

Chapter 3

Working Group Presentations: Tuesday, 13 September, 1300-1630

Second Day Opening Comments:

PKSOI:

A couple of quick points. One, on the critique form: we're not looking for, "Hey, great job." I could care less about that sort of critique. We're looking for some real substantive points. For example a point was raised yesterday was that some folks felt that the questions kind of DOD-centric. And I said, "Huh. I didn't think that, but I'm from DOD and we wrote them, so imagine that!" So again those sorts of points, to say, "Hey the questions are DOD-centric" is one thing. To say, "Hey, if you wrote the question this way, then it wouldn't quite be DOD-centric." That would be helpful. That's the sort of feedback we're looking for, because it wasn't intended to be DOD-centric questions. They were intended to be questions that were university applicable to educators and to trainers and to help us get at how we can, as educators and trainers, improve what we are doing. So obviously that isn't what we want to communicate. That is what communicated to select individuals or to a large group of folks, because I got that from numerous places. So give us some thoughts on how we re-craft that, so that we can learn to get it out there in a way that's meaningful for you and you don't see it as DOD trying to come in and ask for feedback that we're not going to be sharing. So that's the sort of stuff that we're looking for on the critique form. What can we focus in on? Did we focus in on the right topics? If you wrote the question this way, those are the sort of things.

On the reference material, again, a lot of good ideas I'm sure are going back and forth. And what we'd like to do is to get those to Mike. If you can get it to Mike by about Tuesday of next week, and then that way we can start mailing the CDs out by Friday of the following week. Any additional reference materials that you think are of value added; links to web sites, those sorts of things. Short description, push that to Mike and we'll grab that, collate it, go through it and put it back out to folks. Again, that would be very helpful as well as a start point of resources we can share with the intent of taking then that same sort of information, and as we get a web site stood up and other folk's web sites, we can get it out there on web sites and get links established, and share the information among one another. So those

are two points I wanted to make. Again, appreciate your support. Don't worry, we've got thick skin, so give it to us and tells us how we make this conference better. It's not supposed to be a DOD conference; it's supposed to be a conference for all parties involved in stability reconstruction on how can we work together better, and how can we share with one another.

Focus Area A: “Integrating Peace, Stability and Reconstruction Operations (PS & RO) into the curriculum.” (Groups A, B and C)

DISCUSSION:

How is PS & RO curriculum determined? Are there constraints that prevent stability operations from being fully explored?

What is the understood scope of stability operations and is it integrated into other subjects or taken as a stand alone topic?

Is there value in PKSOI coordinating the formation of a curriculum development group to share good ideas and approaches? Or are the existing groups such as the MECC for the war colleges the more appropriate vehicle?

Have your institutions defined the minimum level of proficiency required for a student to have an understanding of stability operations? What types of subject areas should the student be aware of, such as the role NGOs, Rule of Law, Counterinsurgency principles, Cultural Aspects? [See question below if you have time to expand on the cultural and behavior aspects of stability operations.]

What is the best aspect of your curriculum in exposing the students to stability operations?

What directives and policies specifically addressing stability operations education are you using in your organization?

What is the level of interest in the S R & O instruction by your students?

IF YOU HAVE TIME – CONSIDER THESE QUESTIONS

Do you have a distance learning aspect of your instruction and how does that approach complement or differ from the resident approach? What are the unique challenges?

How are the “behavioral” or “cultural” aspects of stability operations addressed, i.e., the historical, socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of maintaining peace in these environments? Do you see any need for improvement?

Working Group Presentations

Group A: First Question:

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group A

Key Points

- **No common terms of reference for the interagency in support of S&RO**
- **Who:**
 - **DOD within the JIIM context**
 - **Customers**
 - **Facility**
- **What:**
 - **Doctrine or Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP)?**
 - **Doctrine and concepts have not kept up with the current operating environment – doctrine losing out on best practices/lessons learned**
 - **Need to teach understanding the situation and what to do about it**
- **When:**
 - **Basic subjects taught from beginning to end of career**
- **Where:**
 - **Formal Academic Institutions, training centers and experience based learning**
 - **Mentoring**

Tab 4 of your (conference work) books has a breakout of who was on each team, for you recall. For Team A not listed on there are Larry Hamby from Booze Allen, and Rick Radcliff from TRADOC, were both part of our

team yesterday. I think Teams A, B and C all had the same issue to grapple with and that was integrating peace, stability and reconstruction operations into the curriculum, as it was framed. And as we addressed that issue we used probably the most complex method of organizing our thoughts that we could think of to fit the audience. And so here's how we did it. The who, what, when where and why method of organizing.

We started with a general statement, and it applies not only to this topic but a lot of the discussion yesterday. And that is, the need for a common terminology within the Interagency. And we began by just saying, well, are we talking about training or are we talking about education? And we could have gone down that rat hole and finally focused on education. We will not be presenting to you a group approved definition of those terms. Our statement is simply upfront. In this area as in all others dealing with the Interagency, the need for a common, approved, or at least accepted, terms of reference is absolutely vital before you start any serious undertaking. For workshops, for group work, for the development of policy, at least have a straw man for the key terms that all can at least accept for the purpose of whatever project that you are undertaking.

And then for the rest, instead of dealing with the questions that were on the handout, and I don't know if Groups B and C had the same handout. It began with how is the curriculum determined? We kind of brainstormed various ideas and then organized them into the questions that are listed there. And we began with the who. Who is the curriculum supposed to be for? Who are we educating? And we determined that our primary students, if you will, are those members of the DOD that will take part in peace, stability and reconstruction operations. But they are to be, or should be, educated within the joint Interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational context, which is key. And so, what does that mean? Well, that means privates are in basic training. It means any military personnel as they go through their initial entry. It could mean Cadets in pre-commissioning training. It certainly means Lieutenants at their basic officer leader course and at their officer basic courses. So it's the entire DOD, and so we weren't trying to develop a curriculum for members of the State Department. For us, the curriculum that we grappled with is for the Department of Defense.

Another aspect of the Who, are the customers. Once these members are educated, then where will they then work? And those that we brainstormed were certainly the combatant commanders; those that will be in charge in an AOR of PS&RO, but also Ambassadors in each of the countries. And

we looked at those as key members to gauge are we meeting educational requirements, because later on you will see where at least we thought, what should we be teaching? The What, you know what policy guides, how we ought to be educating, whatever target audience we decide upon to conduct these operations. And a key source for that, what we ought to be teaching, are the customers of those who we educate. And those were the two primary ones we mentioned.

The third bullet under there actually ought to read faculty and not facility. So if you're taking notes, please correct that. The faculty, those that educate, those that are charged with educating our students. It is an interesting dynamic that we discussed that we find ourselves in here in 2005. About 65% of the students that we teach here at the Army War College are coming from CENTCOM's AOR, within the past two or three years, or immediately before this assignment. They have the experience as Lieutenant Colonels or junior Colonels in peace, stability and reconstruction operations. In a few years, they will be eligible to join the faculties at our senior service colleges, once they finish their utilization tour as a Colonel. In other words, the potential faculty that will be available in the next one to ten years will be bringing with them a depth of experience that we have not seen since post Viet Nam era for educating on this topic.

Then we moved to the What. And we approached in very, very general terms, What should we be teaching to get at peace, stability and reconstruction operations? Well, we're taught as you develop a curriculum one source for what you teach, at least within the Department of Defense, is our war fighting doctrine. That's a source for training. It's a source for what functions are performed. It's a source for what responsibilities are performed at each level of command. And it's a source for what tasks need to be performed in order to perform those functions or operations. As opposed to doctrine TTP, Tactic, Techniques and Procedures, how do you do things specifically, specific procedures to fit a specific situation or a specific task. So it's a bit different than enduring doctrine. And so we asked that question. Is it one or the other? The problem with doctrine is that we feel that our doctrine, especially in peace keeping ops, especially at the rate we're learning about how to do certain things, has not kept up with the experience that both those that we would educate and those that would be the educators have, based on operations in the last four years. So to use doctrine as the basis for the What is problematic. TTP, however, because it is more flexible, there is a more agile system under development, and I don't know if it is in fact complete,

to bring tactics, techniques and procedures that have been proven in the field and formalized them and disseminate them into our school houses and into our various units.

Regardless, what we talked about, though, was a general framework for what to teach fall into two general categories. And that is an understanding of the situation and then what to do about it. And the way we discussed it was like this, the understanding of the situation is an understanding of the contemporary operating environment. It's the environment in which we live and it involves the culture and it involves the political aspects. It certainly involves the nature of the threat or the adversaries or the obstacles to PS & RO. And it involves, then, an understanding of what could occur in the next months, weeks, years. And then what to do about it, not necessarily specific procedures, but how to think about the problems. And so while we didn't say this directly, and with apologies to Team A for maybe putting words in our mouth, education really is not about what to think, but how to think about problems. And that type of framework, I think fits, looking at education in that way.

When do we educate our target audience on peace, stability and reconstruction operations throughout their careers? As I mentioned, it has to start early. We talked about the case of the "Strategic Corporal," where any actions they may have could be the topic for the SecDef's next press conference. And they need to understand, not only from a cultural awareness, but because of the prevalence of the media and for various other aspects, that education in PS & RO is mandatory throughout their careers. But what they are taught is certainly going to be different when they are a 20year-old Private, Sergeant, Second Lieutenant, vice when they are a 45year-old Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel, or a 50 year-old Brigadier General. So what they're taught could be different, but a constant continuous program of education throughout their careers, we think is what is called for.

Where do we do it? Academic institutions, training centers, and here, when we got into this discussions on Where in fact the education ought to occur, then the blurring between education and training became much more. Training centers certainly is more a training experience. Experience based learning. It could be self paced. It could be self development. It could be delivered via distance education or distance learning techniques. But, again, we thought it's important to mention that because of the depth of experience that both the audience and the potential faculty will have for the next decade, at least.

And then we discussed the idea of mentoring as a part of a formal education process throughout the years. We, at least in the Army, talked about mentoring from two primary aspects not related to education. And one aspect is kind of you have a mentor to help guide you along your career path. Well, should I take a second company level command as a Captain or should I move on to the highest level staff that's available to me. And it's questions like that that either a serving or a retired general officer can help you early in your career wrestle with based on what your career goals are. The other aspect of mentoring is formalized in our officer evaluation report system, where your senior rater is mandated to counsel you on a periodic basis, on your performance and what you can do to improve. We're talking about mentoring here from an education standpoint. And again, those potential mentors, and they don't have to be general officers now because, again, of the depth of our bench, the depth and the number of potential mentors that have experience in the PS & RO. And so they could team with one or several students, whether in our institutions or in units and mentor

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group A

Why:

- **Current operating environment demands it and the future operating environment will likely require it**
- **Important to the customer**
- **Qualitative Improvement**

• How:

- **DOD mechanism and procedures exist to guide and develop curriculum**
 - » **Questions:**
 - » **are they responsive;**
 - » **do they consider other than DOD;**
 - » **do they consider experiential;**
 - » **are the mechanisms exportable**
- **Policy and guidance – no standard – is it required**
- **Exchange program**
- **Educational Objective determined by study of history, concepts and doctrine, and experience.**

them in the various aspects of PS & RO. I didn't mention it at the outset, but as I'm going through this, if you find a point that you'd like to question on, please do so, embellish or challenge.

Why need we develop a curriculum for PS&RO? We felt for those reasons there. Current operating environment which we find ourselves in now, is the major military operation that we have ongoing now and for the foreseeable future. And as you read documents like the Joint Operational Environment, any of the concepts dealing with future warfare or future conflict talks about a future operating environment in which peace, stability and reconstruction operations will be part of any conflict or post conflict operation. It's important to the customer. We talked about a survey that someone either had access to or participated in as a member of our group in which the combatant commanders were asked about what's important to them. This is beyond simply an integrated priority list. This is what is important to you now and what shall we be preparing service members to do before they come into your command. And the notion of PS&RO was very high on the list. So it's important to those customers. And then a qualitative improvement we believe is called for. And the source of this, I can't speak to firsthand; it could be after action reviews or assessment of unit performance, but how well we conduct peace, stability and reconstruction operations, our group felt certainly could be improved. Education is one way of doing that.

OK. Those were the five Ws. How do we in fact, then, integrate PS&RO into the curriculum? Well we felt that a mechanism already exists at several levels within the Department of Defense to build curriculums. The college here, any senior service college has a process by which curriculums are built. I believe the Joint Staff is responsible for JPME (joint professional military education). Is the J-7 Rep (on the Joint Staff in the J-7 section) still here?

J-7 Rep:

Yes. And you (DOD) were provided guidance.

Group A:

So procedures do exist to guide the development. But just because they exist, we had questions. Are those procedures, are those mechanisms responsive? Again, if you think back to the what should we be teaching, if,

in fact, we ought to be teaching what our doctrine says on peace, stability and reconstruction operations, well, the program of instruction, or the lesson plans may not change for five to seven years. Which is the normal life cycle of a Joint Pub or I can at least speak to Army field manuals. But if in fact we ought to be educating our target audience on what are we learning today and what should these members know before they go into the CENTCOM area of responsibility, well then our doctrine may not be responsive enough. And then we are getting into tactics, techniques and procedures, lessons learned versus lessons observed as a member of our group was quick to point out. And in order to provide in our education system the relevant material to best prepare them for these operations.

Question:

I guess I have a quick question. I mean I know that 60% of the doctrine right now is under revision. But why would, I mean, I don't think an instructor would actually, if they know that the doctrine is outdated, that would be the start. But then they would show how current operations have changed and things need to evolve. I don't think an instructor is going to sit there and just teach outdated doctrine. But you do have to establish here is where the doctrine is today and this is where we're evolving to. I'm not an instructor, but I'm sure that most of the instructors are doing that. And they're supported by the students who have the direct experience. So I mean we can point our finger at doctrine, but we understand that it does take a while to go and get that updated.

Group A:

I agree with you. And I think we're pointing the finger at doctrine because that came up in our discussion as a source for what ought to be teaching.

Comment:

One of the members of the group pointed out, and in fact it's what drove us to that point, is that that's what should happen in the classroom, but in some cases that's what's not happening. There is significant dissatisfaction on the part of those coming back from actual experience that a firm belief on their part that that experience is not being taken into account. And that there is this disconnect with the doctrine that is not being addressed.

Comment:

I mean it's doctrine, but it also is faculty currency. I mean that's a faculty development issue. They should understand that here's where doctrine is, but how are they getting the information that tells them that things have changed. There's all kind of lessons learned out there. There're reports, there's self study, there's self development. You should know as an instructor if you are responsible for that area. What is doctrine today, what is TTP?

PKSOI:

That's probably the people we're trying to get at because to say that you should know as an instructor is a cop out. To say that the instructor does—it's in the doctrine is a cop out. The point we're trying to get out is, how do we get things out there for instructors to do? And we're going down a very DOD-centric path right here right now. So, my thought is that, again, what we're trying to get out of this is how can we, or what should be taught and then how do we make sure that we're teaching the most current and relevant pieces of this? Hopefully, we can distinguish a little bit between what the needs are of the different organizations within it and we can start identifying subject matter experts and resources that we can use together and share between one another. That's what we're trying to get at here. What needs to be taught? How do we teach it? Now we have an understanding what needs to be taught. You were focused on the curriculum. There's another set of groups that will be talking about faculty development. So we'll get to that soon.

Comment:

Just two points probably unrelated in support, I think, of what Larry said on training and education. Training, you are teaching people doctrine and how to apply the doctrine. And that's something, I guess, that basically stops at the staff college level. At the war college level you're beyond that in the education and people are looking at higher levels and they may be analyzing doctrine, rewriting doctrine, but you're certainly not teaching the doctrine. At the higher levels, the way you want to teach people, first off, and I can give you chapter and verse on this, you can't teach 40 year olds anything. They can learn. But you can't teach them anything. So that's the hard part. You have to cause learning without being able to teach. And so the best way to do that is using, I think, a case study method. And finally, and this is just more a comment on OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation

Enduring Freedom), the whole process of doctrine writing is changing. It was something that was done by the Imperial Them. And it was very much of a top down process. There was an incredible bureaucracy connected to it. But that's really sort of more about the production of field manuals than it is about doctrine. GEN DePew used to say that doctrine is what 51% of the Army believes and practices. And what's going on in the field today is people are writing doctrine from below. And they are passing it out. And Wednesday's doctrine may not be Friday's doctrine. And, you, now, these various nets, the company commander's net, the platoon leader's net and whatever, this is where people are going for doctrine. They are not going to FM so and so and such and such because they know that that was written pre 9/11 or for another battle field or with conventional warfare in mind. So I just throw that out to people who are thinking about doctrine because I think it's probably one of the biggest revolutionary consequences of the conflicts we're involved in right now. And ultimately things like TRADOC will end up on the trash heap of history because their world has been turned upside down and they are no longer relevant. But probably not next year.

Group A:

I think we tried to get at that last discussion here with our bullet on considering experiential activities that are occurring in theater. But again a caveat has to be applied to that. Just because something is working over there, as you said, Sir, that next week a different approach may be working and so what we bring into our institutions as the basis for an education program, we ought to be pretty darn sure that it's not just the technique of the day, and ought to be something enduring, especially if we're talking about education and teaching.

Comment:

My pals who are real students of the higher levels of doctrine say that you're better off today teaching, basic theory than practical, this is how you fight, doctrine because the basic theories are going to satisfy your tests and then stand the test of time.

Group A;

And here, of what I know of our POI, especially as campaign planning, is we do both. They get the theory early on. When they get into the campaign planning, they get into the Joint Pub Five series.

Comment:

I think I was just going to add and I think I agree with Joe in general. But I wanted to bring up a pretty substantial debate in our group and I would offer I would suppose it was probably one in all the groups, was really distinguishing between the lexicon of doctrine in tactics, techniques and procedures. As one of these guys just coming back from over there and going to these sites and CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned), is a phenomenal resource, but frankly that's not doctrine. Frankly, that's tactics, techniques and procedures, a wonderful repository of what to do but in a very specific context. I think our question on one of the previous slides was one that's really getting to the question of doctrine. That raises some concern from today. And that's the concern we have with the lag between the collection. The enemy's given us a wonderful opportunity right now to allow us to collect a lot of tactics, techniques and procedural lessons gathered. But we are questioning the calibration of the operational mechanisms. That middle tier between formulated policy and implementation. That bureaucratic middle ground where doctrine lies that converts these experiential gathered tactics, techniques and procedures and converts those and puts them into a broader context. Actually transforms some of those things and sees what's common within those experiences that can be then actually converted into a theory, doctrine. And transposed forward into new "how's" of doing the business. And that was what we were really questioning in terms of the calibration of the mechanism of doctrine. And the last one I'll make, there is some anecdotal evidence out there, particularly from the junior end of the special military education programs that we are in a moment right now where a lot of these folks are coming out of experiences and experiential based knowledge. They are running up against some folks at that operational tier and higher tiers that are really approaching doctrine as dogma. But we're having a doctrinal dogmatic conflict and for some it's turning them away and they are actually voting with their feet and leaving the ranks. Others it's breeding a degree of cynicism. Some are doing the great thing and they are going toe to toe with their more senior, but perhaps less experience in the contemporary operating environment, professors and actually that's good, I think for me. That's a great environment where they can go in conflict and come out with both the so called student and teacher actually both becoming learners and learning from the experiences. But I think there is a mechanism problem that we tried to address, and I think it's, I'm sure all of us probably addressed it at some point in our discussions.

Comment:

I was just going to ask about that; you talked about year long learning. PS&RO basically is ten years old. We've been at before, since Bosnia, and we were in several years of denial there. So how do we teach the most senior people when you need to teach a new subject from bottom to top, top to bottom. It's not like these are basic trainees and I'm going to teach them to be an infantryman. Colonels and Generals – they've been infantrymen all their lives and knew what they were doing. Now it's a whole new subject. How do we introduce these new thoughts all the way up and down the line?

Group A:

That's kind of THE question. And we didn't come up with a specific answer for that. But that's the task of at least the three panels, integrating this into the curriculum.

**Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum
Group A**

• Recommendations

- Foster Interagency terminology and concepts**
- Develop cross-agency baseline educational objectives (amount of time required but what knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes at various levels)**
- Share curriculum data among agencies**
- Establish Interagency Education Council**
- Establish Interagency Policy that can be used to drive curriculum development**
- Encourage Interagency Exchange**
- Survey and pursue Advance Civil Schooling for Stability and Reconstruction**

Let me go through the rest of the How, because this was our attempt at answering that question. Now that you asked it so bluntly, I don't think it measures up. No policy in guidance or at least a lack thereof—Oh, I forgot. Are mechanisms exportable? John got it right on. This is DOD-centric, but are our mechanisms exportable to the rest of the Interagency? That's something that we ought to consider.

An exchange program is another way of cross fertilizing among the Interagency. And then this could be within the What, but we put it in the How. The educational objective, the learning objective, the outcome of learning, what you want to achieve by this educational experience. We figured the source is not only a study of history, but what we are doing currently and we called that concepts and doctrine. And then the experience that we're bringing back once it gets approved and formalized.

And given all that discussion then we have a few recommendations. One is to develop some standard, accepted terminology regarding peace, stability and reconstruction operations. Across agency base line educational objectives. And this is something that would apply beyond the Department of Defense. What are those common knowledge skills, abilities and attitudes that could apply to anyone working in a PS&RO operation or environment? We didn't get into the amount of time that would be required either by agency, by individual skill or whatever, but we were under the understanding that this afternoon we're going to be brainstorming some resource or constraints on this process. So we'll leave that for another time.

Speaking for the Army War College I could not say with any certainty that we share our curriculum of PS&RO with the other senior service colleges. OK, we do? Alright, well, there we go. We're still recommending that we share our curriculum data among all those interested in this educational project. There is something called a Military Education Council: we are wondering about the establishment of a similar body, Interagency Education Council, could be to set policy, could be to establish or accept or approve a common curriculum or those aspects of the curriculum that are common — Interagency policy that could be used to drive curriculum development. If one way of furthering our education is to exchange members within the Interagency, then our recommendation is to encourage that exchange. And then in terms of another educational opportunity, advanced civil schooling, and I don't think he's here yet, but Spanky, a member of our group is undertaking a survey of four year colleges that have ROTC that can also be considered centers of excellence for study programs relating to PS&RO.

So he's involved in a survey and then pursue a program like that as another educational outlet. That is the sum of all the Group A discussion items on this issue.

Group B, First Question:

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group B (1)

- **Best aspects**
 - Practical, real life exercises with military and civilian mentors
 - Real time judgment by ambassadors and generals
- **Recommendation**
 - Integrate PS & RO into curricula
 - Tours/detail with civilian agencies and IOs
 - Need a concurrence in the content to be taught

Group B:

Good morning. I live and work in that vague and cloudy area called the Interagency. The Interagency is apparently a vast wasteland impervious to folks who wear uniforms and are able to differentiate their services by what they wear. Those of us in the Interagency who are male are allowed to differentiate ourselves by the color of our necktie on occasion. Ladies, however, may wear what they want. The Group B came pretty much to the conclusion that we are now at a teachable moment within both the civilian side of the government and the military side of the government. And we should not lose this. We're going to paint with a 4-inch brush, not a 1-inch brush. Group B was half members of military schools and half subject matter experts from the civilian side of the government and outside

the government. So we're not going to give you a lot of words that you understand from your doctrine. We looked at the value of the service schools as agents for change and the importance of making sure that those schools stay relevant, keeping up with what's going on. We definitely took a DOD-centric approach because our understanding was we need to start within DOD, and once DOD feels comfortable it might reach out beyond that. But let's look in house before we jump out of house, even though you've invited us into talk about it. We started out bragging. We looked at our best aspects in all of the eight people that were there plus the people from here in Carlisle. There was a remarkable concurrence in that practical, real life exercises with military and civilian mentors in those exercises were the way to go. Peer teaching went along with the formal teaching. We decided that what you really needed was a lot of reading assignments, practical exercises, minimize the lectures, so I'm lecturing, talk to each other. And the real spur to make this work is that when you get done, you have to have real time judgment, standing tall before usually retired Ambassadors and Three-Stars. Because Three-Stars makes you do your best work if you have to talk to him directly. So we like the fact that you were called on the carpet right away and you had to be relevant with senior people's expectations.

We didn't go immediately to recommendations but here are the recommendations that we are putting out. Yes, we believe that PS&RO, sounds like a railroad, ought to be in the curriculum, integrated. You are going to have to integrate it from Lieutenants up to General Officers because there is a basic knowledge that all soldiers will require in how to deal with these things. We determined that wherever there were electives available within the service schools represented in our group, that the people who took those electives were foreign officers and American officers who had already done that job. The notion of an elective was something that was not increasing the number of people trained in these particular skills. You do, however, need an elective just in case you start doing things like we're doing now in sandy places. Or if someone gets a warning order and says they are about to mobilize, they will require that module in order to be able to train up their people, their troops in their division in order to get things going. So the notion of an elective or a module may be useful.

We also like the notion of putting people on tours or perhaps details into that place called the Interagency, specifically USAID, State Department Geographic Bureaus, not State INR, those are the Intelligence folks and they feel real comfortable to you and we're looking for people who uncomfortable

to you. The United Nations and the operations that United Nations operates. We weren't able to come out to a way that we could drop military personnel into the non-governmental community, but that would be helpful, too, trying to be able to get them to understand that just because that person has a uniform doesn't mean he stopped being human. And just because we are all fuzzy minded civilians doesn't mean we stopped being patriots. So there's a cultural thing that has to be handled there, but it's important that military and civilians swap off. For my own personal experience, we had two Lieutenant Colonels in Kabul that sat in the AID mission, it took them four months to figure out what the hell we were doing. Once they figured it out, they were super team members and they pulled their weight and more. We also, I can commiserate a little bit with our British colleagues, we had a DEFID person come into AID in Washington, took him four months also to figure out what we were doing, and we had a common language. So it's not as easy as just "have a tour." There's a lot that's involved there. We also determined that there were quite a number of lists already of what stability operations and reconstruction ought to look like. The taxonomy has done right down to the eashes and pieces. And everybody kind of figures they know what their piece of the elephant looks like, but there is no concurrence on what the content should be for someone who is teaching it to officers of whatever rank or to enlisted people.

Integrating PS & RO into the Curriculum Group B (2)

- **Gaps**

- Public security and public order
- Informal power, underground economy, social networks (clan, tribal)
- No front line: reporters, IEDs, etc
- Understanding civilian capacity (S/CRS, USAID, local and international NGOs)

- **Constraints**

- Educating to fight the last war
- Zero sum (courses, budget, inertia)
- Need a champion

We'll look at some gaps. We found a number of gaps. Because we understood that one of the major reasons why this conference is being held is that there some gaps out there. We need to find them and figure out what we can do about them.

This is not a gap but it's perhaps a notional thing. We found the subtlety was a tremendously important piece of what we were looking for in stability and peace operations and reconstruction, because essentially stability operations are not close order drill. Everybody's going to be moving at a different pace. They're going to be at a different step. It's alright. It's unmilitary, perhaps in the doctrinal sense. But it's okay. The subtlety comes in, for instance, peace keeping, peace operations, are very different from stability operations because in stability ops, the Americans are on the ground and we're in charge. And that's a different set of rules of engagement that peace keeping operations when the Americans are on the ground and someone else is in charge. And there are different belligerence and the rest of it. You handle it differently and the people who are in charge for our side must be able to see the difference and not just apply the same tools indiscriminately.

What we looked at then as far as major gaps, public security and public order. When you guys in uniform say security, you're out there fighting terrorists and insurgents, and conventional warfare and the rest of it. Those of us in the Interagency, out there in that fuzzy area, when you tell me public security or security, I'm thinking cops. I want the girls to be able to walk to school. I want commerce to be able to function. I need people not to be assassinated in their homes. Those are police and the American military doesn't do police. We've never been told to. We don't really want to as far as I know. It's a requirement for a constabulary. No number of military policemen on the ground, no matter how well educated, can be a civilian police force analog.

The informal power structures. If you're going to irregular warfare, you're going to run into informal power, underground economies, clans and tribes. They are going to be all kinds of messy and we need to be able to teach our people how to handle that.

There is no front line in many of these irregular wars. You're going to get accosted by a reporter as you walk out the door and you're going to be the strategic Lieutenant at that point. You're going to get hit by IEDs on the way home. You're going to end up having your women transport people captured because they took a wrong turn in southern Iraq, and all kinds of

things like that happen. It's very different than trying to keep Russian tanks coming through the Fulda Gap.

We do need to make sure that there is an appropriate understanding of civilian capacity. That's the State Department's CRS plus what the geographic bureaus do. What my agency, AID, does. The local and the international NGOs, and then also we didn't put the UN on there, but what they are up to as well. I sat through a military exercise not long ago where there were no civilians in the world. And it was a great exercise. We won. But the military had to eat out of its budget all the same stuff that I could have paid for and they didn't have to. And there was the resource issue came up at that point.

We did identify some constraints to putting the business of peace operations, stability and reconstruction into the service schools. We found out that almost everybody wants to fight the last war. Over 50% of the people who come back to the service schools are coming back from Iraq or Afghanistan and that's what they want to talk about. The people that you are educating in your schools are going to go back to an Iraq or an Afghanistan or someplace else, and it's going to be a year later and the conditions will be different and the tactics will be different and everything's going to be different. So let's not fight the last war if we can help it. One of the things that's missing in fighting this war, the National Security Strategy does say diplomacy, development and defense. And we'll have to fit into that in this new irregular area.

We did look at it as a zero sum game. Professors and courses are going to have to deal with the transformation issue just like tankers and striker brigade commanders are dealing with transformation. We expect that the budget will not change significantly, so you are going to have deal within the money we've got. And everybody's risk averse. There will be some inertia. Nobody wants to be the first one because people are going to talk about what you're saying. I would hope that we're not going to create a bureaucracy because bureaucracies are slow moving. We will lose this teachable moment both for the civilians and for the military.

Lastly, we need a champion and we need to champion in uniform. Civilians change. I've been in the government long enough to know I could wait out the political appointee and get the next one and maybe we'll train him better. I presume the same thing happens over on the south side of the river. What we need is somebody like Billy Mitchell who says airplanes are important in the Army. We need Hyman Rickover who says submarines ought to be

nuclear. I don't know who the hero is going to be — who the champion for stability ops is going to be. It's got to be a career military person who's crazy enough to push this through. We believe that stabilization is just as important as kinetics. We want to make sure that this gets into the curriculum and we are able to continue on doing the things that the American military is best at. Questions? Comments by the rest of the team. Did I do an adequate job of saying what you said?

PKSOI:

Good point on public security. So you would say key feedback we'd want to send back to the Sec. Army, that MPs don't equal public security.

Group B:

An MP is trained to do military security. He is not going to investigate a robbery. He doesn't do train of evidence. He's not a detective. You can train your MPs to do that. But is that the best use of a military policeman given the other requirements?

PKSOI:

I tend to agree with you. So I think that is the sort of feedback that we will send back up the chain. He did ask for feedback. I think he is very open. He wasn't just saying, hey, give me feedback, and doesn't want to hear about it. So those are the sort of things we'll think about, again, as you're talking your way through. This is a point from the Secretary of the Army's talk last night and we can give him some feedback. Because I was not struck by that answer that you can have more MPs, that's going to give us public security. I kind of see a gap there.

Comment:

We had a lot of conversations over four years about constabulary forces. Something between military and police. A large number of people like the Carabinieri or the Gendarmerie, most of whom don't deploy actually. But to get them and they would be a law and order force in an intervention to begin with, and then they would also turn around and train the police. In the global peace ops initiative, we roped off a few million dollars which we were transferring, I think we have transferred to Italy, so that they would have their Carabinieri school train people for in Carabinieri kind of skills for peace keeping. I think that's a good solution. British Military Police

train foreign policeman. Why? Because they think it's important. US MPs throw up their hands and say, that's not in our METL (mission essential task list). We don't train foreign police forces. If we want to do that, we can do that. But we need to recognize here, sort of the tyranny of the TTP and the doctrine and the procedures and the SOPs. There's never been a decision by the Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States that US Army MPs are not to train foreign policemen. That's something that we've developed on our own and we tell people, "Sorry, boss, we're not capable of that. The reason we're not capable of that is because, you know, the doctrine says." And it becomes sort of a circular kind of thing. I'm struck by how many thousands of MPs we have. What a huge problem we have in training foreign police and how the US Army has stood at attention and just said, "Sorry, not my job." And no one in the leadership has passed on that as to whether or not that's something they want to do. Now, there are also legal problems here in terms of authorities and what we're allowed to do. US Military generally is not allowed to train foreign police. AID is not in that business. We have another bureaucracy in the State Department, INL, which is wired in to a strange outfit in DOJ (Department of Justice) called ISITAP. And that's how that happens and it's a cumbersome system full of contracts and contractors and in small scale things, it can work. In large scale things like Afghanistan or Iraq, it's not going to work. And we just okay, we'll make the contracts bigger. You know at a certain point it just doesn't get it. So, I definitely think that that is a point for Department of Defense leadership addressal. Should US Army Military Police units be in this business?

Group B:

I don't want to get into a policy debate in an education conference. The reason that we brought it up is that we know that military units will either have to do some of the policing themselves as they've done in both the countries mentioned. At the same time, if we're not doing it, we will have to be able to work constructively with whoever is handling the police. That's the reason for putting it in here. Now the conversation we've just had is extraordinarily germane, but not necessarily to education. I take my life in my hands when I ask Mike to talk about public security.

Comment:

I'm blowing off old steam. Well, you basically read my mind. There are two conditions that we have to deal with. One, if the US is operating

unilaterally, then we can't call upon these forces which are now called stability police units that are being developed in the world among allies and other international organizations. We've got a gap that we're going to have to fill. And it's not going to go away. And it's absolutely decisive in terms of the outcome. So, we need to be prepared to address that situation. But the more likely condition will be that we're going to encounter these stability police units. It's a growth industry. The UN has 17 units right now, they're going to 30. They'll go larger if they can obtain the resources. There is in a sense going to become a much larger part of the force mix. And my point being, our troops need to understand how to work effectively with them. And of course that raises the issue of transition. I mean if we did begin in a unilateral manner, we would certainly like to be able to transition to a point where we're working with someone else performing the public order function. That's an international capability. And then transitioning to the point where the locals are able to perform these duties. And in a hostile environment you can't get individual police to do it. And it's a huge gap in Iraq. How do we provide any kind of adult supervision over those police who are going to be in the grip of the clans, the informal power structures, etc. And it really becomes, you know, we can't proceed any further unless we can solve that problem. So that's a gap in terms of understanding. We've got to grapple with it so we can effectively carry out our policy. And also it's a policy question for which road shall we go down, but we can't wish the problem away.

Comment:

I thought that there were institutional training units from the Army Reserves that were in Iraq and their responsibility is to train and peace. And those are units that are specifically designed for retraining of US Military. And this is the first time that they've actually been deployed and they are being utilized in that capacity.

Group B:

The recommendation is that stability ops people need to be able to make the difference between military security and public security, police functions and military functions. Because if you just smush them together, then the MP commander gets whip-sawed out there. So again we did not intend to start the policy debate, only to say that it's important to make sure that these gaps are covered.

Comment:

If I could just make one comment on that. And I want to offer something on this point. The enemy gets a vote. And enemy is smashing together the [unclear] . . .our dogma that separates security of policing actions. I am in favor of packaging it in modular forms. And I think we may have identified a subject for maybe another conference, the idea of a constabulary type module. And I think this [unclear]. . .that in terms of the direction of the module course development [unclear] . . . that can then put in operating areas as in terms of the modular force concept, with a commander, can have readily access to that capability to plug and play in the ground when the enemy as well as the combatant commander determines face in the nature and the scope and the scale of the environment. But that's rapidly changing. And then another point, you had said that you guys when through and looked at opportunities to imbed individuals in the different organizations [unclear]. . . there was a delta [unclear] . . .how do we get folks, military in particular [unclear] . . .I would offer at the pre-commissioning stage, case in point, at West Point we have a very robust internship program, part of our experience based learning model. Every summer, particularly during the Cadets' Junior and Senior summers, we send them across the globe. And governmental organizations as well as NGOs. One example is the Cross Roads Africa program where we imbed our Cadets, and junior faculty, as leader/mentors that go with these [unclear] . . .doing at pre-commission level, I would assume that we probably have some ROTC programs that do similar things. I think that's a pretty good model, perhaps, for us to look at in terms of doing it for the rest [unclear]

Group B:

It sounds like you need to talk to you, Linda, and see if we can find a constructive solution.

Comment:

I want to point out that in this hiatus between the Peace Keeping Institute and PKSOI, the world has moved forward. And CIVPOL (civilian police) is an integral part of UN Peace Keeping Operations. So if you're not familiar with the civilian police function within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, they have a curriculum, they have a training section, they have a very well thought out role for this issue of public sector and public order. It's not rapidly deployable at the moment but the European Union has

committed to the mobilization of 5,000 police officers within 90 days. And there are people that are working how do we do this better. Whether they are gendarmerie, Carabinieri. My good friend BG Pistolazi from the Italian Carabinieri tells me there's no problem in the world that can't be solved with a battalion of Carabinieri. So, I'm just letting you know that people are working this. Certainly not on this continent necessarily, but elsewhere in the world.

Comment:

When we went into Iraq, we just almost arbitrarily said it would sure be nice for us to have four battalions of gendarmerie, Carabinieri, kinds of troops. And we racked and stacked every country in the world that had those forces and a lot of those countries were in the operation with us. So it wasn't a question of the fact that we were politically turned down. We ended up with one battalion. UNCIVPOL, sorry, 5,000 in 90 days, yeah, that's possible. And when you have something like Bosnia or even Kosovo CIVPOL is an answer. But in those places that are not yet post conflict, you're going to need something more robust. And I don't think CIVPOL or the normal UN way of doing business is the only answer. I think that we have a great asset in the United States and for us to just keep wringing our hands here making out as if this was a problem we can't solve because of posse comitatus or sunspots or whatever, you know. It ought not to be. And we also have to fix our laws in the United States. But I salute you and I think that it is important for anybody, and this is a great point you made, that if you haven't been to the UNPKO website lately, you need to go and spend a few hours there because there are tremendous amount of things that are going on that are useful. And there's a huge peace keeping world outside of what the US is doing. And the complexity of the operations in Africa are something that military people ought to keep an eye on because there are undoubtedly lessons that you can pick up there, too.

Group B:

Are there questions that do not have to do with public security? Mr. Chairman, I yield the rest of my time.

PKSOI:

Well done, well done. Can we have Group C, please.

Group C:

Question One: Curriculum and Constraints

► How is PS & RO curriculum determined?

- Major DOD goals and directives (eg, Joint Staff documents) get translated into the core curriculum, but course directors determine specifics.
- Neither service or joint staff have created explicit requirements for SO, so institutions have taken initiative.
- More guidance equals less latitude, so a "lack of direction" from services & joint staff is not necessarily bad.

► Are there constraints that prevent stability operations from being fully explored?

- Lack of a definition of what SO actually is, lack of clarity about who defines it.
- Requirements come from the services and the RCC, and they may conflict
- Lack of a DOD directive that SO are as important as MCO.
- Institutional denial over the past few years that the US military conducts SO ("the elephant in the living room").
- Teaching other required classes limits time available for SO.
- Not the core function of the military (organizational culture): "we never dealt with stability because it was our job to create instability."
- Resources: the job of USMC is to win the nations wars, and now SO, but were are the resources?
- The military's orientation towards completing objectives conflicts with the non-linear aspect of SO.
- America: "the impatient people." We are "cultural impaired" as a nation, having a bad case of ADD.

We had a very disobedient group. And some of the questions that we were asked to consider we didn't consider at all, and then some questions we weren't asked to consider we spent a lot of time talking about. So I tried to organize our discussions into something that resembled what we were supposed to do. So we'll see how it goes. And I thought you'd probably be tired of white slides, so I decided to add some color. So the first thing we tried to address really is, how is the curriculum determined? We had a discussion from a number of people who represented professional military educational institutions about their processes and it seemed that the consensus was that stuff comes down from high and then it gets translated into the curriculum. That people who direct courses have a great deal of latitude in terms of what they want to do. There are no explicit requirements so far. So people really have an opportunity to take an initiative in terms of the kinds of courses that they develop for their students. There was some discussion about, well, really kind of a consensus, that more guidance would actually be a bad thing because as it is now, people have latitude to develop what they want

to do and if we did have guidance in terms of doctrine or even a really good definition of peace keeping, stability support, reconstruction, etc., that that would limit and restrict what people were able to do.

Are there constraints? We spent a lot of time talking about constraints in many different ways. There's a lack of definition about what stability operations is; a lack of clarity about whose job it is to define it and a lack of clarity about who is supposed to do it. That's a constraint because in a way it limits what we're able to do if we don't have the language to really talk about it. There are requirements that come from the services and the regional combatant commanders and those things can conflict. So as you can see, we're not really in the sense talking about just curriculum. We're also talking about the military at large and its processes internal regarding stability operations.

There is also no DOD directive out there. Although it seems that there might be one soon that basically says that this stuff is as important as major combat operations. So nobody has really said, hey, you have to take this seriously yet. And the result of that of course is that there are not resources. There is not the manpower. It's kind of a sideline to what the military considers still to be its main business, of war fighting. There is some institutional denial that still exists in various places that the military does, in fact, conduct stability operations. Someone referred to this as the elephant in the living room. Something that we all know is there, but there are still people who don't want to acknowledge that it is actually really important and needs to be paid attention to.

In terms of what goes on in military institutions, there is the constraint of actually having to teach classes in other subjects that are mandated, so this is something that kind of gets pushed into the time remaining. Another organizational cultural issue in the military, this is basically not a function of the military. There was quite a nice quote, "We never dealt with stability because it was our job to create instability." There's also the question of resources. For example the job of the Marine Corps is officially fight and win the nation's wars. And you need to do that if you're doing war fighting or if you're doing stability operations. But where are the resources that are being dedicated to allow the military to fulfill this new function it seems to have acquired. That's restraining its ability to do this effectively.

There's also, in the military, there is a focus, another organizational cultural issue on achieving the objective. And when you are in a stability operations environment, it's going to be non-linear and a lot of times the

objective that you are meant to achieve is not going to be as clear as you might like it to be. And I told a funny anecdote which I'll tell you now. The Office of Naval Research, namely me, ran a series of focus groups with Marines from all levels of rank, coming back from Iraq for the Marine Corps War Fighting Lab. And one of those Marines in that group who was a young Captain, told me a story and he said, look if you want to get anything done in Iraq, it's going to take you five hours, fifty cups of tea, fifty dollars and five goats. And you just try to tell that to Gen Mattis, because that's not how Gen Mattis thinks about doing business in the world.

So America, the impatient people, we have some of our own cultural issues that affect our ability to do this type of operation. Someone said we are culturally impaired as a nation, having a bad case of attention deficit disorder. So that is a constraint because it affects, again, our ability to do stability operations which tend to have a very long life cycle. And if you are very impatient for things to get done quickly, to go in and get out as fast as possible, that can affect what we're doing.

Question Two: Scope

► What is the scope of SO?

- The SO doctrine needs to be defined, as it is too broad (alternative view: definitions don't matter since PME institutions teach students how to think)
- There is disagreement between and within services about scope: the Army views SO as security operations, where as CA views SO as anything necessary to create stability including economic development.
- What is the definition of 'war?' Does it include the execution of SO?
- Definitions are critical for defining roles. Narrow definitions can reduce military capabilities (eg, "civil protection" not part of mission in Afghanistan, thus there are no firefighters).
- What is stability? The education necessary for creating a stable environment vice creating a stable environment based on a market economy and democratic procedures.

So then we considered scope. The actual question is what the understood scope of stability operations and how is it integrated into other subjects?

We didn't consider the second part of that question, only the first part. The scope really is extremely broad, how stability operations is defined tends to vary across the board. But the fact that it's extremely broad is not necessarily a bad thing. And that is because basically definitions don't matter because professional military educational institutions teach students how to think. That's their job. They don't teach them doctrine. So you don't actually need doctrine, maybe. That was the alternative view. There's also disagreement within and between services about what the scope of stability operations involves. The Army views stability operations essentially as security operations. Whereas Civil Affairs within the Army views stability operations basically as anything that's necessary to create stability, which might include economic operations or even information operations. There's also a kind of ongoing questions about what is the definition of war. And does it actually include the execution of stability operations. And we don't have an answer. That was just a question.

Definitions are really critical for defining roles. And if you narrow the definition down, that's going to limit military capabilities so that, for example, civil protection might be excluded or was excluded from the mission in Afghanistan and therefore we don't have any firefighters in Afghanistan because it wasn't considered part of what we were meant to do. Then we also considered what is stability, because how you define stability is going to have an effect on how you educate people to create stability. And sometimes the education for doing that, for creating a stable environment is different from the education that you would need to create a stable environment based on a market economy and democratic processes. And that second one, it's much harder.

So question four, we skipped over question three entirely. What are the important proficiencies in subject areas? This actually to me was the most interesting part of the discussion. Essentially, stability operations should be learned at the same time as campaign planning. And phase four should be treated as a military operation. It should be treated like that within the curriculum because the military often operates with the assumption that Interagency assets are going to run phase four. But many US Government agencies really are not prepared to work under fire and as someone said, then the Army gets to turn the electricity on. So if stability operations are not considered part of the Army's official war fighting job, if phase four is excluded from the notion of war fighting, all these other competencies and capabilities are also going to be excluded. SAMS should be teaching phase

Question Four: Proficiency and Subject Areas

- ▶ **What are the important proficiencies and subject areas?**
 - SO should be learned at the same time as campaign planning.
 - Phase IV should be treated as a military operation. The military operates with the assumption that interagency assets will run Phase IV, but many USG agencies are not prepared to work under fire and “the Army gets to turn the electricity on.”
 - SAMS needs to teach Phase IV planning.
 - Certain skills (eg, private sector development) are lacking in the active duty and reserve components.
 - Is the curriculum actually supporting SO operations?

Question Five: Best Practices

- ▶ **What are some best practices?**
 - Effective SO requires diversity, specifically a team of people with different assumptions, priorities and political views (not just multinational partners, but local).
 - Including foreign adversaries in educational processes and using examples of enemy success is a powerful learning tool.
 - The US believes planning is the basis of coordination, but in the real world of relief organizations, there is no plan only a planning process.
 - The function of education is to create informal networks and developing a common picture.
 - Nurturing qualities (eg, tolerance for ambiguity) is more important than teaching facts and concepts.
 - Non-military immersion experiences are beneficial. Other models include rigorous fieldtrips (“no more wine and cheese tours”).
 - Regional studies courses provide great value.
 - The focus on metrics (eg, how many projects have been completed) is counterproductive; the focus should be on long-term effect.


four planning. Very important. Also, certain skills even now are lacking in both the active duty military and in the reserve component, including such things as private sector development and perhaps those things ought to be incorporated into the stability operations curriculum. And then we had a really great question and we didn't really discuss it in tremendous detail. Is the curriculum actually supporting operations?

So diversity is very important. Stability operations requires diversities specifically a team of people with different assumptions, priorities and political views. So having multinational partners in your operation, in your curriculum, it's not really adequate. What you really want to do is get people who think outside the box and are really, really different from you. That can make a stronger operation. It can make a stronger institution and it can build a better team. This discussion actually was about a UN training process where they incorporate foreign adversaries into the educational process and use examples of enemy success as a learning tool for students in courses that they run on stability and peace keeping operations. But I thought it was really interesting in any case because you learn how other people think and how your adversaries work by being around them and working with them. So if you ever have the opportunity to include foreign adversaries in your educational curriculum, I think that would be a great idea. It's red teaming at its best.

The US tends to believe that planning is the basis of coordination, but in the real world of relief organizations, there is often no plan and there's only a planning process. And this planning process is in fact the most important thing because it is what creates informal networks and develops a common picture. That's also the function of education. Nurturing qualities such as tolerance for ambiguity is more important than teaching facts and concepts because you want to build people who are leaders, not just people who can recite things from rote memory. Non-military immersion experiences are extremely beneficial. Other models we discussed were rigorous field trips. Meaning no more wine and cheese tours. Regional studies courses have value and the focus on metrics is counter productive. It should be on long term effect.

Basically we say that planning is not the foundation for coordination in relief operations. It's information sharing. Because we never the benefit in the international arena of having a shared plan at the beginning of an operation. It's never worked up. Everybody has a plan, but unfortunately it doesn't necessarily result in THE plan. So the process is on relief, the

priorities for coordination information sharing task division, then planning. Planning then provides the bridge into reconstruction and development activities. The important point for us is that the foundation for all of this is training and education. And if you don't have training and education where you at least have the generation of mutual respect, and you have an understood vocabulary, if not a common vocabulary, then you can never effectively share information. And my argument would be, in this case, we failed at this in the case of Afghanistan. And as a result today, we're still struggling with that transition in the planning arena because we failed to establish the mutual respect, the dialog and the exchange of ideas during the relief operation.



The concept on the other side is that in relief you use local assets and national assets first, international civilian assets and then MCDA international military and civil defense assets. But the whole point of the slide from our perspective is that training and education is the foundation for this. And unless you have people of a diverse background in the same room prior to the operation and prior to the emergency, you are never going to build that foundation of understanding, nor the informal networks that are necessary to effectively operate in this environment.

PKSOI:

To add to your point though and as a military planner I agree with everything you say. I've seen on both on the civil side and on the military side those who succeed in the end state as a plan. The example of that is we have a disaster relief plan for Louisiana, but where is the process? It's the process that was broken, not the plan. So we weren't able to execute the plans, we didn't have a process. But then you start talking about the way to get at the process is to share and bring people on board, the ability of non-governmental organizations, international organizations and the Interagency to participate in planning with the military and the inability of sometimes the military to think past and invite them together, those are the sort of things we need to start pushing and start discussing. And that's hopefully why we're having something like this training and education conference to identify opportunities for us to bring these audiences together to train and educate together. We're talking education here so we can start at that piece and start getting people to understand the importance of the process. So I think it was a very good segue into what we're trying to do in this conference. But at the same time the reality side of it is being on that side as a military planner trying to reach out to non-governmental and international organizations and getting the no because of the cultural bias. So we need to find a way, hopefully through education that we can open up as opportunities and start doing that training and coordination in understanding how the processes work together, so that we are doing it before we head into a conflict zone rather than sitting in the middle of Kabul or Baghdad and try to sort it out to. Excellent point. That's what we're trying to get at here in the education pieces. How do we open up those opportunities?

Question Nine: Cultural Aspects

► What are some cultural aspects of SO?

- Cultural awareness tends to focus on social norms. Of more value is political culture: how is power organized, shared, and used in a given society?
- The US does not have a clear understanding of non-Western social systems, but focuses on formal political processes which are often irrelevant or broken in failed states.
- SO education should focus on how to identify and leverage traditional authority, which can be defined as the informal patronage networks based on status and honor (eg, sheiks).
 - How do you utilize traditional authority but at the same time move a country towards democratic government?
 - How do you get them to give you power without destroying a 6500 year old power structure?

Group C:

And I think we have one more slide and then I'll take questions. These are the cultural aspects of stability operations. This was a sort of consider it if you have time questions. We ended up spending a lot of time on this question because it's interesting. I'm just going to run through this cultural awareness as it's taught in most military institutions tends to focus on the social norms. Of more value something that should be taught is actually political culture, meaning how are societies organized? How is power organized? How is power shared? How is it transmitted and how is it used? And also how can it be destroyed and how can it be rebuilt in a given society. The US really lacks a clear understanding of how non-Western traditional societies are organized. We tend to focus on formal political systems and that actually has very little relevance in failed states where those things tend to be missing, broken or damaged. So we need a better framework for dealing with non-Western traditional society's social systems, how they're organized. Also stability operations education should focus on how to identify and leverage traditional authority. Essentially these are informal systems of power in most non-Western societies. Patronage networks are an example. This type of authority is based on status and honor within the society, not because of any official role. Sheiks are an example of a traditional authority figure.

And an understanding of how these types of processes work and how they are related to the political culture of the society would be of tremendous benefit because this is the kind of stuff people actually have to deal with when they deploy. Some of the questions about traditional authority that are important to think about are how do you use it? How do you utilize it? How do you leverage it in order to conduct your operations and compete what you want to do? But at the same time move a country towards a democratic government where traditional authority systems are probably going to be less important. So there are some issues about the prime directive. Do you go in and change somebody's culture? Is there something ethically wrong with that?

Comment:

One thing we spent a good deal of time also discussing in addition to common terminology was a common understanding of roles that had to be shared as part of the education process so that people really understood exactly what the other person saw their participation as representing.

Comment:

Drawing the distinction between peace and stability operations. When we're operating with an international mandate, US Military is not one of the belligerents but trying to get the belligerents to follow a path towards peace, we have a common objective with our IO and NGO partners. When we are in a stability operation, when we are operating unilaterally, and we do not have an international mandate, and our very presence has a belligerent, threatens the humanitarian space for the NGOs to operate in. No matter how well we construct processes and informal networks and all that, we're not going to be able to plan together with the IO and NGO community until a later phase in that activity. This is a barrier that we're not going to be able to overcome and we should recognize that and just understand that we're operating in two very different environments.

Comment:

One of the hardest things that I always had to explain to my boss was that NGOs are the absolute epitome of independent operators. So international mandate or not, NGOs have their own agenda. They have their own funding that is coming in from people with their agenda and that sort of thing. It always makes it bit dicey. It's not like you are moving a company to the line

of departure when you are trying to get Samaritan's purse to help out with hungry people.

PKSOI:

Before we get another group, we're going to have a break here shortly. What I'd just like to say is a couple of key things I heard out of all the reports, was content concurrence. There's some value added in wrestling with content concurrence and getting the experts from across the sectors to get their opinions in what we're teaching about them to ourselves to make sure that we got it right. So there is some value added, maybe—how do we set something like that on up? So that's something for discussion.

When we are doing counter drug missions, we used to provide 176 Reserve Intel analysts every six months to every alphabet letter organization in the federal agency that was doing counter drug missions in about fifty different cities. And we found out the problem was, you go in there for six month tours, it takes three months just to get the process and procedures under control, and common lexicon, so they were really only there for effective two months, because three months to get on board, two months of effectiveness, cause the last month they are looking at transitioning them back out of there. So what did we do? We then talked to the folks and we wound up having each one of the organizations build, or we built for them, we worked with them and we got their material and we built a CD for everyone of those alphabet organizations that what is it that you would want this guy to understand or gal to understand about your organization. And it was a CD we built and then we sent to the individual before he came on tour. And then we went back and assessed how effective it was. And because we had their participation in building the information about what they wanted to tell this individual about themselves, that person had about a two-week to three-week learning curve rather than a three-month learning curve. So there are smart things out there that we can do. These are the sort of things we ought to be talking about. What is it that you want us to know about you. And help us build that we can work with you in terms of building that sort of product that is something that can be put on the web and people can go and find out about it. And instructors can go, hey, we're going to talk about these organizations. Before we do, go to this portion on the web and here's a block of instruction that can walk you through at your self pace about this organization so you understand. And we start getting at their lexicon and their understanding. So that's something potentially that

we can do. Key point. Electives are not the way to mainstream a subject area. Very clear that electives aren't the way. It's got to be part of the main core curriculum or it's not. And if it's not, it's just an elective and it's not on the same level as what's important. So there's got to be something that says this is as important as everything else and make it part of the main stream.

Doctrine versus TTP — lots of confusion. Within our own military, I don't think we understand it. But I've always fallen back to something that someone taught me a long time ago which was doctrine is a set of principles on which you base action. TTP, then, are how you take those principles and apply them to a set of circumstances that incorporates the environment and the technology. An example is some principles of war, but then doing an air mobile operation. Air mobile operation is very dependent upon the technology of helicopters, but I would still follow the same principles but the TTP I would use to do an air mobile operation, attacking on foot versus attacking from a helicopter are going to be different. So there's a difference between tactics, techniques and procedures and doctrine. And we are so "loosey goosey" that we have confused ourselves as to what really is doctrine and what's really TTP. I think we get at a point of a concern instructors dealing with students who have more experience than they do. If the instructor is focused on the principles, then what he can do is capitalize on the experience and the TTPs the student brings, and provide him a means in which he can articulate what he did in terms of TTP, but how he drew that TTP based on an understanding of certain principles. Or how that TTP that didn't work; maybe the reason why it didn't work was it wasn't based on a set of principles which was guiding his actions. He was just following a set of TTP. So the fact that the instructor who doesn't have the experience that the student has should not be an issue if the instructor is grounded in the doctrine and is able to use the student's experience and draw from him the discussion of the applicability of those principles and how he applied those principles to come up with those TTP. So that get that instructor prep and I think there's some things we can talk about as a challenge.

And finally, the idea of training versus education. There's lots of confusion about what's training and what's education. We sometimes blur our terminology. With training we're teaching what to do in a specific environment; with education we're teaching how to think. Right now we're focused on education, not training.

Overall, a big constraint that has not been mentioned is the lack of capacity within the US government overall. The military has more capacity

than the rest of the US government – what can the military do to help other agencies that don't have the capacity. How can we help? It will be mutually beneficial if we share that capacity with other agencies. This is something we need to talk about.

**Questions, Focus Area B:
“Preparation and Development of Educators /Instructors”
(Groups D, E and F)**

DISCUSSION:

Are there special skills, understandings and qualifications useful in teaching stability operations? What specific expertise is needed on the part of instructors that teach stability operations courses?

How are instructors selected and assigned? Do you have any ability to identify and obtain key personnel? What is the expertise, educational background, and operational experience of your instructors in peace, stability, and reconstruction operations? What is the system for hiring and preparing instructors in these areas?

Does your institution have a network of experts and organizations so that you can tap into Subject Matter Experts and know what offices, individuals and departments are teaching and researching what?

How do the instructors maintain currency in their areas of expertise?

Do you have access to what are other nations/organizations that have been traditionally involved with peace operations and stability doing (i.e., the Nordic countries/Canada/India/the International Peace Academy/ UN/ ECOWAS)?

Group D, First Question:

Group D

- **Discussion**

- **How are instructors assigned?**

- **Challenge: Limitations to getting instructors to teach these subjects**

- **Who is available?**

- **Assigned military**
 - **Civilian**
 - **Guest Lecturers/speakers**

Group D:

Our discussion was on faculty, on how do we best prepare educators and instructors to teach PKSO subjects. We had a long discussion and much of what you've already talked about was discussed in our group as well. Because you can't separate the curriculum from the faculty. And I think that was a key to our discussion. What is the audience that we're trying to teach? What are the subjects we're trying to teach? And so as you look at your faculties, what can you do? One of the key things about it, though, is how do you get your faculty? And one of the questions we had to discuss was, are there certain characteristics or qualifications useful in teaching stability operations? Of course there are. Experience is really useful in that. And should expertise be needed on part of part of instructors that teach stability operations? What specific expertise? I mean basically we came down on experience and ability to teach. So those things are pretty easy.

Second question not so easy. How are instructors selected and assigned? And that's where you get into the problems that we discussed and how do you prepare instructors. Because at least about, what is it 50% of most of the service schools, at least in the DOD atmosphere, are assigned. Guys like me, who may or may not know anything about stability operations and yet are going to be instructors, teachers in the different courses that we provide.

And the other part are civilian faculty who are on, not permanent contracts, but certainly relatively long term and stable employment, or there's not point in having them, to be honest. And then finally after that you have guest lecturers and speakers, who are available to you, where you can actually get your experience, get your actual experts in the field to come and talk to your students. But the problem with them of course is that they're not there everyday. They don't take the curriculum that we've tried to imbed throughout the course and understand it. And so you have those particular issues.

Group D

- **Recommendations**

- **Faculty Development**

- **Skills**

- **Ability to teach**

- **Culture**

- **Ethics**

- **History**

- **Critical thinking**

- **Creative thinking**

- **linguistics/religion**

- **Experience**

- **Some is valuable but experience needs to be transferable to other faculty**

- **Faculty should leverage student experience**

So basically we came down on, it's nice to hire somebody with these skills, but it's not really practical in an education environment. So you have to go further to take the faculty you have and improve it. And get it to understand what you want it to teach. The first three groups had accomplished what they wanted and got the curriculum imbedded for peace keeping and stability operations into the curriculums of all the schools. Then the next thing is to get the faculty prepared to teach that curriculum. And it isn't going out and hiring new faculty or a lot us in this room would be out of work. We're not trying to get there.

We looked at skills and discussed for a great deal of time, you know, what skills, what experience, what this, what that, do you need to give to your faculty. And we came to the realization that in most of our education institutions it may not be skills in learning in the specific subjects of peace keeping and stability operations. That, in fact, other things that make you more able to understand the subject and better able to lead your seminars and do the education portion, can be a part of faculty development. And in fact the Army War College started a process this year which we made a hinge of our faculty development recommendation which was to impart to the faculty skills such as ability to teach appreciation of culture as a part of all societies, not just our society, not just our culture. Ethics, history, critical thinking, creative thinking as separate from critical thinking, and an appreciation for linguistics, religion, other pieces of culture that may go across countries and across cultures but are important to your ability to function in an area physically, geographically, and ideologically in which you are not normally operating. And the good news about this is, just as yesterday morning our first speaker said that if you do all of this stuff for stability operations, they'll have carry-over in the major combat operations. I didn't fully agree with him. But in this case if you get these skill set into your faculty and then through the faculty into the seminars and the students, you will in fact positively impact any operations that your students do, whether they are military operations or they are civilians who are in your military schools or anywhere else. These skills, if transferred to a student body audience and then used in an audience of a combatant command or an operation should in fact improve your ability to operate along the spectrum, the range of military operations or civilian operations.

Then experience. We talked about this at great length because it's valuable to the faculty to have some experience. But it's got to be transferable. You can't afford at our institutions to hire, as I said, everyone with peace keeping stability operations experience. So when you do hire it in, you have to make that specific person part of your faculty development in order to spread it across the breadth of the faculty that you do have. You can't have them just teach an elective. It's got to be a part of the core course and it's got to be a part of what goes through the entire operation of the school. And then we also as you've heard, everybody that's in a school understands that 50% of their military population is coming to them having at least considered that they've done this. They walk into the class. Been there, done that. What are you going to teach me, Colonel? Or what are you going to teach me civilian?

I've just come from OIF and I've just been doing this while you've been sitting on your can teaching other student stuff. And that's true. And it's a very valuable resource. And we discussed it at length on how to leverage that resource. And we think that the faculty development and the pieces that we've talked about there prepare a faculty member to properly use that experience within the seminar environment and at the same time, as you heard earlier in a different briefing, raise the level of both the faculty and the student. Because the student is going to come in primarily with a tactical point of view. Usually the highest level they come into the Command and Staff College and even the War College is not as a senior planner on a combatant command, but as a tactical operational kind of guy. And at least at the War Colleges and in the Command and Staff Colleges the goal is to raise the level of thought of the students in the educational process so they can leverage what they've learned to whatever they're going to go do next, which may or may not be stability operations, peace keeping operations. And may or may not be in an active theater, but might be on a higher staff in Stuttgart or Tampa or Honolulu, if they're lucky. And so the leveraging of the student experiences was important to us in trying to get through.

Group D

– Recommendations (cont'd)

- **Exportable POIs that have been centrally developed, researched and vetted**
- **Repository of instruction materials**
 - **Where?**
 - **How to characterize relationship with other institutions?**
 - » **NGOs and Think Tanks (e.g. Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping)**
 - » **Private Security Companies**
 - » **Intl' and regional peacekeeping training centers**
- **Collaborative Website**

Further, and this was also touched on by the other groups, is that there was some discussion earlier whether you need a doctorate. Education is all about the way to think, not what to think and therefore if you don't have what to think, you can still educate people to be successful anywhere. Now, in our group at least, we came down on the idea that we need some structure that's out there. Not an order to teach in a certain way, but something that is exportable POIs that have been centrally developed research and vetted that are quickly turned around and turned out to the field because faculty, civilian and military, may or may not be good enough to update themselves in a pull kind of manner. They might need something that's pushed out there that says, okay, smart guys have come up with this stuff. We provide it to you for incorporation into your curriculum as you see fit. And we give you sources and ideas that are going to help you do that. And we see a place for that. And we also see a corollary place, and maybe all put in the same place at the bottom is a repository of instructional materials where somebody said is the Army War College sharing their stuff? The answer is that the Army War College is sharing their stuff. But they are probably sharing it on a peer to peer basis, not on a across the spectrum basis. So in our final recommendation on this page anyway, we discussed the building of a collaborative website. Kind of along the lines of General Dunn's idea of communities of practice, but not email based, because it's a very difficult process to wade through and maintain, but a collaborative site that is accessible to the schools that an instructor who has developed a course of which he is mightily proud, can put the information and the materials and the syllabi out there and make it available to everybody. And then an instructor who is totally not proud, as I point to myself, can go out and cherry pick the ideas and the materials that are being developed by smart guys. We collaborate in the JLASS program and everybody's willing to do that. And we're looking for the same kind of site for that campaign planning exercise. So as that gets developed, we recommend that both of these things could be put in a collaborative environment. Although the difference between the two, once again, is that the repository of instructional materials and ideas is a pull system. I'm an instructor who needs good ideas beyond what has been put out there in the exportable POI or something that specifically hinges in my curriculum, I go to this place and I pull it out. I look for it at least, along with google and yahoo and everywhere else, I go. The exportable POI on the other hand is a push system which does not wait for the instructor to have to think about updating, but reminds him to when he's too busy or not smart enough, or whatever he is to update.

Group D

– Maintaining Currency

- **Temporary assignments**
- **Exchanges**
- **Courses**
- **Sabbaticals**
- **Research**

We were also asked to look at maintaining currency in this process. Once again, you see much of what you've heard before. Exchanges and temporary assignments, we think, are a great way to give faculty, if you have the breadth of faculty to allow some maneuver and give a guy the time to go do that, are great ways to do it. We did not come up with how to because, you know, the UN has specific rules for uniform guys that you have to work within and get that done. You have to do the memorandums of agreement to get the exchanges, but we concur with the earlier groups that say that these things are important and valuable ways for faculties with individuals to maintain currency. And then come back, and back to the first chart, spread it out to the whole faculty as a payback for that time. Now, we include in that, taking courses, going to conferences, etc. The real academics, not uniform guys, the real academics like sabbaticals. I don't know why, but, you know, it's needed. So we put that in there. And then one thing that military schools in general are not as hard over on because of what we do and what we produce is research. And we need to find ways to incentivize and encourage faculty members as well as students and everybody else to do more research and the focus it in the peace operations and stability operations arena. There are many ways to do that. You can come up with a prize. You can add it to the chairman's stuff there. You can incentivize that stuff for both your faculty and your students. And we think that that might help maintain currency for the faculty. Even if it's the students doing it, if you've got to read it, it's currency.

Question:

When you talking about faculty assignments, you were focusing at the senior service college?

Group D:

We had War College guys in our group, yeah.

Question:

Did you intentionally exclude education at the lower levels within DOD, or if you include it, could faculty assignments be handled differently?

Group D:

I think we were biased towards intermediate and senior level schools and we had a discussion because much of these operations—there was a discussion this morning that peace keeping and stability operations have to be brought through the entire spectrum of military training and education; from Private through General Officer. Well, it may or may not be true. In fact Privates who are trained to do certain things and do them when you tell them to, in the way you tell them to; it's good for them to understand the bigger picture. But it may be operational dependent. It may be chain of command delivered. It may be any other way you want to do it. It doesn't necessarily have to be a part of basic training, which is mandated by law what it includes in their 13, 16 weeks that they get. We were thinking more along guys who were going to work at staff levels that would have impacts on this. That may have been a flaw in our logic yesterday, so we did not discuss the entire range of military education. We did not leave out intermediate schools because we believe that those colleges at the Command and Staff College in Army, Marines, Air Staff College, we all believe those are educational institutions vice training institutions. And we did discuss briefly that really below that level the concentration is truly on training, not on education. Am I on track?

Someone in group:

You are on target.

Question:

I may have missed this, but the exportable POI — what drives the engine of that?

Group D:

That was one of the big questions we had. And here's how we got out early before everybody else. The august leader of this group said, "Well, we can come up with suggestions without solutions." Because, you know, the answer is somebody has to be tapped to do that. And we had a long discussion. Should it be PKSOI? Well, is it a part of the joint professional military education system? In which case PKSOI is truly an Army organization and may not be able to push the exportable POI. Should it be JFCOM that does it? We had a JFCOM representative and he said it should be JFCOM. And there's no question about it. We actually assigned it to JFCOM. The issue is it took a lot of discussion because while we think it's important and that the right organization to do it is in fact a good question. And we discussed during that period whether PKSOI needed to be chartered by somebody besides the chief of staff of the Army, if they were going to take it on. Whether JFCOM should come up with the ability to do that. J-7 tasks them to do this. It was really a discussion point, but not one that we could solve. And yet we still think it's important enough to put the bullet up.

Question:

It seems to me that it's more a question of resource capability than it is of authorities or appropriateness. As long as someone does it, then the results essentially are the same. A volunteer could step up and do it, couldn't they?

Group D:

Well, I agree with you as far as the product is concerned. But the product needs to have some authority or viability when it is pushed out. As saying, there's a book, "A Quest for a Viable Peace;" the authors of that book are doing a great job of providing that book to different organizations as a test ground. But they're out selling their book which has a lot of good information in it, but what we're talking about is an organization that has the ability to say not only am I pushing this out here, but you should look at it before you abandon it. And figure out how to use what you can out of it.

Question:

I think that JFCOM is not the proper organization to do it. I'm not JFCOM. Actually Joint Forces Staff College is. But also each one of the intermediate and senior level colleges is responsible for JP and execution of Joint Professional education. So in that case there is nothing to say the PKSOI can't put something together, coordinate with the senior and intermediate level colleges and if they all agree that, yeah, this is the way we need to go, publish a POI. We encourage you to do that. Or you go work with JFSC or NDU and see something can come together. We do that all the time. I mean that occurs all the time. And there's nothing else going to restrict that.

Group D:

But the context we looked at it in was coming up with a common POI so that we weren't all teaching different things, so that everyone had a central instructional start point to go from. And that's where you get into the authorities, because the authorities believe in resourcing. I mean I would love, John will kill me, but I would love for PKSOI to stand up and say okay, this is our thing, or the Armed Forces Staff College to stand up and say this is our thing, but to maintain it, keep it relevant, goes back to the authorities which [unclear]. When we started getting into that, we said, okay, let's stop. Let's move it back. So the concept is this should be developed and then we'll try to figure how we get there.

Comment:

But I think you have the authority. This right here is the SAE list, Special Areas of Emphasis list, that the Director of Joint Staff put out, sent to the services and said, include stability operations. And here it is right here. March 2005. So there's your authority, but it doesn't say how because the title 10 responsibility for training and education rests with the service chiefs. So if the Army says that this is a very important thing, I have the authority right here, and they want to apply resources to it and work with the other services to put something together, the authority is there.

Comment:

That's precisely the problem. The authority rests in everybody's court.

Comment:

That's the problem right there. We came to the conclusion was that he developed a POI, I'm developing a POI, he's developing a POI. We've got seven or eight different institutions doing it. Probably have some pretty good ideas, but we could use some help on reinforcing those ideas.

Comment:

I think when you hear our group; we basically talked about that issue. There's a way. There's a lot more collaboration that should be occurring with all of the schools. You should not be going out there and doing anything in necessarily a vacuum. There's a lot we have within the joint community, a military education coordinating council, where we do get together and we do ensure that that ideas are shared. But that's just one venue. You can duplicate that for this particular area and share that information. Bring in all the instructors that do stability operations. Bring them all together and all the curriculum developers from all the schools and come up with something.

Comment:

The problem is that somebody has got to do it. We can't say everybody has got the job.

Comment:

I'd like to just voice a caution on a notion of a common POI. Common POI suggests that there's a common institution and in that common institution there is a common student. And they are all going to get the M-1, A-1 stability ops POI. Common subjects that we all ought to agree on basic definitions and whatever, that's fine. But each institution is different, and the students at the institutions are different.

Group D:

We discussed that at great length. And that's why we wanted to actually put it up there. I said it's not directive. But what it does, once again, it's the matter of who can do it, can be everybody. Who can do it can be a guy outside the system. Who will do it is the question. And then it's purpose is, really, our question was faculty. Its purpose is to allow faculty development to have the resources it needs in a pull environment, collaborative website, which we fully agree needs to be developed in this subject and many others. But a push that gives them information so that within the context of their

structure, whether it's Marine Corps Command & Staff, or War College or Army Command & Staff or Army War College or Air Staff or whatever, they have resources in there that are, because of the venue it comes from, and this is why we are pushing on this, because of the authority it comes from, you will pay attention to the push. And even though it's not directive, you will look at it. If it's a pull, I've got to have time to go out to the collaborative website. I've got to be developing the course. It may be an elective. So we understand the danger.

Comment:

A vehicle that you ought to think about if PKSOI or Joint Forces Staff College or whatever is the blackboard program, which is excellent, and it's available on the web to anyone, anywhere, and you know, as long have a password. So there could be a piece and stability operations academic area on the blackboard. You get the password and then you go into it and anybody who is a member can post things. And you can post your, well we post everything now. Readings. We post syllabus. We post training aids, counterpoint programs.

Comment:

That's for your students.

Comment:

Right it's for my students, but, you can sort of develop a separate module for this. I'm in one in Georgetown. I'm in one at the National War College. And so this is a doable thing. There's already a commercial product out there that if everybody wanted to post their stuff ... you know.

Group D:

There are several commercial products to my understanding, none of them are free, but there are several commercial products that will facilitate being able to do this. And that's exactly right. That's why we wanted a collaborative website.

Comment:

I don't mean to put you on the spot over there, but doesn't ITEA do something similar for Interagency?

Comment:

Yes. We use the Blackboard system as our password protected user site. But our public site that everyone can go to, but if we have anything that's sensitive or, because we try to, as I said, be a clearing house for so many different agencies across the spectrum, we like to protect their information within it. We're looking at who's requesting a password and that's how they access that material.

Group D:

But you pay for it and use the end user.

Comment:

We are on the MBU system. Above that I'm not sure what the relationship is or the cost.

Comment:

Could I just also say one more thing and Montgomery brought this up yesterday, talking about a project that she ran. The difference between experience, very important, interesting, gives you creditability versus experiential knowledge. Everyone who's been on an operation or has even visited an operation, has the sense of what stability ops are all about. But the systematic learning about people's experience is something that's just really beginning. And I salute all efforts that go in that direction. And we need to encourage, particularly over the next few years while people's personal experiences are ripe, surveys and focus group kinds of activities where we get the stuff and ask questions in a scientific way and start to come up. I'm the strangest person in the world to come up with a notion like this. Except I participated during the end of the Clinton Administration in the study of Military Culture. We surveyed 12,000 people in the armed forces; we had focus groups with over 800 people. And at the end of it, although at that time I had never been to Kosovo, Bosnia, Sinai, or whatever, our little group of folks became the experts in what was going on in the armed forces at that time. And we had data that folks were coming after. And we were the kings of K Street for a week or two. But in any case, that sort of thing really needs to be done in a systematic fashion so that all of this great knowledge is not lost. And every guy who comes home and has had a significant experience. Every GI Joe or Jane who comes back and who is not scientifically sort of debriefed, that stuff is being lost.

Question:

Is there anyone here from the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

CALL Rep:

Yes.

Question:

Are you doing anything of the type that he is talking about?

CALL Rep:

On a selective basis, we're conducting post deployment interviews. But it depends on, we're not catching everybody that comes through — every level of command. It's very selective because of limited resources on our part. We do have what we call "embeds" in theater. Who are positioned to gather from the deployed units. Plus we deploy specifically focused collection teams for periods of time in the theater, in any theater, but in the theater of operations to collect against specific issues that have been identified by us or for us. And that information is done, password protected and put on our website.

Question:

I mean I actually call you to be a great resource. But now you're classified, right? It's not open.

Comment:

It's password protected. We do have a classified website, but we've got a nipernet website. Some information on that nipernet website is public access, and some is restricted access.

Comment:

At USIP we have stood up a lessons learned unit on the civilian side and it's small, it's embryonic but we've done 113 interviews with civilians. We're just completing about 100 civilians who served in PRTs in Afghanistan. And those interviews are all accessible on our website or collected interviews. Those that agree to have their interviews put up. And we are trying to link with various institutions. But it's a difficult process. And so this is the first time that we've ever tried to document the experiences of civilians in the United States government. It's hard for us to figure out how to make that resource available.

PKSOI:

The other part of it is you do the interview and then you have to be able to test the data that's coming out of there. It's one thing to do an interview. The other one to systematically do a study of and correlate the data, the validity of as well. I've seen some of the interviews both military and civilian side. And, you know, I question some of the statements being made by the folks that are being putting out there as fact and getting quoted. Hmmmm, that's an interesting perspective. A little different than when I saw it. So that is a challenge to do that. And I think when you talk about systematic surveys; I'm sure particular activities were real scientific.

Question:

Who did that, Army Research Institute? Somebody put together that survey.

Comment:

It was put together by GEN Walt Umber and a social scientist by the name of Owen Jacobs. So it was a specific instrument designed for specific study. That's way beyond me. I mean I couldn't do anything like that with any sort of validity, but there are people who can.

PKSOI:

If we look at what USAID is doing and USAID has a lot of folks coming back. But they also have a ton of contractors. Folks that we work with who are doing great work who would do some real good bang up things in there. And we're losing those experiences.

Comment:

Well, we're relying on AID and others to help try to identify the people for us.

Group D:

But the other thing is, if there was a collaborative web space it would give you a place to put you links that would, hopefully, send your information more into the area where faculty, if they could, if they wanted to, could look at.

Comment:

One of the other initiatives that we've undertaken that gets into this lessons learned to lessons applied, is something I might have mentioned earlier. But the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, a community of practice which hopefully will be replicated in other areas relevant to peace and stability ops. But the way it will work is that as issues arise in the field and there's a need to respond, the experience pool of practitioners in the network will contribute their thoughts. Let me use a specific example. One of the communities will be stability police units. And the recognized authority for that activity is the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units. So they would serve as the moderator. They would assemble a consolidated response and reply to the field. That's to serve the practitioner community. But if you're talking about creating a network among educators, that's an aspect I had not thought of linking. This network of real world practitioners confronting problems in the field and letting at least the educational community benefit from that exchange and being aware of the cutting edge issues that are arising. So that's something we need to think about is how to integrate the one effort with what you are talking about creating here to maintain currency.

Comment:

Just to add in, on the slide on repositories, we added the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. And I don't know if everyone knows about that organization. It's a collection of NGOs and Think Tanks that deal with issues related to peace keeping and stability ops. They have a website, effectivepeacekeeping.org, which is the beginning of a really strong repository of what's been written by organizations like USIP, RAND, CSIS, Stimson and they have both non-governmental, governmental, international organization documents there as well. So I think that's something that it can start to link up these types of information.

Comment:

Add to that, they also follow congressional action on these issues in a very timely way, which is something I think we ultimately all have to pay attention to.

Comment:

And they have monthly roundtables that anyone is invited to. They have great presentations. So it's a real good mixture of the types of Think Tank organizations, but also the humanitarian providers like CARE. So you really get a mixture of different types of perspectives.

Group E, First Question:

Educational Challenges

Question #1: How to achieve a common baseline knowledge

Recommendations:

- Define common baseline
- Assign responsible agent to develop the baseline and ensure quality control
- Continuous process/group interaction to determine best practices; Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTP); products for education
- Push & pull Lessons learned, electronic libraries
- Copy civilian executive education model (combine part-time resident with distance education)
- Collaboration communities/websites to support education effort
- Mechanisms to ensure quality of content

Group E:

Two years ago, the Chief of Staff of the Army let a contract to the Combined Arms Center for the development of a collaborative system of networks called the BCKS, Battle Command Knowledge System. And basically it's everything that I've heard people talking about now. The first year it was let's get ready to get organized. We're teamed with an IT organization. We've got all the network people and all the people that make data bases and hook databases together. Our side, a Cubic side, we hire the content managers. And you've seen some of that. Before data gets put in these individual databases, it's bedded by a content manager who is an expert in that field. We've got a leaders' network. We've established one at the Sergeants Major Academy. And I really am at a loss to know, but there are about eight different networks. I will provide anybody in here with a little

flyer. I don't have them with me now, but we've got a slick little tri-fold there that tells you just about everything you need to know for the battle command knowledge system. It'll probably go for another three or four years for sure under contract. We're in the second year of the first option year. And I believe it's a four year contract.

We started off in our group with a dynamite facilitator. First of all we looked around the group and we were decidedly DOD heavy. There was no doubt about that. And that kind of pushed us off of track on our initial go here, and then we had to restart. The first thing we did, we took a ballot. We had two pieces of paper, one with educational challenges on it, and the other with a list of about six or seven questions. We took a secret written ballot on the back of a piece of paper and the educational challenges won, by a majority vote. On the other side of that paper, the group took a vote on who was going to be the stuck key to be up here. And by a majority of one, I guess I won. It's the only thing I've won on an elected office since I've been aboard. The first thing we did, we did some big muscle movements. We now know we're on the sheet for educational challenges. So we divided up into four chunks. We realized that how are we going to achieve a common baseline on what you ought to be teaching these peacekeepers. That was number one. We also agreed that the timing of when you teach certain things and how you teach it, that's very critical. Because you can't wait until you're ready. You're on alert to go someplace to start training peacekeeping operations. So the timing of the educational experience was very important. The next thing was how are we going to do this? Are we going to hang it on the web and let everybody go out and get it on their own? Or are we going to do lectures, seminars, exercises, practicums and probably a combination is the first thing you come up with that would be a good idea. But we figured we'd better go ahead and kick that around. And then the hard one was, how do you know that what you've put together when you get the system rolling, how do you know that it's actually doing the job? How can you tell? And what are the measures of merit or how do you know that your educational experience is really working? And I've been checked out on this thing here.

We talked about the common baseline. And what we're talking about here, I heard some comments about a common curriculum. There needs to be a base that every peacekeeper needs. And we came to the conclusion; a lot of us who had been there, that, yeah, the Private may not need to know everything that the commander of the multinational force knows, but he

probably needs to know a little bit more than the Bradley driver that was in the Fulda Gap. He's got to have a little feel for what's going on there. So we figured that we need some sort of common educational baseline. Now once you've come to that, I heard my buddy back here, Bob Coon, talk about, okay, we know what we need. Who's going to step up to the plate and say I got the ball. I got the mission. So we need to define that. And we did not come to a conclusion on who that ought to be. But we did come to the conclusion that there was a definite need for that. This is not a one time shot. If I had stability ops when I was in the advance course, I don't need it any more. It's like you were inoculated for smallpox and you're good to go. It is a continuous upgrade and you need to make sure that the upgrade embodies what's going on in theater now. And sending people that are going to be on the platform to places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo is probably a good idea.

We talked a lot about tactics, techniques and procedures. We, too, talked about a pull system or push system. Marv Decker over here works in CALL. And there are two types of things: I can go to the CALL website, log on and go and get data. If I'm a little bit savvy, I won't get 22,000 hits. I'll be able to narrow it down and pull what I need when I need it. Marv is also pushing things out to commanders. The important things. For example when we went into Bosnia, one of the things we had to do was clear the zone of separation. Find out what a ZOS is. I didn't know what a ZOS was. So he came back and said, Sir, there's nothing written on that. The closest thing we could find to anything that even resembled what they wanted us to do in Dayton, was the green line in Cypress. There's now a CALL publication that talks about drawing a line in the mud. And it captured our experiences and now somebody else if they've got to go in and set it up, is on a separation, they've got something. But at that point, it wasn't there.

We figured that the civilian education model has been around for a long time. We shouldn't go out and try to reinvent the wheel. But let me just say about how we started off. We started off with a DOD heavy—you got a General up here and you've got a Private down there. Now what are we going to teach all of those levels. We didn't think anything about anybody else. The Red Cross, the State Department, it was strictly military. We got about a half an hour into that, feeling pretty good about it. And then we said, hey, wait a minute, this whole peacekeeping apparatus here is a lot bigger than just a bunch of trigger pullers. We then talked a little bit about collaboration communities and I think everybody here has mentioned that,

the ability to capture data from every quadrant coming back to maintain a current curriculum. The only thing we came to, though, is, for example, companycommander.com. That's great. But who's vetting that data that make sure that that company commander that's putting that on the web really knows what he's talking about. So you need to have sort of filter, faucet, content manager or something like that. But collaboration, there is the definite need for that.

We also talked about every level of training. There is the upper level, the senior guys. There's the brigade commander level, the O6 level, the MIL-1 War College graduate. And I will tell you from my point of view having gone in with Task Force Eagle, that's where the rubber met the road right there. If that was a success, you had success in that sector. But the company commander's got to have savvy. The senior non-commissioned officer's got to have a certain amount of cultural savvy. What's going on? What the overall mission is? And that little strategic corporeal or whatever you want to call him has got to know a little bit more than the average type bear that was in the Fulda Gap. So he's got to have a feel for what the overall organization is trying to do.

We talked about periodic venues for vetting and networking. That has to be a systematic process and there needs to be a system that once you get this curriculum developed with all these multiple agencies or institutions that have the capability to develop them, there has to be a system that will allow it to be updated and captures the newest data coming back from the field,

We talked a little bit about SMEs. Subject Matter Experts. There was a lot of those out there. And when you are in the bottom feeding contractor world, you hire those type people. You're hiring people that have expertise that are coming back from theater afar. And normally in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, some Colonels. But that's how you keep your organization fresh. You also do it by sending embeds like Marv talks about. Sending soldiers that are stationed, let's say at Ft. Leavenworth, and they go do 179 days in one of the theaters overseas.

The next one is provide adequate resources for this additional education. We came to the conclusion that this is going to be a zero sum game. We've all got a little bit of background working in the government. That you're probably not going to get a whole ration of extra money to go ahead and develop these different hours for peacekeeping instruction. So then you have to say, okay, what's going to go when you are doing this. So it's probably a zero sum game. We don't see a big bag of dollars coming with

this. Hopefully, I'll be wrong on that because we came to the conclusion that it's definitely needed. But something's probably going to have to come out of the rucksack. But I will tell you, when you get ready to go on one of these deployments, the US government is going to give you every new piece of kit in the world. And you've got to have time to go ahead and force modernize. That's something additional. Every person that is going to send you down range, there's not a commander alive that's not going to have you qualify with your individual weapon. If you are a member of an armored vehicle crew, you're going to qualify with that, too. So those are givens. But all of this is going to be resource intensive. But we didn't see a whole lot of money coming with it.

The next one talks about, let's take a look at what we've got. Let's not reinvent the wheel here. There are some pretty good, and I have attended several seminars that have to do with peacekeeping particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo. But we're pretty much on the mark. So there's a lot of educational curricula out there that's already developed. And let's go ahead and do a search before we reinvent the wheel.

We have to educate a core, maybe educate is a hard word, but we've got to familiarize a core of interagency professionals. I've done five consequence management exercise—three for USAREUR and two for EUCOM. The last one was SACEUR, is flag officers. And we did not have a State Department rep there, and I don't know why because it was a conspicuous lack because we really needed them. If you're going to talk about foreign consequence management, the lead federal agency for that is the State Department. So we've got to somehow marry at the hip and get them, the interagency folks thinking a little bit more the way we think. And we need to certainly know how they thing. And I'll talk a little bit more about that in a few minutes.

We need to let people know what's out there so there needs to be an advertisement campaign to let people know what's going on, so everybody is familiar for these curricula are being developed. We thought that perhaps a net team, new equipment training team. That we'd educate a team that will be able to go out and train the trainers. So we could expand the training base and not just have x-dozen people and that kind of propagates across the fleet. I've seen it on two other charts, an exchange program to get out there. And when heard about the West Point, getting folks out there like the Cadet program. It's outstanding. And we have to do that. Because what I know about the State Department and USAID, you probably could put in a small thimble. OK.

Educational Challenges

Question #2: Timing of educational opportunities

Recommendations:

- Tailored depending on when specific tasks/skills are required
- At each increasing level of responsibility
- Refresher education immediately prior to actual employment/deployment
- Prior to assumption of “new” functional/skill area

Discussion:

- Duration of educational opportunities must be determined after both common baseline and specific/focused area content are identified

The second one is, we talked a little bit about timing of the educational responsibilities. We have a tendency, at least in the military – you don’t just alert, then train, then deploy. You have a basic training program, then you alert, then you focus the training, and then you deploy. When do you have certain types of education, how is it taught, etc? So there’s a timing issue there. It’s got to be across every level from the Private on up. It’s probably going to reside a little bit from mid level managers to CGSC (Command and General Staff College – mid level planners) level folks on up. That’s where you can really get in trouble, but we figure that whatever the POI is, it has to be able to be stretched over the entire spectrum of rank and responsibility.

A refresher packet: now-a-days that’s particularly germane because you get youngsters that are coming back. They touch down here in States from Afghanistan and 10 months later they are on their way back to Iraq. So they need to be re-spun up or re-tooled before they go back for their second or third deployment. And then if you just look at the discussion here. Common base line—already talked about that.

Educational Challenges

Question #3: Selecting/balancing effective delivery methods

Recommendations:

- Establish Professional IA Education (PIAE) system
 - Increase other agency participation in DOD schools as interim measure
 - Create quick response education capability (e.g. traveling team)
- Incorporate all delivery methods (lectures, dialogue, experiential learning, etc.) appropriately throughout the education program
- At each level complete education within own organization prior to initiating inter-organization education
- Conduct planning exercises
 - With other agency participation
 - Role play by actual assignees
- Robust IA liaison officer education
- Reinstitute Defense Fellows program with Congress

Now we said, “Okay, we got a common base line.” We never did come up with who was going to be the guy in the bullpen that we went to do that, but we know we need that. And now, how are we going to actually propagate this education? We thought it was an, and I had never heard of a PIA&E. It’s an interagency education system where we could educate not only green suit peacekeepers but we could get our interagency brethren to know the same thing that we did. And we’d know a little more about them. Because it’s a daunting feeling when you go in the theater and there are so many agencies to work with. There were 130 NGOs and PVOs in Bosnia and I couldn’t even spell it when I first went in there. But there are a very, very valuable asset; they get a lot of mileage. They’re good people trying to do right. But how they operate, where they are, whatever, what they do is not well known. Maybe get Interagency participation in existing DOD schools. I know when I came to the War College a hundred years ago, we had a couple of CIA folks in here, a couple of State Department folks. But in all the other schools that I’ve attended there hasn’t been that flavor for anything other than green suits or DOD, I should say.

I’ve already talked about all delivery methods. The bullet down there — planning exercises. You now only have to plan things. We used to go

through and we do all these planning drills or whatever. We are an execution based force now. Used to put a piece of tape down and that was a mine field. Now you got to get the mines. Take them out of the box, arm them, bury them, whatever. So these planning exercises. We've got to structure these planning exercises and they have to be a combination of both green suit, and our Interagency brethren. You see the liaison there? We get a big fat F on the Army side of DOD when we talk about liaison. We don't take it very, very seriously. Normally, it's a first or second Lieutenant, the newest guy there, go over there. You are our liaison officer. European Armies send former Battalion commanders as liaison officers because they think at the level of their commander. And we've got to have a better liaison with the Interagency so we know what's going on and for the lead IA guy or gal and the lead peacekeeper if the green suit all know the same thing. And Lorelei talked about the Defense Fellows program. I don't know a lot about that, but it seemed like it was a good idea to re-institute that.

Comment:

It still exists, by the way. It's just been drastically cut back.

Group E:

Why don't you give us 2 seconds on what it is anyway. A lot of people in here probably never heard of it.

Response:

Defense Fellows, younger officers usually, were detailed to congress. And then they find an office to house them for a year. And something that probably a lot officers don't realize is that certainly in the '90s these people had these tremendous sort of liberal artsy international perspective. And they could provide all kinds of information on staff about exactly what we're doing for world and the changing roles admissions of the US Military from their own perspective. Having worked in congressional offices for so long, that's who people go to for information. They go to the cubicle next to them. They don't call Carnegie Endowment or go to the PKSOI website. And so a lot of these new more progressive issues inside the military, that nobody know about them, in a critical mass. You know what I mean. In a general way. So then they don't become priorities. I really feel like that's what happened to PKI. They almost got closed. I'm just to tell a little story about how out of it sometimes members are even ones that have really salient concerns is

Todd Platts, the member from this district. I ran over to his office when I found out about the realignment task force for PKI that it was going to be shut down. And I caught him going into his office. And he was about to go visit his reserve troops in Bosnia. So it was a perfect moment to say did you realize that the only place that is capturing this institutional memory is going to disappear. And that woke him up. And I think that it's just these little tiny things of people talking to each other that are very missing on these types of issues. And again, it's not the armed services staff. They are great. And it's not necessarily even the foreign relations staff. It's sort of everybody else, which makes this not a priority. And that's a huge challenge, but the Defense Fellows from one of these repositories of knowledge that you could go to. Another example is like the Air Force officer I remember who was a new liaison officer in the Rayburn Building. Every time I took some people in there to talk to him, all they wanted to talk about were tactical fighters. And this guy had been the liaison at the United Nations. He had this huge, wonderful background that was so relevant. And for some reason those questions never get asked. And I'm thinking, what are ways to get inside the initiation loop of a place like congress? And the Defense Fellows is one way to do that. Of course I know there's lots and lots of professional restrictions on policy advocacy, but being there and offering your expert advice that's very pragmatic and solid. It's not policy advocacy. And I think that's a huge mental block the military needs to get over.

Question:

Why was the program shut down? And how could it be restarted?

Answer:

It hasn't been shut down. It's been severely reduced. It still exists. But I know that's also been a problem in the other agencies. And the gossip on this, and people here probably know more than I do, is that Secretary Rumsfeld got very angry when the Crusader (artillery system) caused such a rumpus on Capital Hill because they wanted to get rid of it. And there was a lot of behind the scenes action to somehow stop that from happening. And I think that got to this tall issue of there're too many loose cannons. And we need to shut them down. So, and correct me if I'm wrong, but that it was one of the—I mean, they took the fall on that. And I'm somebody who is always looking at the big picture aspects of congress, and it hurts us tremendously to not have those people there just offering consistent low level advice. So

that's that story. But I think you would get members who would just fall over themselves to get a military officer working with them.

Educational Challenges

Question #4: Methods to track the effectiveness of education

Recommendations:

- Feedback from graduates and reach-back mechanisms
- Accreditation process/requirements at appropriate levels/units
- Execute capstone exercises to measure results
- Results of peer & 360 degree evaluation mechanisms
- Measure increase in IA collaborative personnel activities (e.g. number of IA liaison officers, number of exercises, number of role players in exercises that are/will be actually in portrayed role, etc.)

Discussion:

- Common popular belief that more defense spending buys more security makes it difficult to get funding for non-DOD programs

Group E:

I thank you for that. I said early on the hard part here was how do you know when you've developed this baseline and you've got all your ducks in a row and you've taught the curriculum. And how do you know you've got a successful product, or your educational effort has been successful. We kind of had a discussion on the Army mode. There's a new trend that started back before we went into Bosnia. It's called certification. You don't get on an airplane and go to Bosnia or Kosovo or anyplace unless you've been through some sort of capstone exercise that has been supported by observer controllers, OCs for short. You normally have a senior observer who's a retired four star military. And you've got more than likely the combatant command who's going to say like Nero, thumbs up or thumbs down, or not quite good enough, or whatever. Mainly this is for the leadership. But this type of system here where there's some sort of certification exercise or whatever to make sure that you've gotten through to the individual peacekeepers. One of the low level items that we had because of the tremendous number of mines in Bosnia was everybody had to pass a mine recognition test. And

you had to get above 80%. And it had everybody from 2-star Generals on down to the youngest Private doing that. But we accredited the low number of people who really got hurt by mines for that education. And that's what I mean by the capstone exercise there. To make sure that the people have hoisted in the individual items relative to peacekeeping that you wanted them to. The brief back when you come back from theater, I was debriefed. I came back to Ft. Leavenworth after seven and a half months. I talked to the people in the combat studies institute. And I also had an interview from the Center of Army Lessons Learned, wanting to know, was the peacekeeping Mountain Eagle series of exercises that we gave you and your colleagues, did that hit the mark? And really it got fairly high grades.

The fourth one down there, you might not know about the 360 degree leadership assessment program. That involves your superiors, your subordinates and your peers. A lot of information is exchanged there. A lot of close knit coaching. So along with the close knit coaching you can find out how well the educational program is. We just figured that was another medium if you will to be able to use. And you can measure the number of hits on the collaborative nature on these individual networks and see if people are really cooperating.

Focus Area B: Preparation and Development of Educators/Instructors

Discussion items:

- **Special skills, understanding and qualifications are required for teaching stability operations. Exact expertise needed depends upon common baseline and specific/focused area content.**
- **Select and obtain SMEs via networking**
 - **Personal**
 - **with UN, international organizations,, senior level schools and other education institutions, other agencies such as DOS, service doctrine divisions, etc.**

And the last one here. We felt that in order to have creditability as a faculty member, that you did have to have some experience. We see this all the time at places. I grew up in the Viet Nam era. If you were teaching

at Ft. Benning and you didn't have a combat patch on your right shoulder, students didn't want to talk to you. Pretty much now, I think it's probably up around 60-70% of the Majors; I mean you look out there at the class and everybody's got a right shoulder patch from one of the conflicts we've been in for the last few years. But we did feel that in order to train the individual he needed rather intricate peacekeeping skills to include negotiation. I never knew what BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement) was until a guy from the War College parachuted in and told us when you're arguing with the Serbs or Croats or whatever, you've got to go in with a position that if he gets you in a half nelson and you can't get out, what's the back up mode there. But things like that that you normally come up as a green suit trigger puller, you'd never hear of. We've got to go ahead and grow a field full of peacekeeping subject matter experts. I mean we've got hundreds of them now that are coming back from these multiple conflicts. We've got to cap that, bottle it and identify who they are. So we know that when you need something, I know to go to Ft. Carson to get the expert on negotiation. Or I know to go to Ft. Stewart to get someone who knows more about factions than anybody else. So there needs to be some sort of system to be able to do that.

And we talked a little bit about the UN but that's about it. And as you can see here from the lines and the bullets on the slide, even independently, in A, B, C, D, & E, a lot of the same things were batted around. Collaboration is a big one; the use of subject matter experts; use of a common baseline curriculum. So that's what our group came up with and I'll try to answer your questions if I can or get one of our group to go ahead and do it.

Comment:

I might add in that I like some of your recommendations because it's precisely what we're doing. At the Naval Post Graduate school a year ago we created a new teaching institute. It's called the Center for Stabilization, Reconstructions Studies. It's the one place in the federal government where the executive branch is spending money to do combined education of all of the communities from the peach officers, stability ops, or what ever we want to call it now, environment. And it's a little bit different that inviting the relief community to participate in DOD events, or DOD education. Rather than that, which that's really structured for DOD's benefit, our mandate, our purpose is to design education and deliver education that's relevant to all of the communities. To everyone, not just DOD. We're learning how to do

that. We're trying to learn how to do that because it's new. We've had great collaborations from the other communities of actors that are involved on the ground around the world. And so we're hopeful that we can live up to some of the recommendations that your group and the previous groups also.

Group E:

Just a little personal anecdote; I told it to the group. Before we went to Bosnia in December '95, we started about two months out. We had the folks from GEN Clark's group come over from Dayton. And we're down, about 30 of us, up in the ark on the floor going across the boundary line to make sure we could live with it. We had classes from the people who wrote the framework for peace. We then had a two-day, fourteen hours a day seminar, where we learned a little bit about the cultural things for each one of the factions. We had a Canadian battalion commander in there that had been UNFORFOR for a year. It was a very, very intensive two day seminar period followed by anywhere from 14 to 18 days of 24/7 training to include everything to manipulating rules of engagement to fire coordination exercise. All part of it. And then we came up to about somewhere around the 12th of December and the peace treaty hasn't been signed yet, so we said, okay, let's do it again. And that didn't make me feel too good then. But when I got off the C130 in Sereavo, and a day later I'm dealing with a most obstreperous serve you ever saw in your life. The fellow that prepared me as the speaking Servo-Croat when I was in Grafenvier, Germany, prepared me well to deal with that person. And I really felt like I swung the heavy bat and now I'm swinging the light bat. So I think most of the people from Major on up would probably echo that same sentiment that it was the first one out of the chute, if you will, peacekeeping operation. But we felt we were pretty well prepared going in. Other questions?

Question:

Quick question to the presentation but also to the group, was there any mention in any of these discussions of the international association for peacekeeping training centers, IAPTC? And is PKSOI the only member of that association of any of the training centers in the US is a question. And then was there any discussion of some of the models and best practices of other peacekeeping training centers. Over the past two years as part of our research, we've been traveling to about eight or ten of them around the world. There are some good models. SACOPAC in Santiago, Chile, is an

excellent model of how to use information technology to really get these materials out to their students, current and past students, and actually get it out to them in the field. So I would recommend looking at what some of the models are that other peacekeeping training centers are doing around the world.

Comment:

We do go to IAPTC. It's a good place for the part there about networking particularly. Networking for international subject matter expertise, networking for other organizations. So if you want to go try to see what's out there, what they're doing. That's a lot of place where we pick up some of our international subject matter experts. Unfortunately, in my view, the organization is not quite as effective as it could be. If it actually sort of stepped up to kind of what the promise is, it would be good. But it's obviously funded resource.

PKSOI:

Pearson Peace Training Center in Canada are the guys who are steering it. And the Pearson folks are struggling with the focus of that organization in the IAPTC. And in conjunctions with the challenges, but there's another project out there that in Sweden. What we're trying to get is a happy medium the IAPTC which has more of a tactical focus on training vice a focus on education. Challenges is talking about collaboration in training and education. What they are trying to do is maybe draw a line between the two organizations and have the IAPTC take a look at the tactical operational level training first, education next, because that's what they are more comfortable with right now. And have Challenges Project look at operational education. And trying to split that between [unclear] trying to get that steered. Trying to get that division put in place. And as Rich said, I agree they have not lived up to their potential, but it is worthy to keep working with them. And the context you make with the other organizations, the other folks playing in there, I think are excellent. So that you can get views of what's out there. So, yeah, we are working with them. I don't know if it was discussed in the group and if the folks were aware of it, so we can give folks information about the IAPTC. It's an organization and an effort that's still growing and developing.

Comment:

It's also one of the things that is interesting it has a lot of CIVPOL component that is growing in it. So that's another case, if you're interested in the development of the civilian police sector, it's useful. Because there're a lot of those other training institutions are starting to come to that.

Group F, Question 1:

Question

- How do we better prepare and develop military educators to provide stability operations instruction at the senior, intermediate, and entry levels?

Group F:

I have the enviable position of coming after everyone and I do remember what John said at the beginning about not repeating and I will try not to do so. I want to start off by saying, in a slightly different way than the last group, that I for one definitely appreciate the diversity of perspective that existed within our group. And we did discuss the preparation and development of educators. And we focused almost exclusively on educating the educators. I would say training the trainers except the difference from the DOD's perspective has been explained to me in a way much along the lines that John described, but perhaps more vividly. So we started off trying to figure out what we were going to talk about and what we weren't going to talk about. And once we got beyond that and figured it out, things went very smoothly. I did not actually have a big part in the leadership of how smoothly things went. I just volunteered to be up here to get a different view of the room. So we started off saying, "Well maybe we should be answering this question, how do we better prepare and develop military educators to provide stability operations at the senior, intermediate and entry level." We diverged from that to a certain extent in that like Group D, in a way we were biased towards focusing on the senior and intermediate level and for

other reasons that have been mentioned. We focused in the end on senior and intermediate levels. But we also ended up discussing not just military educators but educators from the Interagency and from outside the US government.

Context

- **Can't make every Soldier/Marine a Stability Operations expert**
 - Time is a constraint
 - SME availability is a constraint
- **Different education required at different levels**
- **larger than just the US military -- Stability Operations is inherently Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational**

This slide is pretty much just explaining some of the challenges that we reviewed before launching into a discussion of recommendations. A lot of this has been discussed. I remember Group A even started at the very beginning talking about different education required at different levels, so I won't go into that too much. It's true we can't all of our service men and women be experts in stability operations. And when you are talking about schools, you are talking about a varying level of time. Allison comes from a program in which they have degrees in peacekeeping operations stability operations. And some of these classes have one week. Some classes have one three hour session. So definitely when you are talking about educating educators, it's a question of to what degree are they actually engaging their students on these questions.

We declared victory over all those challenges and moved on to a discussion of recommendations or some possible solutions. And these are they. Some of these have come up in discussions throughout and in both of the first three groups and the last two presentations. Once again I will just reiterate that we were focusing on the educators. So when we're talking about exchanges, we're talking about exchanges of educators and similarly in terms of symposia and who the repository is for.

Solutions

- Faculty Diversity
- Symposium
- Exchanges
- Collateral Repository

Faculty Diversity

- More Interagency Hires
- Hiring Practices

On the issue of faculty diversity, everyone who's working in this field when it comes to educating on stability operations, seems to recognize the tremendous value of having people from outside your organization there teaching. And that's true whether you are teaching in a private university and you've got people from the military side coming in and teaching courses as well and it's true at the Army War College. The question is if PKSOI has been benefiting from one USAID professor or instructor, why not two? If there have been two State Department people at a certain college, why not three? I mean, what is stopping further Interagency involvement? Is it prestige of the position? How a person moves up within the ranks of their own organization? If so, and we really want to change it then there's a way to do that. We start attacking that problem. We have to identify the problem and attack it accordingly. State Department Foreign Service Officers can do Y tours. And they can come over to NDU and other places and perhaps engage at a more expanded level. It's not to say that we're not doing this, but we could be doing it more.

Symposium

–Teachers Conference

–Pre-Conference Working Group

We basically saw that, you know, we've talked about different groups in lots of different fields in the field of education. There are teachers' conferences. And this is a burgeoning field with relation to stability operations, reconstruction, peacekeeping, peace operations. And why not actually set up a standing teachers' conference? Perhaps that exists among the various branches that have their own schools, but it does not exist between all of the various educators within the field. We have plenty of conferences where we bring together a lot of the folks here in this room. A lot of people here know each other. And a lot of people in the field know each other. But what we were talking about is getting people who actually teach together in a standing symposium that meets perhaps once or twice a year. And it could be led by a university that does this. Whether it's GMU or Tufts or it could also be led by NDU or others within the government. This is one recommendation, one thing that I think would definitely help educators to help themselves. And it would basically just convene all the stakeholders. And in order to do that, the next step is really to actually have a pre-conference working group of educators. Get them together. Have them find out who's missing. Have them find out when they want to have the first session. Who's going to host it. Where's the funding going to come from. And let's do this.

On the issue of exchanges, it's come up quite a bit. Back in Group B even, Ross and Ike and Linda discussed internships for pre-commission and ROTC service men and women. And Group C talked about non-military emersion. And they were talking about it from the position of the folks who are actually being educated to go out and do these things. And what we were approaching was the educators. It is useful for them to go out to the field to have interactions with NGOs and the UN. And similarly they should actually be encouraged to go out to the State Department and USAID. One concrete recommendation that our group felt should come out of this workshop is

Focus Area B: Preparation and Development of Educators/Instructors

Discussion items:

- Special skills, understanding and qualifications are required for teaching stability operations. Exact expertise needed depends upon common baseline and specific/focused area content.
- Select and obtain SMEs via networking
 - Personal
 - with UN, international organizations,, senior level schools and other education institutions, other agencies such as DOS, service doctrine divisions, etc.

that this workshop should actually call upon USAID and State Department to prepare some sort of educational opportunity for the various professors and instructors in this field from the DOD side. And have them come over on mass and have them work through a module. This can be done. I think there would be a very receptive audience. It's just a question of asking for it and getting it together. It's also important to have students resident at schools. Another opportunity would be for sabbatical opportunities to make these sort of more of a possibility for educators and also we talked about field fellowships. It's possible the NGOs would take on an educator. Not just somebody who's actually being trained, but one of the people doing the training and the educating in this field to come on for several months, share their experience and learn from that perspective. It's definitely worth looking into.

We discussed the model that exists at Tufts University; The Feinstein Famine Center brings in people from the humanitarian community, from government and non-government, who have been out in the field for quite some time, need some time to actually reflect upon their experiences. And Tufts brings them in. They do some writing and they help with instructors and teach some courses. There's no reason why the military schools cannot set up a similarly prestigious system whereby we bring in folks from the outside. Give them an opportunity to work with the expertise that exists within our various institutions and also contribute to the teaching. And so urge the larger group to look into that.

Collateral Repository

- Case Studies
- Syllabi
- Web-based portal w/Staff
- Databases/analysis tools
- Simulations/Gaming

Repository of information — this has been mentioned a lot so I won't go too much into it. Basically just to keep momentum and the clearing house. And the key that I want to emphasize, in addition to everything else that has been discussed on this topic, is that this just requires some resources and some staff. Where it is, is not as important as the fact that you have two people who are working on this. And it's not just about being filters and content monitors, but it's really going out and actually continuing to perpetuate this type of clearing house. I think there have been solid recommendations for this already. And if there's anything that I missed, I would appreciate it if my group would chime in.

PKSOI:

Some thought out there from what I just heard some people talk about. And, again, are some things that people talk about are useful tools. The NDU and the ITEA of a blackboard sort of idea. Effectiveness of government organizations. PCKS. Push/pull sort of collaboration. There are a lot of ideas out there and challenges. And hopefully we can pull some of those together and that will be some of the discussion. That will be some of the discussion that we will get at in your groups today about more details about resourcing and do we get at it and development in collaborative opportunities. There seems to be some confusion as to whether is a focus on the military versus a holistic focus. The idea was that we want it to be a holistic focus but in this first step we had a predominantly military showing. It isn't that we didn't reach out to academic IOs and NGOs, just that the timing and Katrina and

others limited the pull that we could pull from in this initial conference. Plus at the same time there is a perception along the board as what are you trying to do. Are you trying to do this just so DOD can benefit. So our thought is that this is a first step in a process that we'd like to continue and we would like this to be something that is inclusive of all organizations. We are holding for examination as the start point a lot of what we are doing within DOD. And we're looking at criticism of what we're doing, and/or constructive critique of what we're doing in DOD. When I talk as that as the start point, but we do want to focus in on how we make this all inclusive for all the organizations. Because as I said, it would be of not use for you to come here if the only thing you are seeing is that you're giving and not getting. And the idea is that we want to make sure that we are helping to identify ways that we can collectively learn from one another's experiences. So while we may be using the military school systems as a first point of departure, it is not strictly a DOD focus that we're after. We are truly after across the entire spectrum. And we are looking at DOD as well as one way of doing that right now. But we'd like to look at other schools as well.

You talked about Tufts and the Famstein — both of them were invited but could not make it because the academic school year started. So we are looking at a more inclusive group to bring here to have this discussion. And that's part of what we'll talk about at the critique point is what did you think you were going to get out of this conference? I'd ask you then to look at what you did get. And maybe if you didn't get you thought. Why? And that's part of the critique. If you in fact think that this idea of continuing these conferences are of value, to help us shape it in a way that it is more palatable and more focused on what you are looking to get out of the conference. I mean this is our first shot at it. And it is something we wrestled with. And we wrestle with multiple things. The other thing is the level — what level we focus at. Look, we can't solve the world's issues. And we don't want to be handling, I don't think, from Private to General. So where's the focus. And I think the fellow who said, you know the liaison office is a big piece of this, and militaries in Europe saying that guys who form battalions think like their commander. So as we're talking here, I think we want to stay at a level where we're talking at the higher level. We're talking the intermediate level schooling on up, which is the Majors and above to the military. We're talking the middle managers to the executive level. The GS12 to the SES for government civilians. That's the level we're talking and that's probably the level we want to focus at. Because that's a level that we need to influence

significantly. There are a lot of smarter guys. The Captains and the Majors, they're pretty good and the lower level folks who are pretty good at training the Privates and can do a good job at that. But we're here talking at the policy level and the operational level. That's where we want to focus our energy. So just to give you some thoughts. I mean that's what we want to get at. So if we can get some clarification out there.

DOD schools, as a departure point, because that was predominantly who we had here, and at the same time you don't want to put other organizations on the spot and say hey, we're going to introspectively look at your organization and critique it. We're a lot more comfortable getting ourselves looked at introspectively and critiqued than other organizations are right now. And we have a higher level right now of participation. But we want to get past that and get looking at it holistically. So I just wanted to cover those points with you. So again, what level we're looking at. Those are levels to cross all boundaries. Yeah, we're looking at some of the military pieces, organizations. But, again, that's also one of my comments that said, you know, I haven't heard as constraint the lack of US Government capacity because we can fix the military and give us lots of good screw drivers. But we're only part of the solution. And we aren't the whole solution. And we need to stop looking at the military as the solution. It's got to be a holistic approach that has success. And we need to be talking about it in a holistic fashion. Who else needs to be taught? Who else needs to be educated? By whom? In what areas? How can we share the information in an effective way so we have a holistic approach to what we're doing, rather than there's a military approach. I don't think there's a military approach to stability operations. I don't think there's a military strategy. I think those are misnomers. I think those are terms that get us in trouble. I think there's a US Government and international approach. I think there's a US government to exit strategy and an international exit strategy. And I think I'm a member of the US government. That's the focus I want to get at in this conference. And I think that what we've done so far has been pretty good stuff.