
Chapter 1

Conditions of Terrorism

Kent Hughes Butts

Chapter 1

Conditions of Terrorism

Kent Hughes Butts

Since the end of the Cold War, the primary threat to United States' national security interests has been regional instability. In the absence of superpower influence and guidance, long suppressed religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, and territorial issues began to surface and threatened the continued governance and stability of regional states. At the same time, economic and military support from the superpowers was greatly reduced, as was the capacity of regional states to build and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of their people. As they struggled to meet the demands placed on the political system, developing country governments became more vulnerable to criticism from dissident, separatist, and religious groups, and the rise of extremist ideology. Some states, Afghanistan for example, failed and were taken over by groups with extremist ideologies and a willingness to use violence to promote their views and attack their enemies. The United States (U.S.), its citizens and overseas interests, and its allies have been attacked by terrorists from these groups. Addressing this problem requires the coordinated application of diplomatic, development and defense resources and the renewed effort to promote regional stability.

The problem of regional stability and terrorism is complex; its solution will require the application of all of the elements of U.S. national power in support of a national combating terrorism strategy that is based upon clear and unambiguous policy guidance. In the United States it has proven easier, and more popular politically to undertake military operations to attack and disrupt obvious terrorist targets than to initiate multilateral diplomatic and developmental efforts to win the struggle of ideology and diminish the underlying issues that terrorists seek to exploit. The military of the United States is vastly superior to the armed elements of the terrorist organizations and with the support of intelligence, financial, and law enforcement agencies, it has successfully exercised its global reach to strike terrorist bases and those governments that support terrorists. However, both history and the current

effort have shown that is rarely, if ever possible to defeat terrorism using the military alone. Moreover, the military option often entails régime change that is both a lengthy and costly process, and makes the United States vulnerable to the strategic communication of its enemies, who successfully use military intervention to recruit new terrorists.

As attractive and valuable as the attack and disrupt option may be, it fails to address the issues of regional instability that provide justification for extremist ideology. Striking deep at terrorist targets and protecting the homeland are indispensable concepts for any strategy to address terrorism, yet they do not bring the full array of U.S. interagency or partner nation resources to bear upon the problems of regional instability and ideological persuasion. To be successful, the U.S. combating terrorism policy must include the synchronized use of defense, diplomacy, and development to address the multiple elements of a combating terrorism strategy, to include the underlying conditions that foster terrorism.

The importance of addressing regional instability and the underlying conditions of terrorism was recognized by the 9/11 Commission in their report, and by the U.S. Congress. As stated by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Richard G. Lugar,

“U.S. national security interests will be threatened by sustained instability. The war on terrorism necessitates that we not leave nations crumbling and ungoverned. Our tolerance for failed states has been reduced by a global war against terrorists. We have already seen how terrorists can exploit nations afflicted by lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out such places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and tap into a black market where all kinds of weapons are for sale.”¹

The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), written by the National Security Council (NSC), was the basis upon which all agencies were to frame their concepts on how to address the terrorist threat.

¹ Richard G. Lugar, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, February 26, 2004.

The NSCT has four pillars: *defeat* terrorists and their organizations; *deny* sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; *diminish* the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and *defend* U. S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.² Known colloquially as the Four Ds, these pillars are reflected in supporting documentation to include the National Military Strategy. Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld undertook a critical review of the NSCT and the results of the ongoing global war on terror, found it wanting, and directed the Joint Staff to prepare an alternative concept. A chief requirement was that the new concept clearly establish leadership for each of its elements.

The new Defense Department concept, called the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), has three pillars: protect the homeland; disrupt and attack terrorists; and counter ideological support for terrorism.³ The latter element, the wording of which is being modified, addresses the underlying conditions of terrorism, and clarifies why diminishing these conditions is essential to winning the global struggle against the extremist ideology of terrorism. The NMSP-WOT was briefed directly to the President, who approved it. Formally adopted by Secretary Rumsfeld in March 2005, and presented by the Secretary of State at the Principals Committee meeting in May, it now appears that a form of this new document will displace the NSCT. It is expected to underpin the U.S. combating terrorism efforts for the remainder of the Bush Administration. A much needed National Security Presidential Directive that clarifies responsibilities and authorities is expected soon and will reflect the NMSP-WOT.

The importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism is nowhere more compelling than at the regional level where instability threatens U.S. national security interests. Although leaders of many terrorist organizations are from the ranks of the educated, the foot soldiers of terrorism, and the people who overthrow weak governments are often drawn from the deprived masses of failed and failing states. While the United States

² National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003: 11-12.

³ Various interviews with DOD personnel, also "Plan of attack: The Pentagon has a secret new strategy for taking on terrorists," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 1, 2005.

may have been successful in its efforts to attack and disrupt key terrorist organizations, lack of development and resulting shortfalls in the legitimacy of governance continue to provide terrorist organizations a feeding ground of frustration and futility that is replenishing their numbers faster than the United States can diminish them. This point is examined in greater detail in Chapter 2, *Ideological Support: Attacking the Critical Linkage* by Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, recently retired Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific, who said, “This war is a war of ideas, fought on a cultural frontier. Winning the hearts and minds of local populations is far more important than killing or capturing people.”⁴

If the new NMSP-WOT is to be successful in gaining the support of regional partner states then it must overcome barriers associated with the description of the enemy as the Islamic extremists. In the heavily Muslim region of South East Asia where terrorists have attacked western hotels and targeted U.S. embassies, the consistent point of contention between regional states and the United States remains the U.S. approach to combating terror. By its very phrasing, the global war on terror runs counter to the approach of the region’s governments and beliefs of their people. In the eyes of Southeast Asian states, the U.S. strategic communication concerning terrorism defines a war or “crusade,” of the largely Christian West against Islam. The constant use of the term “Islamic extremists” instead of “ideological extremists” to describe terrorists elicits emotional responses from well-educated military and civilian leaders, as well as the working-class populations of the region.⁵

The states of the region, both Muslim and Buddhist, do not perceive a significant Al Qaeda terrorist threat. They see a region of multiple separatist movements where violence has long been applied against state governments. While they acknowledge the presence of the Al Qaeda franchise Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and its well-known objective of a Muslim caliphate, they do not

⁴ Wallace C. Gregson, remarks delivered June 8, 2005 at the *Addressing the Conditions that Foster Terrorism Symposium*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

⁵ Interviews by the author with senior military leaders and the faculty of the senior service colleges of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, June 13-25, 2005.

perceive JI as a significant threat to their governments, nor do they fear JI taking over the existing separatist organizations. The governments do not want to be publicly associated with the United States in a war on terror as they believe it will erode their popularity and enhance the appeal of JI and Al Qaeda. Moreover, they believe that the United States' heavy emphasis on the attack and disrupt element of combating terrorism creates more terrorists than it eliminates and reinforces the belief in the Muslim community that the U. S. is leading a war on Islam.⁶

Instead, military and civilian leaders of the region emphasize the need for the U.S. to lead an effort to diminish the underlying conditions of terrorism and win the ideological struggle. In June 2005, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said, "I believe that we can address the problem of extremism and terrorism by delivering better and more widespread development."⁷ The moderate Abdullah pointed out that "Poverty and inequality prevails in many parts of the Muslim world with high illiteracy rates, lack of human development and poor infrastructure." In arguing that the fruits of development must be shared by all, Abdullah emphasized, "Economic success is a major factor in raising the dignity of the Muslim world and their voice at the global level."⁸ While it is increasingly popular in the United States in discussions of combating terrorism to dismiss poverty, illiteracy and lack of economic development as causes of terrorism, making the assumption that terrorists are ideologically sophisticated, educated elites, like those who attacked the trade towers, Southeast Asian leaders disagree. Republic of the Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo makes the case for a balanced approach to terrorism that emphasizes the need to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism; "We have to fight poverty in the places where they can recruit their supporters."⁹ This theme is reiterated in the Republic of the Philippines' plan for

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Speech at the United Malays National Organization Annual General Assembly, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, June 20, 2005.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ William Green, "Family Comes Last," Interview with Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. *TIME Asia*, June 6, 2005: 27.

internal security and combating terrorism document.¹⁰ This phenomenon is not limited to Southeast Asia. In the North Caucasus, where some republics have 80 percent unemployment and the per capita gross domestic product is half that of Russia, poverty and other socioeconomic issues are driving the populace into rebel organizations with ties to international Islamic terrorist groups. In the words of Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexi Malashenko, "Fundamentalist Islam is a form of social protest."¹¹ The importance of economic development to combating terrorism is made clear by Leif Rosenberger in Chapter 5, *Towards a Socio-Economic Struggle Against Violent Extremism*.

As human rights over-watch groups are quick to point out, none of the governments of Southeast Asia are reluctant to use direct military action against suspected terrorists. However, these countries recognize the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism to maintaining governmental legitimacy and denying terrorist ideology a fertile ground. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are veterans of successful campaigns against insurgency. These countries all have well-developed military programs to win the trust, confidence and respect of their people that focus on development and eradicating poverty. Malaysia, in particular, was most effective in this regard against the Communist insurgency.

Governments recognize that there is an Al Qaeda element to the terrorist organizations operating in the region. Nevertheless, they do not believe that the Al Qaeda/JI influence is as pervasive as the Western press and governments make it seem, and want to address it in their own, low-key way. The countries of the region are quite willing to work with the United States on either socioeconomic or military approaches to the terrorist threat. However, they are reluctant to accept U.S. assistance if it is to be provided in the well publicized context of a global war on terror. They will receive the assistance positively if it is packaged as part of an effort to address transna-

¹⁰ National Internal Security Plan (v4.0), Republic of the Philippines Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, Malacanang, Manila, 2004.

¹¹ Neil Buckley, "Insurgency in North Caucasus Spreads Out from Chechnya: Poverty and Heavy-handed Security Forces are Boosting Support for Islamist Rebel Groups," *Financial Times*, 9 August 2005, p4

tional threats, such as illegal arms and drugs smuggling, trade in humans, and illegal logging.¹² A particularly compelling examination of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia and the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism with the resources of the U.S. interagency community is provided in Chapter 3, *The Regional Dimension of Combating Terrorism*, by the U.S. Charge d'Affaires to Burma, Shari Villarosa.

Benefits of Addressing the Underlying Conditions

Most regions are threatened by some form of natural disaster that will require government planning and management, or the response of multiple governmental agencies, to include the military. Preparing for and properly managing these threats can build governmental and military legitimacy, win the hearts and minds of the people and deny terrorist support, resources and operating areas. The 26 December 2004 tsunami had a significant positive impact on the U.S. image and the politics of combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. No nation was harder hit than Indonesia, where the loss of human life is estimated at 131,000 with over 37,000 listed as missing. Over 450,000 remain homeless and 90,000 people are still living in refugee camps or tents.¹³ In Banda Aceh, nearly 25 percent of the 300,000 population died in the tsunami.¹⁴ Aceh Province had already suffered from years of violence associated with the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The ability of the United States and other donor countries and organizations to rapidly respond to the massive devastation and subsequently depart in a timely fashion built substantial goodwill and eroded support for the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiah. The spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir, said that as a result of the U.S. military relief effort, he was losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the people.¹⁵ Moreover, JI's legitimacy was further eroded when his predictions that Western military forces would

¹² Interviews by the author with senior military leaders and the faculty of the senior service colleges of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, June 13-25, 2005.

¹³ Tini Tran, "Road to Recovery," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 26, 2005: A6

¹⁴ Harry Bhaskara, "Acehnese Bemoan the Slow Reconstruction," *The Jakarta Post*. June 21, 2005: 5.

¹⁵ Mark Dodd, "Western Aid Winning Hearts," *News.com.au*, January 12, 2005.

use the tsunami as an excuse to establish permanent bases in the region were proven false. In polls taken in Indonesia subsequent to the relief effort, the popularity of Al Qaeda dropped 20 percent while the positive perception of the United States rose over 30 percent.¹⁶

The tsunami response demonstrated the value to combating terrorism of addressing the underlying conditions that undermine governmental legitimacy and promote the adoption of radical ideology. Governments have fallen due to their inability to respond effectively to the demands placed upon the political system by natural disasters. U.S. combatant command (COCOM) programs dedicated to building the capacity of host nation militaries to address disaster management and other underlying conditions make a major contribution to the objectives of combating terrorism. Because the threat is transnational in nature, it requires a unity of effort and dedication of interagency, international, and donor communities, which, along with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have substantial resources. The resulting lines of communication and coordination between the host nation and international and NGO organizations increases the effectiveness of the nation in addressing many other issues critical to its perceived legitimacy, builds multilateral cooperation, and decreases the potential for regional instability. Addressing these underlying conditions broadens the support to civilian authority by the military, enhancing the legitimacy of both the military and that of the newly democratic government, while promoting multinational cooperation between regional militaries. As coordinator of the capacity building effort, the U.S. combatant command gains invaluable access, influence, and the opportunity to enhance both interoperability and the capabilities of partner nation militaries.

Nowhere is the potential greater for strengthening the U.S. effort to diminish the underlying conditions of terrorism than in the area of development. Highlighted repeatedly in the U.S. National Security Strategy as a major weapon in the war on terror, the resource of development has yet to be fully integrated into the U.S. combating terrorism program. When Prime

¹⁶ Interview with Dr. Ermaya Suradinata, Governor, National Resilience Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia, June 21, 2005.

Minister Abdullah said that widespread development could address extremists and terrorism, he was not alone. The 9/11 Commission Report makes the same point, “Backward economic policies and repressive political régimes slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and national passions have no constructive outlet.”¹⁷ Lack of development creates breeding grounds for terrorism, challenges the legitimacy of governments whose economies and education systems cannot keep pace with their rapid population growth, and creates internal instability that is easily exploited by antigovernment elements and ideological extremists. Addressing the developmental needs of fragile states, particularly those with large, illiterate Muslim populations, is an effective way for the United States to deny sanctuary, recruits, and financing to terrorist organizations. In Chapter 4, *The Role of Development in Combating Terror*, Elizabeth Kvitashvili clarifies the contributions that are being made by this powerful national security resource and highlights the potential for interagency collaboration between the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U. S. Defense Department (DoD) in regions vulnerable to extremist ideology.

Strategic Communication

Perhaps the most powerful element of any effort to address the underlying conditions of terrorism is strategic communication. Correcting the perception that the United States does not value the interests of its partner countries and practices a unilateral foreign policy directed against the interests of the Muslim community will require more than action; it will require words of persuasion that reflect the regional interests of other states. The U.S. does not have a strategic communication strategy that skillfully manages its message to the world. The lead for strategic communication for the United States global war on terror has changed frequently. Numerous organizations and entities have recently been established within the U.S. government to coordinate, integrate and synchronize U.S. strategic themes and messages. Among these are the Office of Global Communication and several policy planning committees under the leadership of the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Unfortunately, and

¹⁷ 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004: 378.

for a variety of reasons, all of these have failed to implement a national strategic communication plan. In fact, a Defense Science Board study published in September 2004 states that U.S. strategic communication is “in crisis.”¹⁸ There appears to be no strategy controlling what is being developed as the informational component of the War on Terrorism. What should the U.S. message be if it is to successfully use strategic communication to fight the War on Terror?

There should be two elements to the Combating Terrorism (CT) Strategic Communication Plan: domestic and international. Although the U.S. has done well in preventing another domestic terrorist attack since September 11, 2001, other attacks are inevitable. The government needs to prepare the American people for the eventuality of another terrorist attack in order to prevent citizens from overreacting and behaving in ways that promote panic or complicate the government’s ability to manage the crisis. In addition, the administration should endeavor to promote a clear understanding of why other countries and their interests matter to the security of the United States. Popular support for international development funding has been cyclical at best and foreign aid spending is often used against congressional incumbents running for reelection. It is time to educate the American people on the substantial return on investment gleaned from the relatively modest development assistance required to diminish underlying conditions and enhance regional stability. The resulting understanding will be essential if a long-term program to combat terrorism is to be sustained.

Far more important to the U.S. combating terrorism effort is the international message. The U.S. government has characterized the current war on terror in a way that identifies the threat as exclusively Islamic, attempting to define terrorists as Islamic extremists willing to use violence for political ends. This characterization suggests that religion is the basis of terror and greatly complicates the ability of the U.S. to reach out to moderate Muslims whom strategists view as the center of gravity in the War on Terror. This characterization limits the focus of terror to Islamic organizations

¹⁸ *Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington DC, December 2004: 71.

with a global reach while ignoring regional organizations that use terror as a weapon and the organized crime, drug, and illegal arms organizations whose lines of communication support Islamic terrorists.

In order to win the struggle of ideologies, the Strategic Communication Plan needs to fight the world's perception that the West is undertaking a war on Islam and which sees the U.S. as an avenger rather than a champion of human rights and democracy. Because the message is framed by U.S. strategic documents, language such as, "The United States and its partners will disrupt and degrade the ability of terrorists to act, and compel supporters of terrorism to cease and desist,"¹⁹ should be avoided. Instead framers of the Strategic Communication Plan should be circumspect in how they communicate the message while seeking regional cultural perspectives and asking moderate Muslim leaders what form it must take and substance it must contain if it is to help them stand against the appeal of radical ideology. Currently, Egypt provides critical support to the U.S. mission of projecting power overseas; will Egypt be willing to execute this mission in a few years? The primary enablers for the international CT effort are the friends and allies of the United States. If U.S. policies and the Strategic Communication Plan are not maintaining those partnerships, there will be trouble ahead.

Because the Strategic Communication Plan must address the long, as well as the short term dimensions of the CT effort, its tenets should influence the development and execution of other CT activities. As with all political activities, it should: capture the moral high ground; be explained relentlessly; win critical allies to the U.S. side; and guide the planning of all elements of national power. If the United States executes a Strategic Communication Plan against terrorism with the priority, accountability, and thoroughness of the effort to reform social security, it will enjoy overwhelming success against extremist ideology.

¹⁹ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003: 15.

Interagency Process

There are several things that can be done to improve the interagency CT process. One could argue that the War on Terror is less about military actions and more about criminal activities with political purpose. U.S. National Security architecture was not organized for this purpose. An excellent summary of the need to modernize this architecture and facilitate the interagency process is provided by Clark Murdock and Michele Fluorney in Chapter 6, *Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus*. To be successful without a further, large scale reorganization of government, several elements must be in place. Any combating terrorism strategy must be based upon a clear and marketable vision. The supporting strategies should look into the future and identify proactive measures that will aggressively bring the vision to fruition using all of the elements of national power. Strong leadership must come from the highest level, naming a clear leader of the CT effort with the authority to hold the interagency community accountable for executing these proactive tenets. If this is not done, then the War on Terror will be reactive, unsuccessful and the generator of unintended economic, ideological and political consequences that will hurt other U.S. interests. Moreover, a reactive strategy results in failures that create intense public pressure for new organizations intended to correct the failures. All too often, these organizations complicate an already complex architecture, dilute the application of scarce resources and become another ineffective element of bureaucracy. Chapter 8, *Strengthening the Interagency and Maximizing its Effort in Combating Terrorism*, by Bert Tussing, examines the process for coordinating the U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism and identifies new ideas for maximizing cooperation within the interagency community.

Long term strategic planning in support of a national CT vision, requires that principal leaders focus on long-term threats to U.S. national security interests. The trend in recent years had been for the highest level leaders to spend a disproportionate amount of their time managing crises. This is due in part, to the “CNN effect”. The focus of the media on the crisis of the day, and the fact that many lawmakers run for office on a platform of domestic issues first, means that it is difficult to develop the political will and capital

to address long-term foreign policy issues, such as combating terrorism. This approach ensures a reactive effort that is doomed to failure. Success requires the use of the corporate model, wherein companies regularly hold-off sites to identify future threats and create strategic plans that array corporate resources to achieve the corporate vision and deal with these threats. Crisis management should be delegated down, freeing up top-level leader time to address long term threats and keep a crisis from occurring. The importance of strategic planning in the process for combating terrorism is articulated in Chapter 7, *Strategies for the War on Terrorism*. This chapter examines existing and evolving strategies for the war on terrorism and develops the recommendations to improve them.

With the current reorganization of the NSC, and the ongoing Principals' Committee meetings to address CT policy, the potential exists for the NSC to establish itself as the strong leader of the U.S. CT process. A reorganized and prioritized U.S. CT process will allow for a proactive approach and the effective use of all elements of national power. This is essential if the U.S. is to focus on other, salient emerging threats that are potentially much more significant to U.S. national security. The world is getting more complicated and organizing the proactive management of such emerging threats as China, South America, Taiwan and Africa will require a national security community focus that is not constantly distracted by the terrorist threat.

The success or failure of any efforts to improve the interagency process in dealing with CT will be determined at the regional level where the execution and impact of policy will be measured. Executing proactive CT measures at a regional level will require deftness and the authority to overcome a country-centric diplomatic structure. A regional ombudsman with significant political stature and close ties to the President may be required to overcome the state focus, provide the pull from the region necessary to overcome bureaucratic inertia in Washington, and ensure a transnational focus. This person would work closely with the regional bureaus but ultimately be responsible for crafting strategies that utilize a menu of interagency CT capabilities to deal with the terrorist threat as it is manifest within that unique region and multilateral in nature. Regardless of who leads, measures of effectiveness should be emplaced to identify elements of the strategies with

potential. How can the United States best design a regional strategy process and allocate the most appropriate elements of national power against the terrorist threat? In chapter 9, *A Process for Regional Cooperation*, Dennis Murphy and John Traylor provide broad recommendations to improve the regional CT process and overcome obstacles to translating interagency cooperation within the Beltway to cooperative efforts in the field.

Summary

The Cold War was won with a balanced strategy that emphasized diplomacy, economic might, intelligence, strategic communication and development to win the ideological battle, as much as it was by military might. The early U.S. effort to defeat terrorism with military action sent a strong signal and partially decapitated the highest profile terrorist organizations. However, the limits to this approach are now widely recognized and a new strategy and interagency process are guiding the most informed efforts to enhance the U.S. CT process. The new strategy recognizes that the essential ideological struggle can only succeed if the United States addresses the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and wins the battle for trust, confidence and respect of the regional states. Such an emphasis will also create regional stability, preserve newly democratic states, and build legitimacy for those governments and the ideology of freedom and democracy. This volume reflects an effort to encourage informed discussions on the importance of addressing the underlying conditions of terrorism and how the U.S. interagency community could most effectively use the elements of national power to successfully combat terrorism. The Principals Committee is meeting to determine the policy and strategy of the second G.W. Bush administration's CT effort. These meetings are taking place at a time of change and recognition that the struggle against terrorism will require diplomatic and developmental programs as well as the indispensable military dimension, and the support of partner nations. New organizations such as the National Counterterrorism Center; the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State Department; and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation of USAID have been created to deal with elements of combating terrorism, and their most effi-

cient application is being discussed at the highest levels. Moreover, the new administration has evidenced a renewed interest in working with friends and allies to develop cooperative approaches to common national security threats. The authors of this volume hope that its findings will make a positive contribution to these processes.

Dr. Kent Butts is Director, National Security Issues Branch, Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.