; Israel - 16/78. Besides Israel, only Russia had a lower favorability rating than the United States in any of the countries polled. In Kuwait the overall impression of Russia was 33% favorable, 61% unfavorable. Zogby repeated the poll in six countries in 2004, recording the results in "Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn About America," 2004; available at http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/Impressions_of_America04.pdf; Internet; accessed 3 December 2005. The United States only made small headway in the UAE. The favorable/unfavorable percentages follow: Morocco - 11/88; Saudi Arabia - 4/94; Jordan - 15/78; Lebanon - 20/69; UAE - 14/73; Egypt - 2/98.
3. Peter G. Peterson, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 3.
5. Karen Hughes, "Remarks to the 2005 Forum on the Future of Public Diplomacy," 14 October 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/55165.htm> (accessed 3 December 2005).
6. Arnold J. Abraham, "The Strategic Communication Process – How to Get Our Message Out More Effectively," *National War College Paper* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University), 1.
7. *Ibid.*, 2.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Bruce Gregory, *Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls and Imported Norms*, Paper Prepared for Presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 31 August 2005), 7.
10. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 108-109.

11. Defense Science Board, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," (Washington D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2004), 11.
12. Ibid., 12.
13. The Joint Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Information Operations," Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 9 October 1998), I-9.
14. Defense Science Board, 13.
15. The Joint Staff, "Information Operations," (Final Coordination Draft), Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 2005), I-9.
16. Wilson Dizard, Jr., "Remembering USIA," *Foreign Service Journal* (July – August 2003): 57.
17. Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, "How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1645 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 23 April 2003), 2.
18. John Brown, "The Anti-Propaganda Tradition in the United States," Bulletin Board for Peace, 29 June 2003, <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/19.htm>, (accessed 20 January 2006).
19. Ibid.
20. Nye, 104.
21. Johnson and Dale, 2.
22. Nye, x.
23. Johnson and Dale, 4.
24. Nye, 104.
25. Stephen Johnson, Helle Dale, and Patrick Cronin, "Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination and Strategy," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1875 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 5 August 2005), 2-3.
26. William P. Kiehl, "Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?," 13 November 2003, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_10-12/kiehl_humpty/kiehl_humpty.html, (accessed 29 November 2005).
27. Defense Science Board, 2. It didn't help that the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was unfilled for two of the first four years of the Bush administration.
28. George W. Bush, "Executive Order: Establishing the Office of Global Communications," 21 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030121-3.html>, (accessed 29 November 2005).
29. Defense Science Board, 25.

30. Ibid., 24.
31. James Dao and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiments Abroad," *The New York Times*, 19 February 2002, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0219-01.htm>, (accessed 17 December 2005).
32. The list of studies used to complete this research project include: *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Council on Foreign Relations (2003); *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (October 2003); *The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2004); Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communications, Defense Science Board (September 2004); *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communications Strategy*, United States Government Accountability Office (April 2005); and *Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination and Strategy*, The Heritage Foundation (August 2005).
33. Edward P. Djerejian, "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World," (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Group for Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, October 2003), 58-66. The Djerejian report also advocates establishing a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy to head a small office with limited responsibilities: "Establish strategic goals and messages, oversee establishment of programs that meet these goals, and ensure effective measurement of these programs."
34. Defense Science Board, 6; Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 11; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Public Diplomacy Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2005), 23.
35. Peterson, 31-34; Robert Satloff, "The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East," (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 104-105. Satloff does not advocate forming a new secretariat, but recommends the President appoint a senior advisor to direct and coordinate "disparate U.S. government public diplomacy initiatives, now spread among a wide array of bureaucracies."
36. Frank Gaffney, Michael Waller, Alex Alexiev and Caroline Glick, "Wage Political Warfare," in *War Footing: Ten Steps America Must Take to*

Prevail in the War for the Free World, ed. Frank Gaffney (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 145.

37. Gregory, 15-17; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 11; Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 3-4; Defense Science Board, 2-3.
38. Joshua Muravchik quoted in "Regaining America's Voice Overseas: A Conference on U.S. Public Diplomacy," Heritage Lectures No. 817 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 10 July 2003), 7.
39. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in a Broad Arena," *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, 13 December 2004, <http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines04/1213-03.htm>, (accessed 17 December 2005). Shanker and Schmitt describe a National Defense University study conducted at the request of the Joint Staff that proposes creating a "Director of Central Information" who would have responsibility for "budgeting and authoritative control of messages – whether public or covert – across all the government operations that deal with national security and foreign policy."
40. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 3.
41. Defense Science Board, 61.
42. John Brown, "Historical Patterns of U.S. Government Overseas Propaganda, 1917–2004," <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pm&requesttimeout=500&folder=715&paper=1716>, (accessed 5 February 2006).
43. Defense Science Board, 6.
44. Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith and Elizabeth McKune, "The National Security Policy Process," *National Security Policy and Strategy*, Volume 2 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 15-17. Generally, the National Security Advisor's (NSA) roles are to advise the President, advance the national security policy agenda, and oversee the effective operation of the interagency system. The emphasis placed on these roles depends on the President's preferences for managing national security affairs, the NSA's interpretation of his/her role, and the personalities and styles of the leaders that comprise the key policy-making bodies. For example, during Condoleezza Rice's tenure as NSA, she focused more on advising the President and coordinating his policies between departments, rather than initiating policy at the NSC and directly monitoring policy implementation in the Executive Branch Departments. Like the NSA, the roles and mission of the National Security Council (NSC) staff have evolved based on presidential preference, the NSA's organizational and management style, or the complexity of the national security problem. A close working relationship between the President and his cabinet secretaries may result in one or another department dominating national security policy development

and implementation. Conversely, interagency rivalry could lead to an expanded NSC role.

45. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 3.
46. Defense Science Board, 60.
47. Joshua Muravchik, "America Loses Its Voice," *The Weekly Standard*, 9 June 2003, <http://www.weeklystandard.com>, (accessed 24 January 2006).
48. Defense Science Board, 24. Charlotte Beers served as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for 18 months; Margaret Tutwiler for 6 months.
49. Barry Zorthian, as quoted in Peter G. Peterson, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 56.
50. Shanker and Schmitt.
51. Mitchell J. Thompson, "Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power," *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 64-65. Thompson took this concept from a 2000 Washington Post article by Dana Priest entitled, "A Four-Star Foreign Policy?" Although the article focused on Latin America, its central premise can be applied to geographic combatant commanders around the globe. "The Pentagon's role in policy design is increasing. Military engagement activities have been growing, while State Department and foreign aid budgets have fallen or stagnated. Although civilian officials and Congress still generally play the greater role in U.S. policymaking toward Latin America, they clearly do not have the greater momentum. Well-funded, frequent military engagement programs are outpacing or eclipsing U.S. diplomatic engagement with some countries while eluding effective civilian and congressional oversight. By forging relationships and incubating policy initiatives, these military activities are leaving the non-defense branches of government – including Congress – often struggling to keep up."
52. Nye, 116.
53. Linda Robinson, "Plan of Attack," *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 August 2005, 30.
54. Peter W. Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace – The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* 85 (July/August 2005): 14-15.
55. Christopher J. Lamb, "Information Operations as a Core Competency," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 36 (1st Quarter 2005): 93-94.
56. Jason Sherman, "England Orders Eight QDR Spin-off Reviews," 10 January

- 2006; available from: <http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060111410867.html>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2006.
57. Tadd Sholtis, "Public Affairs and Information Operations – A Strategy for Success," *Air & Space Power Journal*, Fall 2005, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/sholtis.html>, (accessed 20 January 2006).
 58. George W. Bush, Speech delivered at the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 October 2005, <http://www.ned.org/events/oct0605-Bush.html>, (accessed 11 February 2006).
 59. Ibid.
 60. Karen Hughes, "Statement Before the House International Relations Committee," 10 November 2005, <http://state.gov/r/us/2005/56926.htm>, (accessed 3 December 2005). The only DSB Task Force recommendation not enacted was moving the Office of Foreign Opinion and Media Research; it remains within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
 61. Muravchik, "America Loses its Voice."
 62. Department of State, "The Budget in Brief – FY2006 Budget Request," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 13, 23; available from <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/41676.pdf>; Internet, accessed 28 December 2005.
 63. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 4.
 64. Gregory, 34.
 65. Gaffney, Waller, Alexiev and Glick, 145.
 66. Bert B. Tussing, "Strengthening the Interagency and Maximizing its Effort in Combatting Terrorism," in *The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the Conditions That Foster Terrorism*, ed. Kent H. Butts and Jeffery Reynolds (Carlise Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 112.
 67. Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy, "Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus," in *The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the Conditions That Foster Terrorism*, ed. Kent H. Butts and Jeffery Reynolds (Carlise Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005), 73.
 68. Defense Science Board, 62.
 69. Abraham, 7.
 70. Defense Science Board, 63-64.
 71. Ibid., 66-68. The DSB states the Center should be guided by three purposes: 1) Provide information and analysis (non-departmental and non-political advice) to decision makers on issues vital to US security

to include: global public opinion; media trends and influences on audiences; information technologies; and the role of culture, values and religion on shaping human behavior. 2) Develop plans, themes, products and programs to create and implement communications strategies to capitalize on opportunities and respond to security threats. 3) Provide services in support of strategic communication objectives such as: fostering cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people and information; maintaining knowledge databases of those with specific language skills and cultural competencies that might be recruited for specific, short-term assignments; deploying temporary communications teams; and continually monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of themes, messages and programs.

72. Gregory, 36.
73. Peterson, 11.
74. Defense Science Board, 64.
75. Nye, 104. At its peak in the 1960s, the USIA had over 12,000 employees; it was down to just over 6,700 personnel by the time it was disbanded in 1999.
76. Peterson, 9. The roles and tasks described in this paragraph were taken largely from recommendations made by the Council on Foreign Relations as they advocated the establishment of a separate agency to oversee America's public diplomacy apparatus.
77. Norman J. Pattiz, as quoted in Peter G. Peterson, *Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 53.
78. Johnson, Dale, and Cronin, 14.
79. Defense Science Board, 61-62.

Strategic Communication: An Imperative for the Global War on Terrorism Environment

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Speech on Government and Military Communication, delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations, Harold Pratt House, New York, NY. 17 February 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060217-12574.html>, (accessed 1 March 2006).
2. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," by William Schneider, Jr., (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 2004), 12.
3. Department of Defense, *Information Operations*, Joint Publication 3-13, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2006), II-1.

4. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006), 9.
5. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 15.
6. James Zogby, "Attitudes of Arabs 2005," 12 December 2005, <http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/2005%20Arab%20Poll.pdf>, (accessed 21 January 2006). 12.
7. Schneider, 20.
8. Ibid. 36.
9. Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror*, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2004), 12.
10. Ibid, 13-14.
11. James Zogby, "Attitudes of Arabs 2005," 12 December 2005, <http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/2005%20Arab%20Poll.pdf>, (accessed 21 January 2006). 12.
12. James Zogby, "Impressions of America 2004," June 2004, http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/Impressions_of_America04.pdf, (accessed 21 January 2006). 1-19.
13. Zogby, "Attitudes of Arabs 2005," 1-17.
14. Scheuer, 11-14.
15. Schneider, 35.
16. Schneider, 16.
17. Ibid, 3.
18. William J. Clinton, "Reorganization Plan and Report," 30 December 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/rpt_981230_reorg6.html, (accessed 15 March 2006). Sec. III.
19. Schneider, 24.
20. Schneider, 25.
21. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 2005), 10.
22. Schneider, 25.
23. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, "Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources," 18 September 2002, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf>, (accessed 30 March 2006). 12.

24. William J. Clinton, "Budget of the United States," FY 2000, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy00/pdf/budget.pdf>, (accessed 1 April 2006). 316-317.
25. George W. Bush, "Budget of the United States," FY 2002; <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy02/pdf/budget.pdf>, (accessed 1 April 2006). 182.
26. George W. Bush, "Budget of the United States," FY 2007, <http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/06feb20061000/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/state.pdf>, (accessed 1 April 2006). 213.
27. Department of Defense, "FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Unified Assistance," February 2005, http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2005_supp.pdf, (accessed 2 April 2006). 3.
28. Schneider, 38.
29. Stephen Johnson, "Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination and Strategy," 5 August 2005, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=81713>, (accessed 3 April 2006). 11.
30. Schneider, 36.
31. Karen P. Hughes, Speech Delivered at the Opening of the Third Annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, Doha, Qatar. 18 February 2006, <http://www.state.gov/r/us/61546.htm>, (accessed 28 March 2006).
32. Kenneth Payne, "The Media as an Instrument of War," *Parameters*, 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 81.
33. USA Today/Gallup Poll, 14-16 April 2003, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2005-04-03-poll.htm>, (accessed 10 April 2006).
34. USA Today/Gallup Poll, 7-9 April 2006, <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>, (accessed 20 April 2006).
35. CBS News Poll, 6-9 April 2006, <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm>, (accessed 20 April 2006).
36. Payne, 85.
37. Warren P. Strobel, "The Media: Influencing Foreign Policy in the Information Age," Department of State, International Information Programs, US Foreign Policy Agenda, March 2000, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0300/ijpe/pj51stro.htm>, (accessed 15 December 2005), 2.
38. Department of Defense, Public Affairs Joint Publication 3-61, (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of Defense, 9 May 2005), X.
39. Ralph Peters, "Kill Faster!" 20 May 2004, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id =226344&attrib_id=7511, (accessed 30 March 2006).

40. Department of Defense, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication 3-61, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 9 May 2005), III-21.
41. Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century," (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 55.
42. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International, 7-16 April 2006, <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>, (accessed 20 April 2006).
43. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004): 65-66.
44. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict," by Vincent Vitto, chairman (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, May 2000), 3-5.
45. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination," by William Schneider, Jr., chairman (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, October 2001), 60-63.
46. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," by William Schneider, Jr., (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 2004), 80-83.
47. Department of Defense, "IO Road Map," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 October 2003), 62-65.
48. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," 79.
49. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination," 60.
50. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," 41.
51. Bryan Bender, "Insurgency seen forcing change in Iraq strategy," 10 June 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2005/06/10/insurgency_seen_forcing_change_in_iraq_strategy?mode=PF, (accessed 31 March 2006).
52. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination," 22.
53. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," 23.

54. Department of Defense, "Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations," Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 5 September 2003), iii.
55. Robert David Steele, "Information Operations: Putting the "I" Back Into DIME," 1 February 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB642.pdf>, (accessed 20 March 2006).
56. Schneider, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication," 66-69.
57. *Ibid*, 76.

National Communication Strategy

1. Karen Hughes, "The Mission of Public Diplomacy," Testimony at confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, D.C.) 22 July 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/49967.htm>.
2. Department of Defense, "The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2006), 29.
3. Ann Scott Tyson, "Rumsfeld Urges Using Media to Fight Terror," *Washington Post*, 18 February 2006, p. A07.
4. Defense Science Board Chairman William Schneider, Jr., "Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication," memorandum for Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2004.
5. Hughes.
6. Rear Admiral Frank Thorpe, Draft Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication, e-mail message to author, 10 February 2006.
7. Hughes.
8. Jeffrey B. Jones, "Strategic Communication, A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2005, 110.

The Dawn of a New Iraq: The Story Americans Almost Missed

1. Baggio quote provided to *Military Review* – Editor COL Bill Darley. Editor's note: The anecdote was solicited by the Editor, *Military Review*, from the Public Affairs Officer (COL Dan Baggio) who served under LTG Metz in Iraq during the period running up to and through the first Iraqi election described in the basic article. Published in *Military Review* VOL LXXXVI, NO. 03, MAY-JUNE 2006.

2. Ibid.
3. "The Rest of the Story" is a weekday radio segment told by Paul Harvey. Beginning as a part of his newscasts in 1946 and then broadcast as its own series on the ABC Radio Networks on May 10, 1976 and continuing until the present, it consists of a quaint "factual" story about American history, usually with the narrative's main character being a famous American. From: Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 21 December 2005, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rest_of_the_Story, (accessed 12 February 2006).
4. Charles H. Buehring, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, "DoD Identifies Army Casualty: Release No. 789-03," 27 October 2003, linked from The Arlington National Cemetery Website, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/chbuehring.htm>, (accessed 28 May 2006).
5. "Car bomb explodes in central Baghdad: Sunday blast near coalition headquarters kills 24 people," *Associated Press*, 19 January 2004, linked from the MSNBC home page, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3990109/>, (accessed 28 May 2006).
6. "Operation Phantom Fury," 21 May 2006 (last update), linked from Answers.com, <http://www.answers.com/topic/operation-phantom-fury>, (accessed 28 May 2006).
7. Thom Shanker, email, Subject: RE: Jan/05 Election success, 08 May 2006. Thom Shanker, a Washington D.C. based Pentagon Beat reporter for the New York Times was embedded with Multi-National Corps Iraq (III Corps) multiple times; he was the first ever embedded reporter with HHC, MNC-I in June 2004 and was embedded during the lead-up to the Iraqi Elections in January 2005.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Geraldo Rivera, Fox News, was embedded in the weeks leading up to and including the surprise hand over of sovereignty from U.S. Administrator L. Paul Bremer to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, two days earlier than expected.
11. Shanker.
12. Christine Hauser and Thom Shanker, "The Conflict in Iraq: Election Day; Voters in Mosul Need Shield of Snipers," *New York Times*, 28 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. A, pg. 1. Story follows: MOSUL, Iraq, Jan. 27 - Snipers are taking up positions across Mosul. The concrete barriers around the voting sites are up. The actual polling stations are being opened, replacing the decoys set up to deceive the insurgents. An election will be held Sunday in this violence-racked city of 1.6 million, but it remains an open question here – as in so many other Sunni Arab

cities where the insurgent presence is strong – whether enough people will brave the dangers to vote in significant numbers. “Mosul is a hot spot,” said Salem Isa, the head of security for Nineveh Province. “We have special security plans and will try to take all the possible steps to get them to the boxes peacefully.” It will not be easy. Even handling election materials is considered so dangerous that ballots and ballot boxes will be distributed to the 80 polling centers by armored American military convoys. “The military has to do it because of the security situation,” said Khaled Kazar, the head of the elections commission here. “No one would ever volunteer to move this stuff.” Once considered a model city of the occupation, Mosul has descended into a hellish sectarian stew, 65 percent Sunni Arab and 30 percent Kurdish, with a sprinkling of Turkmen, Assyrians and other ethnic groups. Making matters worse, in November thousands of police and security officers abandoned their posts under an insurgent assault that coincided with the American attack on Falluja. Since then, scores of civilians have died in attacks. Kurds, government officials and Iraqi security officers have been massacred. Thousands of American troops poured into the region after the uprising in November, anchoring security, arresting suspects, uncovering caches of weapons and carrying out raids in some of the most extensive military operations in the country. Hundreds of Kurdish fighters have been sent here to enforce security. But much damage had been done, and election officials were left scrambling to catch up. Mosul’s 700 election workers, threatened by insurgents, walked off the job. A warehouse full of ballot papers was attacked and burned in December. “It has not gone to plan,” said Maj. Anthony Cruz, the liaison officer between the elections commission in Mosul and the American military. “They had to reconstitute a large portion of staff.” To recruit more election workers, Mr. Kazar promised prospects a secure place to stay, food provisions and a bonus of \$500 – a major sum in Iraq right now. The drive apparently paid off to some extent. On Thursday, Mr. Kazar was busy leading a group of new recruits in the basics of balloting. At a guarded building in Mosul, he demonstrated how to mark voters’ fingers so they could not vote twice, how to use the voting booths and how to check identities. One election worker said he joined the commission because he was convinced it was the only way to get the country out from under military occupation. “We need an election to get a real government going and to get real police and security forces,” said the man, a 25-year-old Arab from Mosul, who declined to be named because, he said, he would be “slaughtered” if he were identified. American officials have been trying to convince Iraqi voters that they can vote safely. “American and Iraqi operations conducted over the last several weeks have set the conditions for the vast majority of Iraqis to vote safely,” Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander in Iraq, said in a brief interview here. But even so, he

warned, “there will be violence.” This week, an American-military supported radio talk show called “Your Voice” hit the airwaves to try to inform Iraqis in the area about the process and to drum up new recruits for election work. In about half an hour on the air, Mr. Kazar fielded at least five calls from listeners. “We will take every possible precaution to make the election sufficiently secure,” he told one listener. Another man called up and apparently voiced wariness about the election. “This is your future, beginning from your neighborhood, your city and your country,” Mr. Kazar answered. Despite such efforts, however, turnout is expected to be low. To begin with, many Sunni Arabs here and throughout Anbar Province, home to Falluja, Ramadi and other volatile cities that form the center of the resistance, are not interested in voting under any circumstances. With that alienation and the pervasive threat of violence, officials are expecting a turnout of only about 30 percent in the Arab section of Mosul and are hoping for as much as 50 percent in the more secure Kurdish area. But they caution that these are just guesses, and that the actual turnout will be affected by what happens on Sunday. Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of coalition forces across northern Iraq, said his “nightmare scenario” would be “multiple, simultaneous suicide attacks early on election day.” The goal of such an insurgent offensive, he said, would be to deter voters just as the polls open, when many people were still making up their minds whether to venture out. “The real key is Iraqi security forces,” said General Ham. They will be guarding election places between now and Sunday, and searching voters on election day. American troops, he said, would be on patrol and on call, but away from the polling places. Meanwhile, Mr. Kazar was giving his raw recruits last-minute instructions on voting procedures. “They will go to the cabinet and fill out the ballot,” he said. “He will go to the box.” Then, he said, putting his hand on top of two clear plastic containers, “These are ballot boxes.” The 30 or so election recruits listened raptly. Mr. Kazar folded up two ballot papers, one for the national assembly and another for provincial elections, and placed both of them in one box, pausing for effect. “Some will want to put both ballots in one box, but don’t let them,” he said. And finally: “When the ballot box is full, secure it well.”

13. Baggio.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Thom Shanker, “The Iraqi Election: Patrols; American Forces in Iraq Brace For Their ‘Day of Reckoning,’” *New York Times*, 30 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. 1, p. 18. Story follows: BAGHDAD, Iraq, Jan. 28 – Col. Mark A. Milley picked his way through open sewage and ankle-deep mud that stuck to his boots like sand-colored glue as he led a manhunt through the Abu Ghraib slum, his target the assassin of an Iraqi security officer. The mission, punctuated by random small-

arms fire from a housing block, ended with Colonel Milley getting neither his man nor annoyed. Meeting next with the police general for Baghdad west of the Tigris River, the colonel was told that the Iraqi police were threatening to boycott duty as election sentries on Sunday if they did not get more automatic weapons. Colonel Milley calmly said that he had been pressing the American military and the Iraqi Interior Ministry for the weapons. In fact, across a day of patrols through one of Baghdad's most threatening sectors, Colonel Milley raised his voice only once, when a jobless father of three said he was too fearful to go to the polls. "I traveled 7,000 miles from Fort Drum, N.Y., so you could vote!" he said at a volume just below that of approaching thunder. "So you better get out and vote. Show some courage." Colonel Milley told the Lebanese-American interpreter for the 10th Mountain Division's Second Brigade, which he commands: "Translate that. Translate every word. And tell the rest of these people, too." For an American military that already has lost more than 1,000 lives to hostile action in Iraq, guaranteeing the election on Sunday offers the clearest, most precise mission since President Bush commanded the military to drive straight for Baghdad almost two years ago. Since then, American forces have executed a complex set of orders to battle home-grown insurgents and shadowy attackers, help rebuild Iraq's economy and train a new army, all incremental projects that will continue beyond the 12-month tour of any soldier here. "That's why, for us, the day of reckoning is Jan. 30," said Maj. Michael Lawrence, executive officer of the First Battalion, 24th Infantry, based at Mosul. "We think we're being successful. We also know we can't let one day define the entire effort. But this is our mission now." Soldiers on point do not debate evidence on Saddam Hussein's program of unconventional weapons. They do not argue exit strategies or disengagement. And the question of whether enough troops are committed to Iraq is answered by looking to their immediate left and right. They pass the Skittles and PowerBars, load their weapons and just want to get through the patrol, election day, their tour in Iraq, and then go home. "It's a funny thing: They don't want us here, and we don't want to be here," said First Sgt. Robert Wright of Company A, First Battalion, 24th Infantry. He is one of those small-unit leaders who is so sharp at guiding soldiers into urban combat that he has picked up the nickname Jedi. "We know it's important to get these people back on their feet," he said. Company A knows most directly about loss from this unconventional war, where even Iraqis who work among them may be their enemies, or an enemy may be wearing a uniform stolen from one who works among them. The commander, Capt. Bill Jacobsen, was one of the 22 killed when a bomb struck a mess tent in Forward Operating Base Marez last month in Mosul. Capt. Jeffrey Van Antwerp was thrust into command. "We didn't lose a step," he said. "We got up and moved out." This week he moved his men onto a

square beneath a mosque in Mosul where mortars were launched five minutes earlier. Seven men were rounded up as possible witnesses to the mortar attack. Captain Van Antwerp quizzed each, in a tough way. But after shouting questions at the seventh – he wore a T-shirt with the “Friends” television show logo – Captain Van Antwerp relented. He let them go, but only after telling them to vote. “We have to get the information about the insurgency,” he said. “But we don’t want to create more sympathizers for the anti-Iraqi forces.” In the fight against those insurgents, by late Friday, Colonel Milley’s efforts for the Baghdad police general had helped bring in 80 percent of the requested AK-47’s. “Victory is won one inch at a time,” he said.

16. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “The Iraqi Election: The Military; Security Efforts Hold Insurgents Mostly at Bay,” *New York Times*, 31 January 2005 (Late Edition), sec. A, p. 1. Story follows: WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 – By increasing American troop strength in Iraq, banning all civilian car traffic and ordering a host of other security measures – some within standard military procedure and others distinctly not – American and Iraqi forces widely thwarted insurgents who had threatened to wash the streets with blood. Even so, military officers acknowledged that the security measures could not all be sustained over time and that insurgents might still be capable of conducting a catastrophic attack. But even on a day where as many as 44 people were killed, including nine suicide bombers, and 100 wounded in insurgent attacks, Pentagon officials and military officers said they had expected much worse. And they pondered whether their major offensive push over recent weeks had, in fact, knocked the insurgency back on its heels. Some even cautiously ventured that election day had been a test for the insurgency, too, and it had been found unable to press a sustained, timed attack in the face of a concerted defense. And perhaps more important, it seemed unable to keep Iraqi voters at home through intimidation. The American military pushed its presence in Iraq from 138,000 to 150,000, the highest level since Baghdad fell, and one senior officer involved in the planning said insurgents had blundered in waiting too long to mount their own pre-election offensive. Just a week ago, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Islamic militant who is the most wanted insurgent in Iraq, warned in an audiotape broadcast on the Internet that any Iraqi who voted deserved death. Commanders had received plenty of intelligence that insurgents had been hoping to present a nightmare scenario of multiple car bombings early on election day to dissuade Iraqis from venturing out to the polls. So a nationwide ban on civilian automobile traffic was ordered, and vast swaths of major cities were declared no-parking zones. “They were saving them,” the officer said, referring to insurgent car bombs. “And I think they saved them for nothing.” Every soldier on election duty heard intelligence warnings that insurgents would try to slip bomb-laden suicide vests into

polling places beneath the long gowns of an Iraqi woman or of a man in woman's clothing. That presented a particular difficulty in a society where it is not acceptable for a man to search a woman, and there were hardly enough women in the Iraqi Interior Ministry to spend a day at every polling site conducting body searches. But American officers devised a solution. They agreed on a plan with Iraqi security forces, who were the visible presence inside each polling place, that one of the first women to arrive at larger polling places would be searched, and that woman would in turn be asked to search 10 others. One of those 10 would then search 10 others before voting, and so on in a daisy chain. Another concern was insurgents masquerading as Iraqi security forces to penetrate polling sites. To counter that threat, the American military printed special badges just for Iraqi forces on election duty, each numbered and registered. Misdirection played a large part in the plan. The American military mounted patrols and ordered preparations in areas that were never meant to be opened to voters, trying to bait the insurgents into planting bombs or planning attacks in the wrong places. The announcements of the official polling places were withheld until Thursday night. Plans for election security began taking on a fever pitch just after November's operation to rout insurgents from Falluja, and quickened even more after Jan. 1. In just the past six weeks, American, Iraqi and other forces conducted more than 1,000 cordon and search operations, and mounted more than 400 specific attacks on suspected insurgent and terrorist targets. The military does not release internal estimates of insurgents killed in action. But a number of officers said the pre-election offensive resulted in the capture or death of 30 percent to 50 percent of the names on their target lists. "No organization can operate with those kinds of losses," one commander said. Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, commander of day-to-day military operations in Iraq, ordered the stockpiling of ammunition, food and fuel, partly motivated by the desire to halt military convoys before the election, depriving insurgents of a target and allowing troops usually on convoy security duty to focus on attacking insurgents and assisting in the defense of election sites. Commanders also took a number of unusual steps to reassign large numbers of soldiers from support and logistics missions to a security role out on the streets, increasing the combat force on the streets of Baghdad by one-third. Although dozens of people were reported killed in suicide bombings and other attacks around Iraq on Sunday, Pentagon officials and senior American commanders in Iraq expressed relief and some surprise that the violence was not worse. "I admit to being surprised at the level of insurgent activity," Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, commander of American forces in northern Iraq, said in an e-mail message after the Iraqi polls had closed. "I thought it would be much higher." Many American commanders saluted the Iraqi security forces, whose decidedly mixed performance in recent

weeks and months has caused some American officers as well as top Bush administration officials to question the Iraqis' ability to secure their own country. Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commands the First Infantry Division, said in an e-mail message on Sunday night that the insurgents' "ineffective attacks" hampered fewer than 3 percent of the 951 polling stations in the four provinces in north-central Iraq that his forces oversee. Commanders warned, however, against being lulled into any false sense of security after the voting. "The post-election period will still be a high-threat period as it is likely, in my opinion, that the insurgents will try to detract from the successes of today," General Ham said. He predicted that insurgents now would single out voting officials, Iraqi security forces "and certainly the winners, once they are announced."

17. Baggio.

Section Two – Information Effects

Deprogramming an Ideology: Thought Control and the War on Terrorism

1. War Department, Military Intelligence Division, "Intelligence Review, Number 14," 14 February 1946, <http://www.danielpipes.org/rr/3370.pdf>, (accessed 10 March 2006, 24).
2. Steven Simon, "Unavoidable Clash of Islam and the West?" Commentary, 23 January 2005, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/012305NWP.html>, (accessed 3 January 2006).
3. Osama bin Laden, "Bin Laden's Fatwa," August 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html, (accessed 11 January 2006).
4. Khalid Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2005): 16-19. The term puritan is used to accurately identify that segment of Muslim society with the potential to embrace extreme violence. Opposed to "moderates," characterized as modernists, progressives and reformers, puritans are absolutist and unequivocal. It is this intolerance of competing ideas that provides the foundation for the global spate of violence, and this is not accurately captured in the myriad of competing terms – fundamentalist, militant, extremist, radical, fanatic, jihadist or Islamist. Importantly, while there are non-violent puritans, the focus of this paper is on those who embrace violence, and this should be considered when the singular term puritan is used. The genesis for this use of the term puritan is heavily dependent on El Fadl's *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*.
5. Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: The Modern Library, 2003): xv.
6. Andrew Harvey, Ian Sullivan, and Ralph Groves. "A Clash of Systems: An Analytical Framework to Demystify the Radical Islamist Threat," *Parameters* Vol XXXV, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 72.
7. Donald Rumsfeld, "Rumsfeld's war-on-terror memo," *USAToday*, 22 Oct 2003, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/iraq/memo.htm>, (accessed 14 January 2006).
8. David Lazarus, "Effects-Based Operations and Counterterrorism," *Air & Space Power Journal* (Fall 2005): 24. The term Effects-Based Approach is used in lieu of Effects-Based Operations to comply with current doctrine and capture the planning, versus operational, aspects of this approach. This concept is central to the presented thesis, and while David Lazarus uses the term Effects-Based Operations, the

context in which he uses it is clearly in accord with Effects-Based Approach.

9. Steve Biko, quote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/steven_biko.html, (accessed 21 April 2006).
10. Margeret Singer, *Cults in our Midst*, http://www.rickross.com/reference/cults_in_our_midst/cults_in_our_midst.html, (accessed 5 February 2006).
11. Steven Hassan, *Combating Cult Mind Control* (Rochester: Park Street Press, 1988): 56.
12. Steven Hassan, *Releasing the Bonds: Empowering People to Think for Themselves* (Somerville: Freedom of Mind Press, 2000): 40.
13. Paul Sperry, "The Pentagon Breaks the Islam Taboo," 14 December 2005, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20539>, (accessed 11 January 2006).
14. Gregory Treverton, Heather Gregg, Daniel Gibran, and Charles Yost, *Exploring Religious Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005): 33.
15. *Ibid.*, xiv.
16. *Ibid.*, xiv.
17. Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, *At the Heart of Terror* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004): 166.
18. Hassan, *Combating Cult Mind Control*, 7.
19. Hassan, *Releasing the Bonds*, 38.
20. Ern Griffin, "Chapter 16, Cognitive Dissonance Theory of Leon Festinger," <http://www.afirstlook.com/archive/cogdiss.cfm?>, (accessed 24 April 2006).
21. Hassan, *Releasing the Bonds*, 37.
22. *Ibid.*, 42.
23. *Ibid.*, 54.
24. Robert Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989): 438.
25. *Ibid.*, 438.
26. *Ibid.*, 420.
27. *Ibid.*, 419.
28. *Ibid.*, 456.
29. *Ibid.*, 454.
30. *Ibid.*, 86.

31. Hassan, *Releasing the Bonds*, 87.
32. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, 436.
33. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002): 11.
34. Sanity, "Shame, the Arab Psyche, and Islam," 18 August 2005, <http://drsanity.blogspot.com/2005/08/shame-arab-psyche-and-islam.html>, (accessed 18 April 2006).
35. Hoffer, 12.
36. *Ibid.*, 15.
37. Eric Hoffer, *The Ordeal of Change* (New York: Buccaneer Books, 1963): 5.
38. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 26.
39. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2005): 1.
40. Hoffer, *The True Believer*, 93.
41. *Ibid.*, 60.
42. Palmer and Palmer, 32.
43. Paul Marsden, "Memetics and Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *Journal of Memetics*, Vol. 2 (1998), http://jom-emit.cfp.m.org/1998/vol2/marsden_p.html, (accessed 15 April 2006).
44. Lori Peek, "Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity," *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 (Fall 2005), <http://il.proquest.com/brand/umi.shtml>, (accessed 6 January 2006).
45. Cragin and Gerwehr, 4.
46. El Fadl, 28.
47. Lewis, 23.
48. Roger Kershaw, "Full Marx for mullahs: A reflection on social control in Islam," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 281, Iss. 1640 (Sep 2002), <http://il.proquest.com/brand/umi.shtml>, (accessed 4 January 2006).
49. Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins, *Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism* (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2002): 6.
50. Bruce Hoffman, "Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader US Policy," *Rand Review* (Winter 1998-1999), <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/>, (accessed 12 January 2006).
51. Palmer and Palmer, 131.
52. Davis and Jenkins, 19.

53. Angel Rabasa, "Moderate and Radical Islam," Testimony, 3 November 2005, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RAND_CT251.pdf, (accessed 15 January 2006), 4.
54. Ibid., 4.
55. Palmer and Palmer, 166.
56. Ibid., 165.
57. Dave Grossman, "Teaching kids to kill," *National Forum*, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 (Fall 2000), <http://il.proquest.com/brand/umi.shtml>, (accessed 11 Feb 2006).
58. Lifton, 469.
59. Sam Harris, *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2004): 31.
60. Sudha Ramachandran, "Public recruitment for suicide bombers sanctioned by new Iranian president," Militant Islam Monitor.org (8 September 2005), <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1057>, (accessed 18 April 2006).
61. Palmer and Palmer, 140.
62. David Connors, "Center of Gravity Analysis," 2001, revised 2003. Developed in its entirety, and periodically refined by David Connors for personal and professional use in his capacity as the Air Force Senior Service Representative to the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA. Paper copy was obtained in July 2005 and reset into Microsoft PowerPoint for presentation in this paper.
63. Cragin, 14.
64. Ibid., 14.
65. Ibid., 27.
66. Hassan, 69.
67. Cragin, Dissuading Terror, 15.
68. Ibid., 15.
69. Ibid., multiple pages.
70. Ibid., 22.
71. Palmer and Palmer, 130.
72. Owais Tohid, "Who are the suicide bombers? Pakistan's answer," 17 June 2005, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0617/p07s01-wome.html>, (accessed 14 April 2006).
73. El Fadl, 37.
74. Ibrahim Syed, "Critical Thinking," http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_101_150/critical_thinking.htm, (accessed 24 April 2006).

75. Harris, 19.
76. Y. Yehoshua, "Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia," 18 January 2006, <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=reform&ID=IA26006>, (accessed 24 April 2006).
77. Unknown, "Federal police consider 'deprogramming' terrorists," ABC News On-line, 9 March 2006, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200603/s1587242.htm>, (accessed 24 April 2006).

Stepping out of the Ouagmire: Building Bridges to Victory through Iraq's Indigenous Tribes

1. George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 2005): 1.
2. W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane, *Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2005): 13.
3. W. Andrew Terrill, *Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 2005): 1. See also, Noah Feldman, Vali Nasr, James Fearon and Juan Cole, "Power Struggle, Tribal Conflict or Religious War?" *Time Magazine*, 26 February 2006, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1167736,00.html>, (accessed 27 February 2006). Feldman, et.al. posit that the "brewing" civil war is not a result of ancient hatreds between Sunni and Shi'ites, as they have lived together peacefully, and inter-married producing offspring of the mixed marriages, for centuries. They argue that, "Instead we are witnessing in Iraq what occurs when government collapses and there is no state around capable of guaranteeing personal security." People seek help by migrating to social, religious, ethnic, or political comfort zones that provide the security needed. This then can lead to polarizing and violence-prone groupings.
4. Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East* (London: SAQI, 2003): 114. The concept of "empty social spaces" was coined by Bertrand Badie and refers to social spaces that escape the authority of the State.
5. The two major indigenous social networks that are influential in Iraq are the tribal structure and the Islamic religious structure. Due to constraints on the size of this written project, the author intends to address only the tribal structure. However, many of the principles that will be posited about building bridges to victory through the tribal

structure can be made applicable to the Islamic religious structure. This author brings more than scholarly research to this topic as he served nearly 18 months in Iraq working with the many indigenous social networks in Iraq, especially the tribes. He first served for 12 months as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 to the Commanding General of the First Cavalry Division, MG Peter Chiarelli and later as the Director of the Office of National Outreach Programs & Initiatives for the MNF-I CMO Directorate, under the direct supervision of the National Iraqi Assistance Center. In each capacity, among his other duties, he operated a Tribal Advisory Group which engaged the key tribal leaders of the major tribes in Iraq and enlisted their support in stability and security activities. Additionally, the project began identifying the legitimate tribes and serving tribal leaders in an effort to distinguish those “tribes” and “sheikhs” that are not considered legitimate—those that resulted specifically from Saddam’s “re-tribalization” of Iraq in his effort to create support for his regime in the failing state. The fruit of that work is being compiled into a reference book on Iraqi tribes and their customs, practices, and characteristics which will be sent back into the field for use by the Coalition. The author also engaged key religious leaders within the two major Islamic sects as well as the other religious groups in Iraq to similarly enlist their support with Coalition efforts in Iraq. Finally, the author also created an Iraqi Culture Training team to provide extensive training to both military and civilian members of the Multinational Coalition. These programs were hampered by the lack of a dedicated institutional mechanism to plan and execute the program of engagement, the lack of a national strategy for utilizing these social structures, and the lack of fiscal authority necessary to seal the relationships and demonstrate Coalition resolve in making the social structure effective and relevant.

6. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990): 4, 18. The authors opine that since the state is more of a “mechanical solidarity” that operates through ethnic, economic, bureaucratic, and political groups, tribal societies would have to undergo tremendous changes in tribal ethos or character to morph into a state. However, they explain that even though tribes don’t generally form states, they often contribute significantly to state formation.
7. *Ibid.*, 5. Citing from Richard Tapper, ed., *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London, 1983): 6, 9.
8. *Ibid.*, 42.
9. Montgomery McFate, *The Tribe in the Desert: State Options for Countering Tribal Insurgency* (forthcoming), 3. This is a draft work by McFate and to date has not been formally published. It is part of

- McFate's ongoing work to explain, illuminate, or provide assistance to the Coalition in Iraq with regard to partial makeup of the insurgency.
10. Ibid., 5. See also Khoury and Kostiner, pages 10-13, for historical examples which show that although whole tribes may not evolve into states, they can evolve into what is termed "chiefdoms". Chiefdom can be viewed as a hybrid political formation that has characteristics of both tribe and state. Some notable examples of chiefdoms in the Middle East are the first Saudi State (1744-1822), the Mahdiyya in Sudan (1881-1898), and the Sanusiyya in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Libya.
 11. Richard L. Taylor, *Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 2005): 10-11. Taylor has a good discussion on the issue of the impact of tribes on state formation in his work. See also Richard T. Antoun, "Civil Society, Tribal Processes, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 32, November 2000, p.441; Mamoun Fandy, "Tribe vs. Islam: The Post Colonial Arab State and the Democratic Imperative," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 3, April 1994, p. 47; and, Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996): 179. Additionally, see Paul A. Jureidini and R.D. McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1984). This work is less than 70 pages but gives a good picture of the positive impact tribes have had on the development and stability of the Jordanian state and the impact of the state on the changing nature of the tribe in Jordan.
 12. Sheila Carapico, "Yemen between Civility and Civil War," in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Augustus Richard Norton, ed., (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996): 288. Taylor, 11-12. Incorporates Carapico's work into his discussion.
 13. Terrill & Crane, 15.
 14. Dawn Chatty, *Mobile Pastoralist: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 131. Taylor, 12. Incorporates Chatty's thoughts and observations into his work. See also, Khoury and Kostiner, pages 245-248 for a discussion of how tribal values contributed to stability in certain states, more particularly the Saudi state, during a period of rapid change and turmoil where tribal values and behaviors commingled with state bureaucracy in a positive way. Tribal values played an important influence on Saudi state development in the 20th century.
 15. One must be careful here. First, the word tribe can be confusing. Tribal structure in Iraq is generally hierarchical and there are different terms for each level. Qabila is generally the term for a large tribe or

confederation of tribes; Ashira refers to the major sub-tribes or smaller tribes; Hamoula or Bayt refer to a house within a tribe or sub-tribe. From there you have clans and families that make up the foundation of each organization. Other terms that may be used for levels of tribal structure (depending on which part of Iraq you may be referring to) include 'imara for sub-tribe; sadr-chest; 'unuq-neck; batn-clan; fakhith-thigh; and, fasila-lower part of leg to refer to a large house. See also Jabar and Dawod, pages 115-116, for a good discussion on tribal structure. Second, during the Saddam Hussein regime, Saddam created new tribes and tribal leaders to help protect his regime and stabilize the country. As such, the real number of legitimate tribes and tribal leaders is yet to be determined by careful study and research. As mentioned in FN 5 above, one such work in that area is underway and expects to produce a reasonably accurate report identifying the legitimate tribes and current key leaders of that tribal structure in the next few months.

16. Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: The Role of Tribes," November 14, 2003, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7681>; (accessed 25 April 2005). See also Faleh Jabar, "Rethinking Iraq: Tribal Identities," April 25, 2004, <http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc217.html>; (accessed 29 December 2005); and, Anonymous, "Tribal Structures," undated, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/tribes.htm>; (accessed 25 November 2005).
17. Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9-29. See also, "Tribal Structures."
18. Ibid. 37. See also, "Tribal Structures."
19. Ibid., 37, 85., McFate, 13-14.
20. McFate, 14. See also Jabar and Dawod, 85-88.
21. Ibid., 14. See also Tripp, 265-266, and Jabar and Dawod, 93-95.
22. Again, it is the hope of this author that the tribal identity project mentioned in note 5 will alleviate some of the problem of identifying legitimate tribes and tribal leaders. One problem created by the confusion over which tribe is real and which is not, is that when the Coalition works with a "fake sheikh", as they are affectionately called by Iraqis, then the Coalition runs the risk of alienating the real sheikhs and tribes by offending the honor of the sheikh and the tribe. This can lead to conflict between the real tribe and the Coalition.
23. Jason Burke, "US Cash Squads 'buy' Iraqi Tribes," *Observer*, 15 December 2002, <http://www.observer.guardian.co.uk/110863,00.html>; (accessed 2 March 2006). See also C. Raja Mohan, "Winning Over the Iraqi Tribes," *The Hindu*, 4 April 2003 <http://www.thehindu.com/2003/04/04/stories/2003040402431200.htm>; (accessed 2 March 2006).

24. McFate, 18-19.

25. Anna Ciezadlo, "A Scholarly Soldier Steps Inside the World of Iraq's Potent Tribes," *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 December 2003, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1230/p01s03-woiq.html>, (accessed 2 March 2006). See also, McFate, page 18. McFate cites an anonymous source designated as "former intelligence" and quotes the source as saying that his plan to leverage traditional authority systems in Iraq was rejected by CPA. The source reported, "The standard answer we got from Bremer's people was that tribes are a vestige of the past, that they have no place in the new democratic Iraq."

26. At the same time this author had begun to work with the OPO in tribal and religious leader engagement in his capacity as the Assistant Chief of Staff G5 for the First Cavalry Division. Since the OPO was going to be disbanded with the CPA after Iraqi transfer of sovereignty in June 2004, and LTC King was to redeploy, my assistance was sought to continue the program of engagement with the tribal and religious leaders and introductions were made to pass the relationships to my care. I was also involved in the conflict termination activities in April 2004 and more particularly with those in Sadr City. Although tribal influence was helpful in obtaining the cease fire in the Sadr City conflict with the forces of Moqtada Al Sadr, it was the engagement with religious leaders within his inner circle that produced the most results. The relationships built in these early meetings were essential and contributed to the success of the First Cavalry's mission during its tour of duty in OIF II.

27. John Berry and Michael Hirsh, "*Washington: A Grim March of Missteps*," 2005; <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6885830/site/newsweek.htm>; (accessed 29 December 2005).

28. Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), 44.

29. *Ibid.*, 45. McFate cites an example from the British forces operating in Amara, Iraq. They recognized the tribal structure's importance to their mission. As a result, they appointed tribal leaders to local councils and gave the councils large sums of money to distribute. This reinforced the sheik's political standing and created an alliance that helped the British with the success of its mission. Also cited is the example of how Saddam Hussein was captured by elements of the 4th Infantry Division because of its diligent work in mapping the tribal structure and kinship tree for Saddam and his tribe. See also Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: The Role of Tribes," November 14, 2003; <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7681>, (accessed 25 April 2005); and, Faleh Jabar, "Rethinking Iraq: Tribal Identities," April 25, 2004, <http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc217.html>, (accessed 29 December 2005).

30. Faleh Jabar, "Rethinking Iraq: Tribal Identities," April 25, 2004, <http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc217.html>; accessed (29 December 2005). See also, Jabar and Dawod, page 114. A vacuum created by an ineffective state apparatus created empty social spaces and lead to the increased influence of tribes.
31. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* September/October 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84508/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-win-in-iraq.html>, (accessed 25 November 2005). Krepinevich is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University. He is also the author of *The Army and Vietnam*.
32. *Ibid.*, 6-7. This author would add that he endorses the plan laid out by Krepinevich as long as the program seeks to identify and work with the legitimate tribal leaders and tribes as a priority of effort.
33. Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind*, rev. ed. (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002): 78, 82.
34. *Ibid.*, 96.
35. *Ibid.*, 85.
36. McFate, *The Tribe in the Desert: State Options for Countering Tribal Insurgency*, 28-29.
37. The reader should recall that this was the name of the office headed by this author, as described in note 5, between March-June 2005. However, there is no record that the office was maintained after the departure of the author nor is there evidence that such an office exists in Iraq today that is conducting the type or scope of work described or recommended in this paper.
38. Krepinevich. See note 30 for complete citation.
39. Bush, 1-2.
40. *Ibid.*, 1, 14.
41. Charles Levinson, "Sunni Tribes Turn Against Jihadis," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 February 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0206/p01s01-woiq.htm>, (accessed 6 February 2006).
42. Bush, 3.
43. This author is not suggesting there is no tribal engagement taking place; however, what is being done does not appear to be based on a unified plan, strategy, or program that is national in scope and reflects a clear policy by MNF-I Command or the U.S. Embassy. The strategy suggested in this paper is designed to correct that problem and build a network of engagement strategy, policy, and programs that can work

within the tribal network to permeate every level of Iraq society and implement the Victory Plan for Iraq.

44. McFate, "The Tribe in the Desert: State Options for Countering Tribal Insurgency," 11.

Reaching the Point of Fusion: Intelligence, Information Operations and Civil-Military Operations

1. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., June 2005, 23.
2. Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters*, Spring 2004, 23. See also John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
3. See Department of the Army Field Manual-Interim FMI 3-07.22 (expires 1 October 2006), Counterinsurgency Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2004, especially Ch. 3.
4. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response", November 2004, in *Theory of War and Strategy* (Vol. 3), ed. James A. Helis, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 29 August 2005, 440.
5. "Torchbearer National Security Report, Key Issues Relevant to Actionable Intelligence," Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, Arlington, VA, June 2005, 7.
6. *Ibid*, 5.
7. Sean Naylor, "Infantry Chief: Cultural Intel Must Improve," *Army Times*, 20 November 2000, p. 15.
8. Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review*, July-August 2005, Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 9-10.
9. After Action Review: 3rd Infantry Division, Chapter #9 – Intelligence, U.S. Army Center for Lessons-Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 6 January 2006, <https://call2.army.mil/docs/aar/3IDAAR/ch9.asp>, (accessed 12 March 2006). "IPE" has replaced "IPB" as a doctrinal term.
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12. JP 3-57, III-27-28.
13. *Ibid.*, GL-6.
14. For a more detailed explanation of this idea, see Christopher Holshek, "Integrated Civil-Military and Information Operations: Finding Success in Synergy," in *The Cornwallis Group IX: Analysis for Stabilization and Counter-Terrorist Operations*, (Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2005): 137-165.
15. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002): 7.

Section Three – Network Centric Operations

Introduction

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2. Michael Wallace, "Brave New Workplace: Technology and Work in the New Economy," *Work and Occupations*, (November 1989), 364.
3. Director, Office of Force Transformation, "Elements of Defense Transformation," (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 2004), 17.
4. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2003): 3.
5. "Elements of Defense Transformation," 8.
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10. William S. Wallace, "Network-Enabled Battle Command," *Military Review*, May–June 2005, 5.

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30. *Leadership in Organizations*, 287.

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32. Defense Science Board, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington DC.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2004), 28.
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14. Department of Defense, "CAPSTONE CONCEPT for JOINT OPERATIONS," Version 2.0. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, August 2005), 13-14.
15. Browne, 14.
16. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare, Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, (Washington, D.C.: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999): 88-91.
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Implementing NATO Network Enabled Capability: Implications for NATO Response Force's Envisioned Roles

1. NATO Public Diplomacy Division, "NATO Response Force: Deploying Capabilities Faster and Further than Ever Before," NATO Briefing, January 2005, www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nrf-e.pdf, (accessed 27 November 2005), 2.
2. *Ibid*, 5.
3. Allied Command Transformation, "Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations," January 2006, 18. "Networking and Information Infrastructure" (NII) is a term synonymous with Communication and Information System (CIS) capabilities – in this case, NATO and national communication systems and core information systems.
4. "An Introduction to NATO Network Enabled Capability," Information Superiority and NATO Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team (IS-NNEC IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, December 2004, 2.
5. "NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision & Concept," Allied Command Transformation, 31 January 2006: 4.
6. The "Federation-of-Systems" or federated network means national networks and assets are still under their respective nation's ownership and autonomous control. This situation is different from a national network environment that operates as a standalone entity. The joining together environment relies on the voluntary support of NATO members. The federation builds a multi-layered and multi-participant network using agreed upon common interfaces and services.
7. Interoperability is defined in both the NNEC Feasibility Study (NNEC FS) and NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision & Concept as "the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."
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Division, 5. NRF can be configured for up to 25,000, consisting of a brigade-size land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force composed of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day, and a special forces component. Combat support and combat service support capabilities will be NRF integral parts. Forces designated are limited to NATO nations only; however, non-NATO nations may be invited to participate on a case basis.

9. Ibid, 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. "Operational Capabilities: Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats," NATO Briefing, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, December 2004, www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html, (accessed 27 November 2005), 9. Forces allocated to the NRF for Exercise Steadfast Jaguar are under JFC Brunssum's control. The Full Operational Capability (FOC) live exercise is scheduled for June 2006 from Cape Verde Islands.
13. "The NATO Response Force – NRF, SHAPE Public Information Office," http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.html, (accessed 30 January 2006).
14. "Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge by NATO's Strategic Commanders," Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation Public Information Offices, <http://www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/docs/stratvis0804.pdf>, (accessed 2 January 2006), 22. A separate document, the Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations (CAFJO), translates the NATO Commanders' Bi-Strategic Vision military guidance into follow-on transformational concepts and operational capabilities of how NATO military forces could conceivably operate in 10-15 years. There is a division of responsibility for SACEUR and SACT as bi-strategic commands. From a CIS perspective, SACEUR has military operational command over the NRF and addresses operational shortfalls against current CIS capabilities. From a CIS perspective, SACT addresses future CIS strategy, concepts, capabilities, and architecture.
15. Ibid, 22.
16. Ibid, 15.
17. John H. Admire, "Transforming Coalition Warfare with Network Centric Capabilities," speech given in Denmark at the Ninth International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Coalition Transformation: "An Evolution of People, Processes & Technology to Enhance Interoperability," September 16, 2004, www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/ICCRTS_Denmark/CD/papers/170.pdf, (accessed 28

June 2005). Admire, a retired U.S. Marine Corps major general, is a senior analyst and program manager with Evidence Based Research and U.S. Joint Forces Command in the J9 Joint Experimentation Directorate.

18. Ibid, 8.
19. Ibid.
20. "Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge by NATO's Strategic Commanders," Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation Public Information Offices, 16.
21. Tom Buckman, "NATO Network Enabled Capability Feasibility Study Executive Summary" Version 2.0, NATO C3 Agency (Communications and Information Systems Division, October 2005), 1. Dr. Buckman is NC3A Chief Architect and Leader of the Architecture and Integration, Integration Program Team, and NC3A's Project Manager for the NNEC Feasibility Study. NNEC FS is a key element of an overall ACT led concept undertaken by NC3A with operational scenarios input from ACO and ACT. It further develops the NNEC scope, concept, establishes a strategy and a roadmap to implement CIS infrastructure capabilities (synonymous with the term NII). In January 2004, 12 NATO nations contracted NC3A to conduct this 18-month study.
22. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, "Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority," 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, February 2000), 88. The three authors are recognized leading experts in NCW.
23. "Network Centric Warfare," Report to Congress, Executive Summary, (Department of Defense: 2001), i.
24. John J. Garstka, "Network Centric Operations: An Overview of Tenets and Key Concepts," briefing presentation adapted for the 10 October 2005 NATO NEC Short Course in Ede, The Netherlands. The four NCW tenets cited in the U.S. DoD Office of Force Transformation diagram appeared in the 27 July 2001 Department of Defense Network Centric Warfare, Report to Congress. Mr. John Garstka is the Assistant Director for Concepts and Operations, U.S. DoD Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
25. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, and David A. Signori, "Understanding Information Age Warfare," (Washington, DC: Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, July 2002), 12.
26. Ibid, 13.

27. Garstka, "Network Centric Operations: An Overview of Tenets and Key Concepts" briefing. During the 10 October 2005 NATO NEC Short Course, Mr. Garstka's presentation depicted a fourth domain, the "social domain" alongside the cognitive domain incorporated into the networked force's value chain. The 2001 Network Centric Warfare, Report to Congress and Alberts, et. al's Understanding Information Age Warfare publication, however, provided only three warfare domains shown as overlapping in a Venn diagram.
28. Alberts, et.al, "Understanding Information Age Warfare," 12. Another cited source describing the physical domain is "Joint Operations Concepts," U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, November 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/ncw/ncw_main.pdf; (accessed 27 December 2005) 14-15.
29. "Network Centric Warfare," ii. "Full spectrum dominance" is the defeat of any adversary or control of any situation across the full range of military operations.
30. Ibid. "Networked" describes a Joint Force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose. Just as NII supports NNEC, the Global Information Grid (GIG) is the infrastructure supporting the collection of all information systems used by DoD under the oversight of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).
31. "Network Enabled Capability: An Introduction," Version 1.1, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), April 2004, 7.
32. Ibid. U.K. defence capability has seven components that collectively provide the Defence Capability Framework: "prepare, project, operate, protect, sustain, command, and inform." NEC primarily benefits the "command" and "inform" components of defence capability by permitting free exchange of information. NEC also enables the other Defence Capability components.
33. Ibid, 9.
34. Ibid, 17.
35. NATO C3 Board, see "Welcome to the NATO C3 Board" website for details, <http://www.nhq3s.nato.int/Nc3bGeneral.asp>, (accessed 3 January 2006). Information to build this table was also extracted from "Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge by NATO's Strategic Commanders," Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation Public Information Offices, <http://www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/docs/stratvis0804.pdf>, (accessed 2 January 2006).
36. "NNEC Foundation Document," Information Superiority and NATO Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team (IS-NNEC IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 1 December 2004, 2.

When fully developed and approved by the NATO Military Committee, the NNEC Strategic Framework will consist of the Vision and Concept, Architecture, Roadmap, Business Case, and Detailed Plan necessary to implement NNEC.

37. Ibid, iv and 7. This Conceptual Framework model was adapted and developed by SACT and the U.S. DoD Office of Force Transformation to meet the unique requirements of NNEC, given its multi-national character. For clarification of military functions, “collectors” are sensors/platforms that transform raw data sources into useable information. The goal of their effort is information superiority. “Decision makers” are categorized as multinational military, governmental, and non-governmental agencies linked to network-centric capabilities. The goal of their effort is decision superiority. “Effectors” are weapons systems/shooters, political, economic, or information capabilities. The goal of their effort is execution superiority (or EBO type effects).
38. Rita Boland, “NATO Undergoes Massive Transformation,” *Signal*, February 2006, 60. In 2001, the RAND Corporation, an Arlington, Virginia based non-profit research organization, published a report titled *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*. The report was generated in the aftermath of NATO’s 78-day air offensive in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. It provided recommendations identifying several major areas in which NATO and its individual nations could improve support to future coalition military operations.
39. “Draft Status Report and Proposed Way Ahead on the Joint Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Concept for NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC),” NATO C3 Board Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1), AC/322(SC/1)N(20006)0002, 21 February 2006, 1-1. A NATO STANAG is promulgated by the Chairman, Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) under the authority vested by the NATO Military Committee. The need to update existing NATO single service CIS concepts for deploying tactical forces has been identified in different fora, such as STANAG 5048, SUBJECT: The Minimum Scale of Connectivity for Communications and Information Systems for NATO Land Forces. At the same time STANAG 5048 was being revised, the NNEC concept was developing.
40. “NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision and Concept,” *Allied Command Transformation*, 31 January 2006, 12.
41. Buckman, 2. NII capability implies the need for an unprecedented degree of flexibility, agility, adaptability and interoperability in the force structures involved and in the networking and information systems that support them.

42. NATO C3 Board Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1), 1-2. A work plan within the NC3 community has been slow in producing current conceptual and doctrinal documents such as a capstone Allied Joint Publication for CIS issues relative to NATO led multinational forces (such as the NRF) for conducting operations involving more than one service. Specifically, in November 2004 the NC3 Board tasked Joint C3 Requirements and Concepts Sub-Committee (SC/1) to develop a Joint CIS Concept for NNEC. Its main aim has been to focus on understanding CIS principles and responsibilities for planning, managing, operating and providing resources for the NII. Aside from ACT's January 2006 NNEC Vision and Concept, a lack of doctrinal consensus exists of what right might look like when articulating guiding principles and responsibilities for network enabled organizations like the NRF.
43. Hugh Daghish and John Neumayer, "NNEC Conference Working Group E – 2004," briefing given to the 1st NNEC Conference, 29-30 March 2004 in Norfolk, VA, <http://nnec.act.nato.int/Conference689/2004NNECPo>, (accessed 28 December 2005). Hugh Daghish is a Captain in the UK Navy, while John Neumayer is a retired US Navy officer. Both work in ACT's Intelligence Sub-Division. They were group facilitator co-leads that focused on NRF issues related to information dissemination management, information content and quality, situational understanding/decision making, and information superiority.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.* Although STANAGs have helped facilitate interoperability, the drawback under the current rigid process is the amount of time it takes to achieve STANAG ratification among the nations. To further complicate the process, setting up a STANAG does not automatically mean any nation has to implement it.
46. "Guiding Principles for C3 System Interoperability Experimentation, Test and Validation in Support of NRF and NNEC," undated, NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 1-1. Specifically, NRF CIS interoperability requirements would need to be identified within the operational view of NATO C3 architectures developed in accordance with a NATO C3 Systems Interoperability Directive (NID) and NATO C3 System Architecture Framework. ACT development of NNEC architectures will serve as nested references for the NNEC Strategic Framework documents once both are fully developed.
47. "NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision & Concept," Allied Command Transformation, iii, 3. The federated approach of evolving improvements recognizes national capabilities/contributions changing over time, as operational groupings of member nations change, and as NATO capabilities change.

48. The “reach back” concept relies on long haul, end-to-end satellite connectivity with deployable ground terminals geographically dispersed between forward deployed and non-deployed elements of an NRF headquarters conducting split based operations.
49. Arnaud Vandame, “The Challenge of NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC),” briefing given to the NATO NEC Short Course, 13 October 2005, 19. Commander Vandame is with the French Navy and is Integrated Capabilities Team (ICT) Deputy Leader for ACT-IS NNEC.
50. Buckman, 14. Internet Protocol (IP) refers to a maturing commercial information transport mechanism that depends on a single virtual “black” core (NATO Unclassified) network with IP encryption devices to handle voice, data, or video traffic for multiple security domains and classification levels. IPv4 and its successor, IPv6, work on a digital bit addressing scheme available to route or control data packets moving across the network. Dr. Buckman points out in the NNEC FS that to support static or mobile domain requirements in the communications layer of the NII physical infrastructure, the idea behind extending the virtual network using IP as a convergence standard should enable operating locations to use whatever type of transmission media users may have access to in support of CIE.
51. “NNEC Architectures,” Information Superiority and NATO Network Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team, (IS-NNEC-IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 24 June 2004, 15-16. FoS architectures will have to accommodate emerging design techniques such as service-oriented architecture (SOA) which allow software applications from different vendors to interoperate between component equipments and be modified to be compliant with changing technologies to facilitate information sharing.
52. Aldo Borgu, “The Challenges and Limitations of ‘Network Centric Warfare’ – the Initial Views of an NCW Skeptic,” 17 September 2003, 3. Mr. Borgu is Program Director, Operations and Capability Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
53. Elton Davis, “NRF-4 CIS: Challenges & Progress,” *Peace Rider*, Autumn/Winter 2004: 5-6, www.1gnc.de/hq%20magazine/winter_2004/04-07%20CIS.pdf, (accessed 22 March 2006). Elton Davis is a Lieutenant Colonel from the UK Army who is CG6 Division/Chief Plans with the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. The Peace Rider is the Corps Headquarters’ quarterly magazine.
54. Buckman, 13-14. The Internet depends on the Internet Engineering Task Force to coordinate development of common standards to allow independently developed national networks to interconnect with the look and feel of a created common set of accessible services inherent

in the Internet. Similarly, the logic is for NATO to consider adopting the Internet IETF model for developing NII standards.

55. COMBINED ENDEAVOR is an annual, U.S. European Command sponsored, Partnership for Peace (PfP) C4 Integration and Interoperability Exercise enabling interoperability between U.S. and NATO/PfP CIS equipment by documenting and exercising technical and procedural solutions. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) is an annual exercise hosted by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 26 coalition countries participating, including diverse military services and government agencies that focuses on interoperability trials to formally assess technology for its ability to solve interoperability challenges. The Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, was established for conducting joint and combined experimentation and analysis, assisting ACT's developmental work on new technologies, modeling and simulation.
56. Robert K. Ackerman, "In NATO, Technology Challenges Yield to Political Interoperability Hurdles," *Signal*, January 2006, http://www.imakenews.com/signal/e_article000509437.cfm, (accessed 27 January 2006) 1.
57. Ruud S. van Dam, "NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) – The Challenge of Implementing NEC in an Alliance," speech given at C4I Asia Conference, Theme: Force Transformation in Action: Information Dominance, February 20, 2006, http://www.c4iasia.com/conference_programme.html, (accessed 23 March 2006). Major General van Dam, Netherlands Air Force, is the Assistant Chief of Staff C4I [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence], and the Director, Allied Command Transformation for Information Superiority & NNEC Integrated Capability Team, Supreme Allied Command for Transformation.
58. Vandame, 21.
59. Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, "The NATO Response Force: Facilitating Coalition Warfare through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing," *Defense and Technology Paper* Number 18, September 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Defense_Tech_papers.html, (accessed 22 March 2006), 62. Mr. Bialos is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Security and Industry Program at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Center for Transatlantic Relations, and a partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill and Brennan. Mr. Koehl is a defense analyst and a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations. Blue Force Tracking (BFT) is a system derived from the U.S. Army's Future Battle Command – Brigade and Below, that enables commanders to track friendly forces down to individual vehicle level to avoid fratricide. It has

a limited U.S. release. Digital Rosetta Stone is a non-releasable U.S. developmental system that will aid in creating bridges between the NRF and U.S. C4I (Command, Control, Computers, Communications and Intelligence) systems.

60. Ibid, viii and 65.
61. Ibid, xi and 4.
62. Ibid, 12.
63. Gordon Trowbridge, "U.S. Lawmakers: NATO Allies Must Spend More," Defense News.com, posted 8 March 2006, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1585143&C=europe>, (accessed 9 March 2006), 1.
64. Reuters, "NATO Commander Fears Rapid Force Delay," Defense News.com, posted 10 February 2006, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1527177&C=europe>, (accessed 11 February 2006), 1.
65. Mark Joyce, "Transformation Evolution: Operational Transition is New NATO Challenge," *Defense News*, 7 November 2005, <http://www.defensenews.com>, (accessed 10 November 2005), 21. Mr. Joyce is a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in London.
66. Reuters, 1.
67. "NATO Handbook," NATO Office of Information and Press (2001), 202.
68. "NNEC Questionnaire – National Inputs"; survey conducted during NATO NNEC Conference, 29-30 March 2004, Allied Command Transformation, <http://nnec.act.nato.int/Conference689/2004NNEC> Po, (accessed 28 December 2005), 36-38. The document provides a complete digest of the actual responses. The 29-30 March 2004 NNEC Conference Report provides a quick mention of the NNEC questionnaire.
69. "NATO Handbook," 202. Two aspects characterize the principle of common funding. One aspect is "cost share," an agreed percentage or formula related to costs associated with NATO activities. The second aspect is the "over and above principle." This means that common funding can be used to fund requirements that are reasonably above what a nation would be expected to provide for NATO's benefit. Types of common funded budgets include: headquarters budgets, which support the military command structure; program budgets related to exercises, experimentation, reorganization, training and education; mission budgets for Crisis Response Operations; and NATO civilian personnel pensions.
70. NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) is implemented under the Infrastructure Committee's supervision within NAC approved annual contribution ceilings. It finances the provision of installations

and facilities needed to support the roles of SACEUR and SACT that are recognized as exceeding the member nations' national defense requirements.

71. "NNEC Foundation Document, v1.00, Information Superiority and NATO Network Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team (IS-NNEC-IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, (1 December 2004), 15.
72. Ruud S. van Dam, "ACOS C4I Speaking Notes at Industry Day," speech given at SACT's Industry Day 2004, Theme: NATO's Transformation Command: "A Partnership with Industry," September 16, 2004, <http://www.act.nato.int/events/documents/indday04/s2vandam.pdf>, (accessed 28 June 2005), 7. The event was held in Berlin, Germany and was aimed at CEOs and senior management of defense industry.
73. "The Review of NATO Military Common Funded Resource Management: SRB Report to Council," Annex 1 C-M(2001)34, with forwarding note by then-Secretary General George Robertson to C-M(2001)34 Document, Senior Resource Board, North Atlantic Council, (18 May 2001), 1-3. Diverse NATO resource management committees are (not all-inclusive): the Military Budget Committee, Infrastructure Committee, International Board of Auditors for NATO, and the Senior Resource Board. In this document, the SRB conducted a study to improve the management of all NATO military common funded resources by focusing on the resource decision making and resource control processes.
74. NATO CIS acquisition programs for NNEC consideration are Automated Information Systems (AIS), NATO General Purpose Communications Segment (NGCS), SATCOM Post 2000, NATO General Tacoms Post 2000, Air Command and Control System, Ground Surveillance, and Missile Defense.
75. Buckman, 6. Dr. Buckman mentions in his Table of Recommendations section of the study that there are around 82 Capability Packages (CP), each containing one or many projects ranging from C4ISR capabilities to infrastructure facility upgrades from the other NATO Transformation Objective Areas, that will need to be assessed from an NNEC perspective.
76. Information Superiority and NATO Network Enabled Capability Integrated Project Team (IS-NNEC-IPT), NATO HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NNEC Data Strategy, 24 March 2005, 24.
77. Boland, 58.

